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Abstract 
 
This study is about the organisation of agricultural production and the distribution of water 
for agriculture in the post-soviet context of a slowly reforming authoritarian regime. The 
study is based on 12 months of field research conducted between February 2005 and 
October 2006 in the irrigation and drainage network of Khorezm province, Uzbekistan. 
Four WUAs were selected as case studies. The concrete methods deployed for the fieldwork 
were (1) direct observations of objects, events, procedures, and social interactions; (2) semi- 
and non-structured interviews with key informants; and (3) a household survey. 
The studied situation is characterised by reforms that echo the sound of privatisation 
and neo-liberal reform, while in practice central planning and state control have shown to be 
persistent, though not unchanging. By moving from collective farming to household-based 
fermer enterprises, for the individual risks and benefits in agricultural production have 
increased. The logics of agricultural production are further discussed along the lines of the 
three forms of production that were distinguished in this study. They are the state-ordered form 
of production (of cotton and wheat), the commercial form of production (of mainly rice and 
fodder) and the household form of production (of a variety of food products for home 
consumption). Each form of production has its specific form of organisation of inputs, 
labour, state control, distribution of benefits, and marketing. 
The main question addressed in this study is how the implemented land and water 
reforms affect the distribution of water. In Khorezm water is relatively abundant available, 
which eases the task of water distribution. In combination with a historic trajectory of 
collective agriculture and the continuation of a restrictive political regime this created a 
situation in which social dynamics between water users are not strongly articulated. The 
three forms of production each have their own ‘logic’ as regards water management; for state-
ordered cotton fermers call on the state organisations, for commercial rice fermers depend on 
their personal connections, and for household production water uses are small and informal. 
The household production water users are politically ‘untouchable’ in a way as household 
production provides for the basic livelihood security of the majority of the rural population. 
The Uzbek government has top-down established WUAs in place of the former 
collective farms. Formally they are user-managed organisations, but in practice they are 
strictly controlled by the state. Among other things the WUAs fulfil important roles in the 
implementation of (state) control over water distribution and agricultural production. 
Farmers strategise in different ways to secure their access to water, in which they makes use 
of their socio-political status and ties and of the spatial and technological situation of the 
field. 
The way the irrigation system has been designed and constructed during the period 
of the USSR expresses the existence of unquestioned centralised managerial control and 
singularity of purpose, allowing a fully pragmatic and instrumental approach to layout and 
hydraulic design. The strict state control over cropping patterns and agricultural practices at 
field level, combined with authoritarian control of society and minimal personal interests in 
increased water use, and an abundance of water created a situation in which there was no 
need for irrigation technology that restricted water use. In the context of increased dynamics 
over water distribution at the WUA level, the role of technology is gaining in importance, 
not only in the dynamics between farmers, but also in that between the state on the one 
hand and farmers on the other. 
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1.1. Introduction 
 
Soviet planners consciously sacrificed the water of the Aral Sea for developing irrigated 
agriculture in the upstream areas of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya basins (Micklin, 1985; 
Zonn, 1999; Peachey, 2004). As a result the Aral Sea has been shrinking drastically at least 
since the 1960s, but (internationally) the alarm bells only started ringing in the late 1980s 
(Micklin, 1988). The diversion of this water has led to many adverse effects; the loss of 
fisheries and wildlife, frequent dust storms in the region causing respiratory and other 
diseases, and climatic change (colder winters, hotter summers and a shorter frost free period) 
(Glantz, 1999). Restoring the Aral Sea seems highly unlikely, and, even if restored, most of 
the caused damage will not be reversed. Now, if the diversion of irrigation water has caused 
and still causes so many negative effects that can not be undone, at least the water that is still 
being diverted is better used for good purposes. 
The irrigation water used in Khorezm Province, Uzbekistan (see figure 1.1) is 
diverted from the Amu Darya, a few hundred kilometres upstream of the outflow into the 
Aral Sea. A large number of households make a living out of this. On satellite images 
Khorezm shows as a green spot in the desert, thanks to the Amu Darya, or Aral Sea, water. 
This study looks at water distribution processes between farmers and the state in Khorezm 
Province, Uzbekistan. The context is that of a slowly reforming authoritarian post-soviet 
regime. It is about continuity and change1 in the Khorezmian agrarian structure. The politics 
of state control show continuity, while institutional arrangement of agricultural production 
are changing, i.e. ‘private farmers’ (fermers) and Water Users Associations (WUAs) have been 
established. These reforms lead to new dynamics in distribution of water and to new 
patterns of water use. Water distribution is strongly integrated with the organization of 
agricultural production and the two are studied together. 
After the collapse of the USSR and Uzbekistan’s independence, the country’s 
government has been looking for new organizational forms for agricultural production. The 
individualization of farming through the formation of fermer enterprises, in combination with 
continuing state control of agricultural production, has led to changing demands on the 
irrigation system. Next to the production of cotton (under state control), which since long 
has consumed a lot of water, the production of rice (for private cash) and household 
production (for subsistence) have become consumers of large amounts of water.  
The relation between cotton and rice production perfectly reflects the relation 
between emerging forms of private production and state controlled production. The study of 
water distribution processes provides a good entrance to studying this relation, as cotton and 
rice have very different and often conflicting water management requirements and different 
(private vs state) benefits. The state control over water distribution is firmly embedded in a 
set of control mechanisms that is wider than control over water in the strict technical sense. 
Without understanding the control mechanisms, the dynamics over water cannot be 
understood.  
The irrigation technology in place reflects the state socialist way of production and 
has changed little to adapt to the gradually changing institutional situation. This complicates 
the distribution of water and the development of new water management institutions.  
 
                                                 
1 This conceptualisation is based on Jones Luong (2002). 
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The main research question answered in this study is as follows: 
 
How is the network of relations around agricultural production and the distribution 
of water between rural workers, fermers, WUA managers, State actors and irrigation 
technologies changing in response to the recent and ongoing land and water reforms 
in Khorezm, Uzbekistan? 
 
 
1.2. The frame of this study 
 
The research has been conducted within the scope of three-party agreement between the 
German Ministry of Education represented by the Centre for Development Research (ZEF), 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), and the 
Givernment of Uzbekistan represented by the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources 
(MAWR). The project developed under this agreement is entitled “Economic and ecological 
restructuring of land and water use in Khorezm”. The project started its work in 2001, and 
aims at increasing the efficiency of human and natural resource use in the Khorezm region 
(Vlek at al., 2001). In line with ZEF’s objectives the project has explicitly adopted an 
integrated, multidisciplinary approach. This study is the main output of one of the modules 
within this project. The module has been organised as a PhD research within ZEF’s 
Department of Political and Cultural Change. As such it builds on earlier project modules 
within the social sciences component (Wall, 2006; Zavgordnyaya, 2006; Trevisani, 
forthcoming 2008). It also aims to build links to the research on water management in the 
natural science component (e.g. Akramkhanov, 2005; Ibrakhimov, 2005; Forkutsa, 2006; 
Conrad, 2006) and the economic component of the project (Mueller, 2006; Bobojanov, 
forthcoming).  
The research included 12 months of field research that was conducted in five periods 
between February 2005 and October 2006. The fieldwork location was the irrigation and 
drainage network of Khorezm Province (Oblast/Viloyat), Uzbekistan (Figure 1.1). Within this 
area four Water Users Associations (WUAs) were selected as case studies (Figure 1.2). The 
selection criteria and research methodology are discussed in Chapter 2. 
The fieldwork for this study was conducted only in Khorezm Province. The analysis 
is based on the developments observed there. There will probably be many similarities with 
situations throughout Uzbekistan, as confirmed by responses of people with experiences in 
other parts of the country. For me it is not possible to assess what aspects of this study can 
and what aspects cannot be extrapolated to the rest of the country. Still, the identified 
mechanisms and processes are sometimes regarded and formulated as ‘Uzbekistani 
developments’. For instance when I discuss how the WUA as a governance model is applied 
I refer to it as the ‘Uzbekistani WUA’. It should be realised that this based on field research 
in Khorezm. The four WUAs that I studied in detail are possibly not representative for the 
whole of Uzbekistan, but still they are besides being Khorezmian WUAs, also Uzbekistani 
WUAs. On aspects where I was aware that the situation in Khorezm is clearly different from 
large parts of Uzbekistan I explicitly made this clear.  
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Figure 1.1 – Uzbekistan in Central Asia 
Khorezm Province is located in the circle 
Source: adapted from www.eurasianet.org/images/central_asia.jpg 
 
Figure 1.2 – The four case study WUAs and Urgench city in Khorezm Province 
(1) Karmish WUA, (2) Chikirchi-Angarik WUA, (3) Madir-Yap WUA, (4) Tagalak-Yap WUA and (5) 
Urgench city 
Source: own compilation from GIS data of the ZEF/UNESCO project 
(1) 
(2) 
(3)
(5) 
(4) 
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1.3. Conceptual framework  
 
This section provides the conceptual foundation of this study by discussing the state of the 
art of relevant fields of research and distilling the concepts relevant for analysing the case 
under scrutiny. Also it can be seen as a description of my basic understanding of how things 
work, or in grand terms: my world view. It consists of three parts. 
 
(1) Sub-section 1.3.1 is about the Uzbek state in transition, i.e. a broad discussion on the 
meaning of what is transition, the essence of state socialism and the trajectories of 
countries moving away from it. This transition process is both political and 
economic. Here the interest is in developing a useful set of concepts to interpret the 
Uzbek development model. This systematic application is done Chapter 3, but in all 
chapters that follow the topic of transition comes back. 
(2) The second debate that I engage with is that of the organization of agriculture (and 
irrigation). Two theories are discussed; the labour process approach and the theory 
of the technological-administrative task environment (TATE). These are then 
applied to agriculture in transition. The debate is further operationalised at the start 
of Chapter 4 and elaborated into a model for understanding the agricultural 
production in Khorezm. The subsequent chapters all build on that understanding. 
(3) In the third and last subsection (1.3.3) the subject of the socio-technical nature of 
irrigation and technology is addressed. It consists of the discussion of the technology 
debate, the elaboration of an interdisciplinary framework for the analysis of irrigation 
management, and the discussion of the theory of access. Chapters 5 to 7 all address 
issues within this. 
 
 
1.3.1. Transition and transformation 
Since the forced independence at the collapse of the Soviet Union Uzbekistan has been in a 
process of change from state socialism into something else. Analytically this process of 
transition can be split into a political and an economic process, which are however closely 
related. The usual term for this change process, ‘transition’, does not reveal much. The real 
question is to what kind of transformations of political and economic relations this leads. In 
many countries for years there has been only limited change, i.e. transition of terminology 
without transformation of social relations of production. 
In this section first it is explored what the state socialist development model actually 
entailed, i.e. the initial conditions are determined. The changes since independence are 
analysed in separate sections on political and economic change. It seeks to characterise the 
Uzbek governance model and identifies in what ways it differs from the Soviet model. The 
section about economic change elaborates the different aspects of economic reform and the 
nature of a transition economy. 
 
The regulation approach 
Before turning to the defining of transition, I first look at the situation of departure, the 
socialist ‘development model’, a concept that stems from ‘regulation theory’ or the 
‘regulation approach’ (RA). The RA is a set of approaches and ideas that emerged from 
Marxist studies on the development of capitalism (Jessop, 1990; 1995; 2001; MacLeod, 
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1997). There are three central concepts in the RA; ‘accumulation regime’, ‘mode of 
regulation’, and ‘model of development’. An accumulation regime is “a complementary 
pattern of production and consumption that is reproducible over a long period” (Jesop, 
2001:8). It mainly concerns the macro-economy. An accumulation regime is stabilised by a 
mode of regulation, which is “an emergent ensemble of norms, institutions, organisational 
forms, social networks, and patterns of conduct” (ibid.). When an accumulation regime and a 
mode of regulation for a long time constitute a stable situation this can be called a model of 
development. This is “a holistic concept that attempts to depict the economy in its most 
inclusive or integral sense” (ibid.). Added to these three concepts could be the ‘labour 
process model’ or the ‘industrial paradigm’. This defines how labour is divided, both 
technically and socially. One example of such a paradigm is mass production. 
The way in which the economy and production were organised in the USSR can be 
characterised as a ‘state socialist development model’. It consisted of four essential elements. 
 
(1) Its predominantly extensive regime of accumulation;  
(2) Its bureaucratic mode of regulation based on central planning;  
(3) Its labour process model based on ‘bureaucratic despotism’ and ‘authoritarian 
paternalism’; and  
(4) Its hegemonic bloc based on the Communist Party hegemony over political, social and 
cultural life to stabilize and protect the state socialist development model. 
(Pavlinek, 2003:103; italics in original) 
 
The extensiveness of the accumulation regime lies mainly in the extensive ways in which 
production increase was sought, i.e. through a longer work day, expanding the size of the 
labour force and organisational transformations (ibid.). Furthermore it is characterised by a 
situation of labour surplus that is anyhow put to work (Burawoy, 1990:164). One of the 
articulations of authoritarian paternalism lies in the use of soft budget constraints, i.e. inputs 
and outputs are negotiable and enterprises cannot go bankrupt as arrangements will be taken 
to make sure that they can continue (Kornai at al., 2003). The stability of development 
model was aided by the glue of a communist ideology taking shape in a political party with 
strong hegemonic tendencies.  
The nature of the socialist system comes out even clearer in comparison with the capitalist 
system. In figure 1.3 this comparison is made by Kornai (2000). The characteristics 
mentioned in the boxes 1 to 3 are the ones that determine the nature of the system, while 
those in boxes 4 and 5 are more the expressions and effects of the former. 
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Figure 1.3 – Model of the Socialist and Capitalist Systems (Kornai, 2000) 
 
The collapse of the state socialist development model has required a new political as well as a 
new economic order, which to different degrees indeed emerged in the former states of the 
USSR. 
 
Political change 
Even though the collapse of the Soviet Union created the potential for radical change in 
most of the Central Asian republics a change of ideology or “framing” took place, and not 
so much a change of the governance patterns. The leaders of the Central Asian states have 
not rejected, but rather strategically incorporated many of the mechanisms of the Soviet 
governance model. After all, the ruling elites came to power through the Soviet system and, 
with exception of the Kyrgyz leader Akaev, had opposed Gorbachev’s efforts to reform and 
welcomed the reactionary coup attempted in August 1991 (Merry, 2004:31). 
The Central Asian states can be characterised as ‘hyper-stable’. In 2004 the only 
successor states of the former socialist block not to have changed regime once were all 
Central Asian states. In Kazkhstan and Uzbekistan still there has not been any regime 
change. 
Jones Luong (2004) argues that the totalitarian state model has often been fit too 
easily on the Central Asian states. She especially opposes the typical dichotomization into 
‘state’ and ‘society’, which either suggests complete social control or a suppressed 
‘traditional’ society. The Soviet regime purposefully blurred the boundaries between and 
state and society; there was no separate sphere of the development of ideas or expectations, 
political and economic elites were the same and the distinction between public and private 
property was blurred. As a result the collapse of the Soviet regime could also not be 
celebrated as liberation from oppression, as was the case with the independence of colonial 
states, but rather the collapse was experienced as an internal crisis (Merry, 2004:31). The 
blurred boundary between state and society still plays an important role, especially because 
state officials usually have multiple roles in society (next to their official job they are for 
instance also fermer, prominent villager, and political party member). When they act it is not 
clear in what capacity they do that. Similarly, all businessmen are people that have a role in 
the political or state hierarchy too. 
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Part of the Soviet legacy are strong regionally based patronage networks. In the post-
independence period regionalism has only become stronger. The power shifts between 
regional and central elites are directly related to the change in access to, and control over 
material resources, like land and water (Ilkhamov, 2004; Jones Luong, 2004). What Burawoy 
(2001) describes for post-Soviet Russia, is recognisable in Uzbekistan too “Regional taxes are 
often paid in kind so that the government recreates its own clearing house, a centre for the 
redistribution of resources, what one might call a return to a rudimentary and hidden 
planning system”. 
Uzbekistan inherited the mechanisms of a modern authoritarian police state from the 
USSR. Since independence Uzbekistan has used the existing structures and institutions to 
control developments in the country at various levels. For instance the creation of 
knowledge and its management (Wall, 2006) and the development and implementation of 
policies are firmly controlled by the state. The latter is clearly observable in the management 
of land and water (Zavgorodnyaya, 2006; Yalcin and Mollinga 2007a and b; Trevisani, 2007a; 
2007b; forthcoming 2008). 
All Central Asian states have created institutions that make them (at least on paper) 
constitutional democracies. In practice however governance is of a personalised and 
hierarchical nature – the position in the hierarchy is more important than the formalised 
rules and procedures on who decides what. Typically a regional governor can interfere in 
issues that actually fall under the jurisdiction of the branch offices of ministries. The regional 
governors are directly appointed by the president and thus generally stand higher in the 
hierarchy. 
Soft budget constraints are used for keeping financial pressure on and control over 
businesses as well as state organisations. A similar sort of mechanism exists in the enforcing 
of rules, which is done seemingly arbitrarily; certain rules apply for some but not for others. 
There are so many and such strict rules that it is hardly possibly to operate fully legal. 
Whether this situation is used against a person depends on personal criteria rather than the 
rule of law. This creates relations of fear and forced loyalty. 
Merry (2004) likens the Central Asian model of governance to what in Africa is called 
the “Big Man” regime type. 
 
Such regimes do not distinguish public from private wealth, transforming corruption 
from a form of social deviance into effective state policy. These regimes maintain 
political control by strictly limiting participation in the political process; by extending 
state authority over a wide range of civil institutions, including business, labor unions, 
organized religion and the media. 
Merry (2004:30) 
 
We can call this type of statehood neo-patrimonial, after the concept of patrimonialism that 
was developed by Max Weber to describe a (feudal) system of personal rule in which the 
ruler dispenses offices and benefits to subordinates in return for loyalty, support and services 
(Weber, [1914] 1978:1031 in Ikpe, 2000). He discerned five characteristics of a patrimonial 
state: 
 
1. The government is based on a personal ruler; 
2. There is lack of separation between the public and private realms for state officials; 
3. Political offices are regarded as fiefdoms and patronage by state officials; 
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4. The system operates primarily through numerous patron-client networks; and 
5. The exercise of public authority is utilized to serve the rulers and officials on which 
the offices are bestowed. 
 
Thus, post-Soviet Uzbekistan can be characterised as a neo-patrimonial state with an 
authoritarian regime and strong patterns of regionalism. 
 
Economic change 
Gorbachev in his speech to industrial executives in December 1990: ‘property relations are 
the core of radical economic reform. It was necessary to awaken people’s interest, to give 
them some motivation for increasing production … There is no other way. Therefore, by 
the way, planning had to be relaxed in order to give enterprises oxygen and economic 
freedom … Once there are owners, there must also be space in which they can operate … a 
market.’ (cited in Clarke, 1992). This speech, which was given following a period of 
increasing internal pressure for economic reform in the USSR, was the starting shot for such 
reform. What followed was the hasty dismantling of the state socialist command economic 
system, and the collapse of the Soviet Union about a year after this speech was given.  
 
Objects of change 
The quote from Gorbachev’s speech shows that right from the beginning of the FSU’s 
economic reforms these aimed at changing property relations (i.e. the introduction of private 
property) and the introduction of markets as a regulatory system.  
The reform of command economies does not automatically lead to modern style capitalism. 
Reforms can be partial and are usually mixed with patterns of the past. Transformation 
processes are strongly influenced by the past, i.e. existing patterns of organisation and 
behaviour are not suddenly changed (Pavlinek, 2003). Burawoy (2001) shows this for 
Russia’s development. He discusses how the transition to a market economy in Russia is not 
accompanied by a transformation similar to that of England’s Great Transformation2, which is 
often considered to be the origin of modern capitalism. According to Burawoy (ibid.) there 
is transition to a market without the wider societal transformation that characterised the 
developments in 19th century England. The transformation of how production is organised 
is limited, there is a lack of the rise of a vibrant society and regional and informal systems 
remain important to the cost of the national system.  
In a study on transitions in agriculture in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), East 
Asia (China and Vietnam) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Swinnen 
and Rozelle (2006) identify three main areas of economic reform that underlie agricultural 
transition; (1) shifts in price and subsidy policies, (2) property rights reforms and farm 
restructuring, and (3) market liberalisation. These areas of reform have been approached 
differently by the former state socialist states; reforms were different in form, combination 
and sequence. The dilemma in reforming centrally planned economies boiled down to ‘shock 
therapy’ versus guided (or ‘gradualist’) reform strategies (Ho and Spoor, 2006:580). 
In comparison with the CEE and East Asian countries the CIS countries generally 
stand out as slow reformers. Shifts in price and subsidies in the CIS countries involved the 
reduction of subsidies on inputs and the lowering of output prices that had been artificially 
kept high. With regard to property right reforms and farm restructuring most CIS countries 
                                                 
2 With reference to Karl Polanyi’s seminal work The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our 
Time, 1944. 
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took a gradual approach3. As a first step state farms were transformed into collectives, which 
in a second step were supposed to be given to individuals. The latter step was often not 
taken and people only received “paper shares” that did not establish a direct link between 
the individual and a specific land plot. Regarding market liberalisation and the establishment 
of market institutions the CIS countries were also slow to start (especially in comparison to 
the CEE countries), but since the late 1990s change in some countries has picked up 
(Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004). 
Could the CIS region be characterised as generally slow in adopting reforms, within 
that group of states Uzbekistan can be characterised as a particularly slow reformer (Pomfret 
1999 and 2000; Spoor and Visser, 2001; Bloch, 2002; Auty, 2003; Gleason, 2004). Yet on 
economic performance Uzbekistan scored very well in comparison to the other CIS 
countries (Spoor and Visser, 2001; Ho and Spoor, 2006). In agriculture country-wide 
privatisation of land only took off in 2005, and then only partially (Trevisani, 2007a; 2007b; 
forthcoming 2008), the centralised planning remained largely intact, and prices remained 
heavily controlled (Macours and Swinnen, 2004). 
The studies discussed above are mainly about economic measures underpinning 
transition of the economy. However, it would be naively simplistic to think that the 
introduction of markets and private property would by itself lead to the transition from state 
socialist economies to modern capitalist economies. Pavlinek (2003:87) correctly noticed that 
at the start of reforms many individuals, communities and even entire regions were locked in 
the pre-existing system of state socialist social and economic relations. “As a result, the state 
socialist social practices and attitudes were mixed with the post socialist present to create a 
hybrid that represented neither state socialism nor capitalism”.  
 
Diversities in the transition economy 
This gradual change process has led to an economic situation that is atypical and reflects 
characteristics of both market and plan economies. For both the Soviet Union and post-
Soviet states often a dual economy model is proposed as a framework of analysis. The 
economy is perceived to be separated in a state and household sector, or a formal and a 
black economy that is sometimes also referred to as a first and second economy. 
Ilkhamov (2000 in Rasanayagam, 2002) for instance proposes to understand 
Uzbekistan through a dual economy model that is made up of a command-type economy 
aiming at export, which is controlled by central government, and a free market economy 
based on household production. Each sector would be operating according to its own logic 
while at the same time being interconnected. According to Rasanayagam (2002) even those 
that employ dual economy models usually recognise the mutual dependent relation between 
state and household production and that the one cannot do without the other. Of particular 
transactions it is often impossible to distinguish whether it was part of the formal or the 
informal economy, as they are only ideal types that do not make up two sectors. They are 
rather two aspects of one economy (Kotkin, 1995 in Rasanayagam, 2002). 
Smith and Stenning (2006) presents a more complete and sophisticated framework to 
conceptualise the hybrid nature of transition economies. They “argue that capitalist 
development in postsocialist societies should be seen as one part of a diverse economy, 
constituted by a host of economic practices articulated with one another in dynamic and 
complex ways” (ibid., p.190). They pose that in post-socialist economies there are three sorts 
                                                 
3 Armenia is a notable exception and even among the slowly reforming countries there were notable 
differences. 
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of economic practices; those involving market relations, those involving non-market 
relations and those involving quasi-market relations (see Table 1.1).  
 
Transactions are 
organized through 
Labour organisation 
(forms of rewarding) 
Organisational 
form/economic model 
Market relations 
- Traders 
- Local markets 
Wage 
- Permanent employment 
- Day labourers 
Capitalist 
- Demand and supply 
driven price equilibriums
Alternative market relations 
- Local trading systems 
- Alternative currencies 
- Black market 
Alternative paid 
- Cooperative 
- Self-employed 
- Indentured 
Alternative Capitalist 
- Environmental ethic 
- Social ethic 
Non-market relations 
- Barter 
- Household flows 
- Gifts 
Unpaid 
- Volunteer 
- Homework 
- Family care 
Non-Capitalist 
- Communal 
- Self-employed 
- Feudal 
- Slave 
Table 1.1 – A diverse economy 
Source: adapted from Smith and Stenning (2006) 
 
The ‘model’ as proposed by Smith and Stenning does not provide a separate category for 
rudiments of the socialist plan economy. In the case of Uzbekistan one could therefore add 
an extra row to the table, which would refer to ‘state planning’. Formally this is a non-
capitalist form of organisation and it could be brought under that heading. However, its 
rationale is different from what is understood as non-market relations in the model. This is 
elaborated in Chapter 4. 
In their article Smith and Stenning (ibid., p. 208) conclude that “the market, the non-
market and the quasi-market are complexly articulated, not as separate spheres, but […] in 
plural relationship with one another in the creation and reproduction of diverse economies”. 
With the addition of ‘state planning’ as a form on its own, the principle is applicable to the 
analysis of the Uzbek rural economy. In the post-socialist society no longer the factory (or 
the LFE) is pivotal in production, but rather the household. Households engage in different 
relations at the same time and thus are a place of integration of the three sorts of practices. 
Smith and Stenning (ibid.) stress that besides the household there are other spaces of 
integration. In the case of Uzbekistan these could be recognised in the extended family, the 
neighbourhood, the village, as well as in the district and in rural-urban connections. 
 
 
1.3.2. The organisation of agriculture 
Agriculture is a production process where land, capital and labour by the use of technology 
transform natural processes into value-added products. The soviet organisation of 
(agricultural) production was radically different from that of a capitalist enterprise. 
Moreover, the soviet (collective) enterprise was not simply an economic institution, but it 
was the primary unit of soviet society, and the ultimate base of social and political power 
(Clarke, 1992). 
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The way in which production is organised can be conceptualised in various ways. In 
the selection of an appropriate theory the starting point was that it should help to gain 
insight in the political-economic nature of the process. One of the theories that are deployed 
in this thesis is the (neo-)Marxist labour process approach that puts the organisation of 
labour and the relations and forces of production central in the analysis. Another theory 
offering a relevant conceptual framework is that of the Technological-Administrative Task 
Environment (in short: TATE), which focuses on how relations external to the farm 
enterprise, through administrative mechanisms and control over technologies influence the 
production process.  
Both theories, labour process approach and TATE, will be discussed in a sub-section 
below. In a final subsection these concepts are then applied to transition agriculture in order 
to point to the major relevant processes at work in the research area. 
 
The labour process approach 
Marx (1999/1867) recognised that labour is “a process in which both man and Nature 
participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material 
re-actions between himself and Nature”. And thus he conceptualises the (agricultural) labour 
process to consist of three elements: (1) human effort, i.e. work itself, (2) technology (“the 
instrument of labour”) and (3) the objects that are transformed in the process. In the process 
the objects (or inputs) are transformed into valued end-products, i.e. the process of the 
production of an added “use-value”. As Marx (1999/1867) puts it: “Labour has incorporated 
itself with its subject: the former is materialised, the latter transformed”. 
Marx addressed the question to what happens if a person works for somebody else. 
In capitalism labour-power is sold by the worker, whereas the capitalist (the owner of the 
means of production) owns the product and thus appropriates the created added value. 
Typically the product will be sold for a higher price than the costs for the inputs (including 
labour) and thus the capitalist abstracts surplus value and accumulates capital4. Also the 
Soviet state socialist systems had an organised ‘regime of accumulation’, which was related to 
the way in which the labour process was organised.  
Tensions will surface between workers and controllers of the production process. In 
response people develop control systems so as to reduce the conflict. These control systems 
are the mechanisms utilized to organize work. Edwards (1979, as for instance discussed in 
Mitchell, 1981 and Garza Toledo 1996) recognised three functions; (1) the direction; (2) the 
evaluation; and (3) the discipline. In addition he argued that this took shape in three modes 
of control: (1) direct control in which an owner sought control through direct contact with 
the production process and the workers; (2) technical control, exercised through machines; 
and (3) bureaucratic control, exercised through rules, regulations and organisations. 
These ideas partly overlapped with Braverman’s (1974) systemisation of the 
functions of the organisation of the labour process in a capitalist form. He argued that there 
are three main functions: (1) “the separation of hand and brain”, division of manual labour 
and intellectual labour, (2) alienation of worker from the product, the process, and other 
workers and (3) subordination to capital (including subordination to the instruments of 
work, i.e. machines). 
Burawoy (1985) distinguished between internal and external relations of production (or as 
Burawoy refers to them: relations in production and relations of production). The internal 
                                                 
4 This is very much a simplification of Marx’ analysis, which by itself is very abstract. However, Marx’ analysis 
is clearly written and provides for a fundamental understanding of the role of labour in the production process. 
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relations of production are the relations on the shop floor; the external relations are the 
relations to the market and the wider structures of surplus abstraction. Though exploitation 
is partly visible on the shop floor, to a large extent “the relations in production are dislocated 
from the relations of production” (ibid. p.32). And through this “the obscuring and securing 
of surplus value” (ibid. p.35) is accomplished. 
The interactions at the shop floor (or at the agricultural field for that matter) take shape 
within the structural embedding of the production regime; i.e. labour processes under 
capitalist production are different from labour processes under state socialist production. 
However, the labour process is not merely an articulation of the production regime. There is 
not a capitalist labour process, but rather labour processes in capitalist societies (Burawoy, 
1985: 14); relations in production also reflect other socio-political and technical realities. 
Most of the work on the labour process and production regimes concerns cases under 
capitalism. The case under scrutiny in this study is agriculture in Uzbekistan in the period of 
transition from state socialism into something else. Therefore the comparative analysis of 
factory regimes under capitalism and socialism in ‘The Politics of Production: Factory 
Regimes under Capitalism and Socialism’, published by Michael Burawoy in 1985 (Burawoy, 
1985), is a welcome exception to the bulk of work. On the state socialist enterprise he 
analyses (ibid, p.15):  
 
Instead of the private appropriation and distribution of surplus through a market, the 
state socialist enterprise faces central appropriation and redistribution. Instead of 
competition among firms in the pursuit of profit, state socialist firms bargain with 
central planning agencies.  
 
The organisation of production in Uzbekistan is no longer of this socialist nature, yet there 
are still clear remnants of the system. Applying the labour process approach to 2005-2006 
situations in Uzbekistan, as is done in the remainder of this study, resulted in similar 
characterisations of this post-socialist form of organisation, which is neither state socialist 
nor capitalist.  
The early work on the labour process approach is all on production in factory 
regimes. Indeed, in some situations, agricultural production has strong parallels with the 
organisational patterns of factories, especially centrally planned production in Large Farm 
Enterprises (LFEs) (Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004) and irrigated agriculture in large-scale 
irrigation schemes (cf. Diemer, 1990; Bolding, 2004). But even when agriculture is not 
organised in a specific factory-like way the study of production relations and production 
forces in agriculture yields valuable insights (cf. Van der Ploeg, 1991; Mollinga, 1998). 
At the start of Chapter 3 this conceptualisation is further elaborated and deployed to 
study different ‘forms of production’ within one and the same socio-political context, i.e. the 
2005-2006 post-Soviet regulations in Khorezm, Uzbekistan. In one and the same agricultural 
enterprise there are often even three different ‘forms of production’, each characterised by 
its own ‘forces of production’ and ‘relations of production’. 
 
Socio-technical regulation and TATE 
The notion of the Technological-Administrative Task Environment (TATE) was developed 
as a concept to analyse the ‘strangulating impact of the institutional system surrounding and 
encapsulating farm holdings’ (Benvenuti and Frouws, 1999:212) in the European5 context 
                                                 
5 Initially it was applied to the Dutch context. 
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from the 1950s onward (Benvenuti, 2005). Through a multitude of technological and 
administrative mechanisms the farm enterprise is connected to a wider environment of 
institutions. Among these are land controlling institutions, agricultural industries, agricultural 
input providers, banks, trading organisations, agricultural extension services, government 
organisations at different levels, labour organisation, etc. (Benvenuti, 1982; Benvenuti and 
Mommaas, 1985). Historically the concept has mostly been applied to the study of (family) 
farm enterprises in Europe that step-by-step are bound by state regulations and 
technological innovations that increase the dependence on the TATE6. In this predominant 
context of application of the concept the TATE strengthens and consolidates specific social 
production relations (Van der Ploeg, 1991:18-19), and limits the room of manoeuvre for 
independent decision making by the farmer (Benvenuti and Frouws, 1999:212). The 
institutions that form a technological-administrative relation with the farm enterprise are 
various in nature. These institutions constantly renew their advice, prescriptions and 
demands. In order for the farm enterprise to survive it needs to conform to the logic of the 
TATE (Benvenuti, 1991:12). 
One of the classical examples stems from Dutch dairy farming. Dairy factories 
started to prescribe that dairy farmers have tanks with a cooling system to keep their milk till 
it is collected by factory. However, the tank is only economically viable from a certain 
number of cows. Many farmers had to face the choice: enlarge their enterprise or quit 
(Benvenuti, 1982). A technological change in the processes of the factory strongly affects the 
operations in farm enterprises. And thus, inextricably bound up with the analysis using the 
TATE concept is a socio-political interpretation of technology. Technology is seen as a 
‘language’ for communication between the TATE and the agricultural enterprise. 
Technology requires a certain environment to function and thus serves as a structuring 
principle. Moreover people who cannot or do not want to speak the ‘language’ of the 
technology are excluded – the ideological dimension of technology (Benvenuti, 1991:21-22). 
As such the TATE concept operationalises the regulation of agricultural production in a 
socio-technical or interdisciplinary way. It is especially for this characteristic that I apply the 
concept to the analysis of post-Soviet Uzbekistan, which is rather different from the context 
in which the concept was initially developed. 
In (post-) Soviet Uzbekistan the TATE has been strongly prescriptive, while the 
freedom and ability of the farmer/labourer to shape the production process has remained 
very limited. According to Benvenuti and Frouws (1999) acknowledging the influence of the 
TATE was not intended to lead to a structuralist approach. Farmers are actors, have agency, 
i.e. ‘the individual actor [has] the capacity to process social experience and to devise ways of 
coping with life, even under the most extreme forms of coercion’ (Long, 2001:16). 
Agricultural production and farming in the brought sense are shaped by farmers in response 
to and dialogue with the TATE. Such responses can be as diverse as identification, 
acceptance, distancing and rejection of various elements of the TATE (Benvenuti and 
Frouws 1999:217).  
The autonomy of the primary agricultural producers is relative to the regulations by 
private and public institutions. Farm enterprises are ‘points of production, within the wider 
relations of agricultural production’ (Whatmore et al., 1987a: 22). In the context of analysing 
family farms under British capitalism Whatmore et al. (1987a and 1987b) use the concept of 
subsumption ‘as a means of examining changing production relations on the farm’ (Whatmore 
                                                 
6 An example of analytic use of the TATE concept in a development context is Hebinck and Van der Ploeg 
(1997), which deals with changing farming practices of maize growers in Southern and Eastern Africa. 
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et al., 1987a: 27). In their analysis family farm enterprises step-by-step get subsumed into the 
wider relations of agricultural production, i.e. both the external and the internal relations of 
production are transformed. The internal relations of production are related to (1) the 
ownership of business capital, (2) the ownership of land rights, (3) business and operational 
management control, and (4) labour relations. Three typical spheres of external relations of 
production are (1) technological dependence, (2) credit relations and (3) marketing linkages. 
In this study the relations of production of Uzbek farming enterprises are examined. 
They are not traditional family farms, as in the case of Whatmore et al.; they have been 
recently established. In Uzbekistan the wider relations of production are also very different 
from British capitalism7. In the first place the state of subsumption and the forms this takes are 
of interest for this study. Secondly it is also studied whether the state of subsumption is 
changing, i.e. whether farming enterprises are getting more subsumed, or maybe less.  
The recent establishment of private (family-based) farm enterprises and the way in 
which external institutions control agricultural production through administrative and 
technological means can be interpreted using the concept of subsumption and aspects of the 
TATE approach.  
 
The state socialist organisation of agricultural production 
In light of these two analytical approaches to the organisation of agricultural production this 
sub-sections aims to outline the main changes in the organisation of agriculture in the 
transition process in the FSU. The principles of the state socialist development model were 
discussed above. I first elaborate what kind of production regime comes with transition. 
Burawoy (1985:159-160) concisely explains a few of the main mechanisms in the 
organisation of central planning: 
 
[C]apitalist firms face hard budget constraints. Under state socialism the plan guides the 
flow of inputs and outputs of production. The planners represent a class of teleological 
– that is, purposeful – redistributors whose interest it is to maximize the appropriation 
of surplus from the direct producers via the firm. A system of plan bargaining between 
the central redistributors and the enterprise determines the plan targets and therefore the 
eventual success or failure of enterprise production. The enterprise, however, does not 
have to meet stringent financial criteria of efficiency. Instead it faces soft budget 
constraints. Its performance is assessed by redistributors who are in paternalistic relationship 
to the firm.  
 
Central planning was organised through targets that were centrally assigned to enterprises. 
These were, however, not fixed targets, but they were negotiable. Enterprises did not face 
hard budget constraints, but soft budget constraints, i.e. enterprises could not go bankrupt as 
they would be saved by negotiating lower demands and/or the levelling of accounts, which 
were mere nominal, administrative accounting systems. As a result enterprises depended on 
the (political) will of their superiors. Hence they kept paternalistic relations with their 
superiors and they were inclined to follow the orders transmitted through the hierarchy. 
 
                                                 
7 This framework of analysis developed by Whatmore et al. (1987a and 1987b) has been applied to a transition 
context before by Vitunskiene and Buivys (2006). Their case (of Lithuania) is however also thoroughly different 
from the Uzbekistani case. 
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Central planning and administrative ‘money’ 
By prohibiting private farming the USSR state socialist ideal favoured large, corporate 
organizations, which implied that farms were theoretically organized on the same principles 
as factory enterprises, and that farmers became workers on their land. The state made 
investments, set planting plans, supplied inputs through planning channels, and remitted 
profits up through the hierarchical system (Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004: 421). Even the 
money that served to pay wages and the allocation of labour was arranged centrally (Clarke, 
1992: 7). 
Also prices were administered centrally by the state. Goods and services were mostly 
allocated on the basis of quantity targets. The administered prices mostly just served for 
accounting purposes. The setting of prices was a political process that inherently involved 
the imposition of taxes on some product and the granting subsidies on others. Thus, prices 
were attached to products and transfers, and balances were adjusted correspondingly, but 
balances were only administrative since the ‘accounting units’ could not be exchanged for 
cash (Clarke, 1992: 6). 
In the CIS nations farming enterprise typically faced low prices for agricultural inputs 
and relatively high prices for agricultural output (Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004: 418). The 
situation for Uzbekistan’s premier product, cotton, was different: the output price was very 
low, implying an implicit taxation, even when compared to the subsidies on the input side 
(Spoor, 1993 and 1998).  
 
Budget constraints and negotiations 
Soft budget constraints are inextricably connected to not really being responsible for the 
results (Clarke, 1992: 9) – at least not through the budget, while of course there are political 
consequences of not reaching the targets. A recurrent issue in the reforms from a socialist to 
a market mode of operation is the hardening of budget (Kornai, Maskin and Roland, 
2003:1114). This way financial incentives are introduced; both positive incentives (through 
benefits) and negative incentives (the risk to go bankrupt) (Clarke, 1992: 9). 
The allocation of all resources was subject to negotiations, not only between 
enterprises and the ministry, but also within the enterprise; between the administration and 
shop chiefs, between shop chiefs and brigade leaders, and even between brigade leaders and 
individual workers. The negation over allocations were at the heart of an intentional system 
of surplus appropriation (Clarke, 1992: 8) i.e. the system was based on hierarchical, political 
control of resources. 
 
Incentives and labour organisation 
Principally there were few incentives for farm workers to work hard, as there was neither a 
big influence on their own income nor on the farms’ profitability. Moreover it was difficult 
to manage agricultural labour as, different from factory production, it was “physically spread 
over a spatially dispersed area” (Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004: 421). Also the planning system 
increased worker control over production, as full-time workers, like everything else, were in 
short supply and it was difficult and counterproductive for managers to get rid of them 
(Burawoy, 2001). Labour incentives were typically ideologically shaped by heralding the most 
productive workers with prizes and medals (Wall, 2006b). Besides these official incentives 
managers sought compromises with workers by providing them benefits based on individual 
performance, which were informally made available from the surplus generated by the farm. 
As such some of the surplus was directly ploughed back into the enterprise, but it was 
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limited to just this as surplus was not used to reinvest in or transform the production 
process (Burawoy, 2001). 
 
Transforming the organisation of agriculture 
By the end of the 1980s the pressure to privatise steadily increased, which initially led to 
minor reforms, but eventually resulted in the major economic reforms that were initiated in 
the USSR by Gorbachev in 1991 (Clarke, 1992: 9). Privatisation consists of the de facto 
introduction of control rights and income rights. In most states these were introduced step-
by-step and not always in combination with each other. Control rights are about who decides 
what to plant and what inputs to use, while income rights are about who gets the added 
value generated in the production process (Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004). Reforms that reduce 
the importance of central planning affect the distribution of control rights. In some former 
Soviet-states central planning in agricultural production was suddenly removed, while in 
others it still plays a significant role for certain crops.  
In addition to the reforms in central planning and the privatisation of rights there are 
two other major dimensions of transitional reform. The first is the adjustment of the 
artificially regulated price structure of the economy with the aim to bring it closer to that of 
the rest of the world. Secondly, there is the organisation of free markets and the regulation 
of those through newly established market institutions. These institutions are typically 
concerned with ensuring competition, defining and enforcing property rights and contracts, 
ensuring access to credit and finance, and providing information (Rozelle and Swinnen, 
2004: 429). 
 
 
1.3.3. An interdisciplinary approach to irrigation management 
This study adopts an approach to irrigation and irrigation management that can be labelled 
‘interdisciplinary and socio-technical’. In that respect it joins the rich body of literature that 
since the 1980s has been produced on this topic, mainly by the Irrigation and Water 
Engineering (IWE) Chair Group of Wageningen University. The framework can be 
summarised as in Vincent (1997 and 2001) and Mollinga (1998). The main aspects are the 
understanding of: 
 
(1) Irrigation as an integrated socio-technical undertaking; 
(2) The distribution of water as a socio-political process of contestation over a limited 
resource that affects socio-economic processes; 
(3) Policy as a (socio-political) process; 
(4) Agriculture and water management as practices embedded in wider structures; 
(5) The access to water as a means for the emancipation of marginalised groups.  
 
Technology is understood as the practical ensemble of knowledge, skills and objects by 
means of which people pursue particular goals in society. This definition follows Mollinga 
(1998), with the addition of ‘objects’. The definition does not distinguish between techniques 
that have developed through practical experimenting by users and technological innovations 
that are based on the application of scientific knowledge. Rather the focus is on people and 
their objectives in society. Different people have different objectives, based on different 
understandings of situations, i.e. people have different problem definitions. People 
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consciously use knowledge, skills and objects to address their ‘problems’. This is the essence 
of a political understanding of the technological process.  
In this section the socio-technical nature of technology is first elaborated in general 
terms and then applied to irrigation. Finally it is discussed how access can be conceptualised 
in the study of irrigation management. 
 
The socio-technical nature of technology 
Williams and Edge (1996) describe the general drive behind the technology debate as to 
open the ‘black box’ of technology development, i.e. to expose and analyse both the content 
of technologies and the process of innovation in order to criticise ‘technological 
determinism’. The underlying objective is ‘to emancipate science and technology – to 
dismantle their privileging as inevitable, or standing outside or above society; and to view 
them as areas of social activity, subject to social forces and amenable to social analysis’ 
(Williams and Edge, 1996:867). Winner (1986), in addition, argues that such analysis should 
not reduce everything to the interplay of social forces, but point us back to the things 
themselves, i.e. the study of technological objects and their characteristics. 
The technology debate has resulted in a fundamental critique on the traditional 
technology-transfer paradigm, which is a ‘linear model of technology development: 
invention-innovation-diffusion as separate stages’ (Williams & Edge, 1996:874). Pinch and 
Bijker (1984: 411) formulated an alternative: ‘the developmental process of a technological 
artefact is described as an alternation of variation and selection’. The implication is a ‘multi-
directional model’ in contrast with the linear model. In reply to a critique by Russell (1986), 
they further elaborate: ‘We think the argument against technological determinism can be 
made in the most compelling way by considering alternatives which were manifest, and then 
by attempting to explain why such paths eventually failed’ (Pinch & Bijker, 1986:353). Thus, 
this model leaves room to analyse why a certain path is followed within the multiple 
directions possible. It is stressed that, in the process, choices are being made (though not 
necessarily conscious choices), which have implications for society and even more so: they 
have different implications for different social groups (Williams & Edge, 1996; Winner, 
1986). As such technology is not neutral; ‘Obviously, the sociocultural and political situation 
of a social group shapes its norms and values, which in turn influence the meaning given to 
an artefact’ (Pinch & Bijker, 1984:428). It is therefore argued that it is not enough to 
establish that technologies are socially shaped; questions will have to be answered about the 
character and influence of the shaping forces (Williams & Edge, 1996:866) as well as about 
‘the characteristics of technical objects and the meaning of those objects’ (Winner, 1986:22).  
Two important schools in the technology debate that started in the 1980s are 
discussed here; the social construction of technology (SCOT) and actor-network theory 
(ANT). In the SCOT debate the reaching of closure is one of the processes under study. It 
entails the stabilising of a technology in a single form. This concept is borrowed from the 
social study of science, where it has the meaning of ending a certain debate or dispute (Pinch 
and Bijker, 1984).  
One of the other roots of the technology debate lies in anthropology. Pfaffenberger 
(1988:245) even argues that ‘Anthropology, at its best, is uniquely suited to the study of such 
a complex relationship between technology and culture.’ He argues that anthropology is 
both strong in its local-level small-scale studies and in its holistic approach towards society as 
a system of more or less interrelated components. Pfaffenberger (ibid.) uses the concept total: 
‘any behaviour that is technological is also, and at the same time, political, social and 
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symbolic’. In his analysis of technological change he also uses the concept politically-
constructed myth (p.247), which has analogies with the concept of closure in the sociology 
of science: they are socially accepted, simplified realities. In constructing a ‘successful’ 
technology, the construction of objects and myths goes hand in hand and ‘its social origins 
disappear from view’ (p. 250). 
Also ANT fundamentally critiques single, simplistic, linear stories as well as the de-
humanising of technological development. Yet it went a step further in the development of 
concepts for simultaneously studying technological and societal change. In ANT it is argued 
that the classical distinction between a ‘social context’ and a ‘technical content’ is of no use 
in the attempt to gain a better understanding of how human and non-human elements are 
connected. Latour (1991:116-117) for instance argues that there is no stable reference point, 
no fixed actor against which an innovation or social change might be measured. In the 
process of change all actors co-evolve into a new state of relation to each other. Latour 
argues that established technology only exists in the stability of social assemblages. Or to 
speak with the title of his article: ‘Technology is society made durable’. 
One of the central points that ANT argues is that the material and the social are not 
essentially different as elements in socio-technical processes. Robust networks consist of 
heterogeneous material, i.e. of both human and non-human elements. Latour (1991:110): 
‘We are never faced with objects or social relations, we are faced with chains which are 
associations of human (H) and non-human (NH). (...) Power is not a property of any one of 
those elements but of a chain’. This chain is the ‘actor-network’. And Callon (1991:142) 
formulates it as ‘For this reason I speak of actor-networks: for an actor is also a network’, i.e. 
an actor always comes to us through intermediaries. The implication of this understanding is 
that we should study the linkages in these chains, especially how people chain themselves to 
objects. 
The building of such a network requires that the various elements are aligned or 
attuned to each other. The prime mechanisms through which alignment takes place are 
enrolment and translation, respectively the processes of incorporating elements in the network 
and defining or inscribing these elements. And again, ‘it does not matter whether [these 
elements are] human or non-human, a collectivity or an individual’ (Callon, 1991:143). The 
point is that all elements are defined or governed by other elements in the network; they are 
products of their history, or as Callon (1991:154) phrases it ‘they are ‘acted’ by the network 
that holds them in place’.  
In the end Latour puts power relations forward as the object of research, i.e. the 
establishment and maintenance of domination, with special attention for the role of 
technology in these processes. It has been argued that the resulting ‘thick descriptions’ of the 
technological development process run the risk of failing to go beyond the black box that 
they aimed to open (Bolding: 2004). The improved understanding of the role of technology 
in processes of domination, which is the result of the technology debate, can be put to better 
use when adopted as part of research on societal change.  
In later studies it has been shown that the development of a technology is not a 
single process, i.e. ‘closure’ is not a single, stable phase, as things ‘rumble on and on, as it 
were, noisy and noisome’ (Law & Singleton, 2000:775). Technology is re-appropriated and 
re-designed by the various actors involved, not in the last place by its users. 
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Irrigation as socio-technical process 
The technology debate that started in the 1980s has had significant influence on the analysis 
of irrigation technology and the role of it in irrigation development and reform. A variety of 
irrigation studies adopted socio-technical approaches and thus provided valuable insight into 
the role of technology in the irrigation process. Pfaffenberger (1988) describes a case on 
irrigation settlement schemes in Sri Lanka, in which he analyses the formation of a tail-end 
problem that goes beyond ‘the harsh facts of hydraulics’. Kloezen and Mollinga (1992) have 
published one of the first papers on the issue of the socio-technical nature of division 
structures. Bolding et al. (1995) describe a classical case of the social construction of a 
device, the modular outlet used in colonial Indian irrigation systems. Shah (2003) has a 
similar analysis of tank irrigation technology. Veldwisch (2006) uses a socio-technical 
framework to analyse the rehabilitation of smallholder irrigation scheme in South-Africa. 
An early application of Actor Network Theory to irrigation can be found in Van 
Halsema & Wester (1994), while later applications can be found in Van der Zaag et al. (2001) 
and Bolding (2004). Rap (2006) uses ANT in his analysis of the development of a global 
policy model for irrigation reform based on experiences in Mexico, while Veldwisch et al. 
(forthcoming 2008) use it to analyse the top-down development process of an irrigation 
scheme in Malawi. 
Also the understanding that technology design and construction are not restricted to 
the engineer’s domain, but that it is just as well part of the users’ domain, has also influenced 
the debates in irrigation literature. The notion of irrigation technology as a social construct 
has become the theoretical underpinning of participatory and interactive design (Ubels, 1989; 
Ubels and Horst, 1993; Scheer, 1996; Boelens and Davila, 1998; Chin-A-Fo et al., 2003). 
 
Mollinga (1998) identified three different ways in which irrigation artefacts are social:  
(1) they have social requirements for use, i.e. irrigation technologies influence the 
management demands,  
(2) they are socially constructed, i.e. irrigation technologies are developed and designed 
with particular objectives and forms of management in mind, and  
(3) they have social effects like income increase and changes in the ways of crop 
production are technology-dependent. 
 
Within this understanding of irrigation as an inherently socio-technical activity new concepts 
and terminology were developed, technical concepts were re-interpreted and social theories 
were applied to processes in irrigation management. The following are a few examples to 
show that such an integrated socio-technical approach has a history and is firmly rooted in 
the analysis of irrigation management. 
From a managerial starting point Uphoff (1986), Chambers (1988) and Huppert 
(1989) developed multi-disciplinary classifications of tasks and activities in irrigation 
management (typically about allocation, scheduling, delivery, irrigation, drainage, cost-
recovery, etc.). Horst (1998) developed the idea of ‘system flexibility’ and its distributional 
effect on the tail-end, as based on the analysis of division structures with upstream and 
downstream control. Uphoff et al. (1991) working on the spatial significance of canal 
irrigation, developed the idea of hydraulic levels that are linked to organisational levels 
(discussed in Mollinga, [1998] 2003: 22-23). This was further elaborated on by Oorthuizen 
(2003: 298 and following) and Bolding (2004: 342). Van der Zaag (1992) introduced the 
study of ‘street-level bureaucrats’ to the study of irrigation management. This was further 
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elaborated through the study of everyday politics by among others Mollinga ([1998], 2003) 
and Oorthuizen (2003). Mollinga ([1998], 2003) developed the boundary-concept ‘water 
control’, which has provided a concept to think about heterogeneous networks of control in 
relation to the distribution of water, similar to the conceptualisation of power and control in 
ANT. Water control is conceptualised as to consist of three dimensions; (1) the 
technical/material dimension, (2) the managerial/operational/organisational dimension, and 
(3) the socio-political dimension. Narain (2003) elaborated for WUAs in India how spatial 
and technological layouts affect management and institutional development. 
Thus there exists a rich body of literature and concepts that dates back to as early as 
the 1980s. The inherent socio-technical nature of irrigation processes is hardly a point worth 
making, as it has become a well-established notion. At this point in time there is rather need 
for frameworks and terminology that help to study processes of ordering, control and access 
in ways that inherently acknowledge this socio-technical nature.  
 
The rights framework and a theory of access 
From within the ZEF/UNESCO project it was initially suggested that I would interpret 
water distribution within a legal or normative framework, i.e. establish what is the formal and 
legal way of distributing water before studying the deviations (illegal or informal patterns). In 
that respect it is useful to explain why I deemed such an approach unfit for this study and 
instead focussed more on the actual practices. Above it was already discussed that there is 
hardly a ‘rule of law’ in Uzbekistan; rather the normative system is authoritarian and 
personalised. Thus the legal-normative domain is hardly separated from the exertion of 
power along lines of loyalty. Also there are no institutions through which rights are created, 
maintained and/or legitimised. This pertains to the state system as well as to traditional local 
systems that have almost completely been replaced by state controlled organisations. Thus, 
in Uzbekistan the legal normative domain does not offer mechanisms through which water 
distribution is influenced in any noteworthy way.  
It seemed therefore more relevant to adopt a framework of analysis conceptualising the 
ability to gain access rather than a framework of analysis on the right to gain access. Or in 
other words: the ‘rights-model’ could have been forced on this situation, for instance by 
focusing on the materialisation of rights, but it seems that it would not have tackled the main 
issues at play. The ‘theory of access’ as developed by Ribot (1998) and Ribot and Peluso 
(2003) builds upon this notion. They distinguish three social processes that regulate access: 
access control, gaining access and access maintenance. It is somewhat a dichotomous model 
in which one actor (typically a state agency) deploys strategies to control access to a resource, 
while the users of a resource deploy both strategies to gain access and maintain their access 
to the resource. Ribot and Peluso define access as “the ability to derive benefits from things” 
or resources (ibid.: 153). In this context rights are only one set of factors in a larger array of 
influences on the flow of benefits; there are numerous institutions, social and economic 
relations, and strategies that shape the distribution of benefits. Hence, the analysis of access 
to benefits involves the study of (1) the nature and flow of benefits that can be derived from 
a particular resources, (2) the identification of the mechanisms by which actors gain, 
maintain and control benefit distribution, and (3) an analysis of the power relations that 
underlie the access mechanisms. 
This theory of access has strong focus on de facto management of and control over 
natural resources. The concept of ‘water control’ in its three interrelated dimensions 
(Mollinga’s, [1998], 2003) in a similar way conceptualises the ability to get or restrict access 
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to water. In a wider sense this conceptualisation builds on the understanding of irrigation 
activities as practices, i.e. social action in which actors strategically engage with each other in 
arenas (or domains) of interaction. These ‘water control practices’ can be connected to what 
Ribot and Peluso (2003) call ‘access mechanisms’. They distinguish a whole range of these 
mechanism, starting with the rights-based mechanisms that can be legal or illegal and 
continue with a long list of structural and relational mechanisms. These include the role of 
technology, labour (organisation), knowledge, authority, and social identity. In any situation 
the particular access strategies have to be empirically studied, but clearly they will be of 
heterogeneous nature, as it requires many conditions to be fulfilled to be able to use a 
resource to produce a benefit. 
 
 
1.4. Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter 2 discusses how the research methodology was adapted to working in the context 
of a post-communist authoritarian country. The nature of the Uzbek regime and governance 
system has had a strong influence on the research methodology and outcomes. In the Uzbek 
context official data, knowledge and opinions are often vague, distorted or unreliable. For 
reasons of security of the informants it was often difficult to triangulate findings with other 
informants. Direct observations of field activities therefore had an important place in the 
research methodology.  
Chapters 3 and 4 set out to discuss the wider agrarian context. The chapters describe 
the relation between farmers, the state and agricultural planning, which is necessary 
knowledge to understand the dynamics in water distribution discussed in the subsequent 
chapters. Chapter 3 discusses the basic structure of the Uzbek agrarian society. State actors, 
privatised farmers (fermers) and peasants (dekhans) each have their distinct roles and there are 
typical exchange patterns between them. Socio-economic differentiation in the rural area is 
taking place at a high speed. 
Making use of a labour process approach, Chapter 4 argues that the Khorezmian 
cropping system can be understood as being composed of three forms of production; (1) the 
state ordered production of cotton and wheat, (2) the commercial production of for instance 
rice and (3) the household production of primary needs. These production processes are 
characterised on the basis of their input and output relations, their terms of trade as well as 
their technical requirements. The emergence of commercial rice production in the sphere of 
privatised production is a major development and a possible nucleus for political change. 
Chapter 5 shows how the control over agriculture takes a specific shape in the case 
of water distribution at district level. The Governor’s office (Hokimiyat) maintains a highly 
centralised state management system. The state secures obedience and the fulfilling of 
production quotas through a system that with one hand puts pressure on farmers and with 
the other rewards them. The differences in water use between cotton and rice production 
play an important role in these dynamics. 
After discussing the history of the introduction of Water Users Associations (WUAs) 
in Uzbekistan, Chapter 6 looks at the actual dynamics of water management inside the 
WUA. Peasants (dekhans) and newly established farmers (fermers) struggle with each other 
over the access to a limited resource. While at some places the newly established WUAs 
strictly control access, at other places patterns of collective action start to emerge. The latter 
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always have an informal character and often take place around the operation and 
maintenance of pumps. 
Chapter 7 shows that the agrarian change currently taking place puts different 
demands on the irrigation technology, both at micro-level and at system level. The 
developmental history of the Khorezmian irrigation and drainage network shows how its 
system characteristics have been shaped by the (historic) socio-political relations. It is shown 
that the fundamental changes taking place in the Uzbek agrarian structure put different 
demands on the irrigation and drainage network.  
The conclusions of this research are presented in Chapter 8. It contains the main 
findings, a discussion of the implications for the theoretical debates discussed in Chapter 1 
and a list of recommendations for both policy and future research. 
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2.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the research methodology used for this study. On a second level it is 
also about the wider issues of conducting research on the organisation of agriculture and 
water management in rural Uzbekistan. The methodological design was influenced by a 
variety of issues; the place of this study in a larger research project (the ZEF/UNESCO 
landscape restructuring project in Khorezm), my personal preferences and earlier 
experiences (research work in Africa and Latin America), the topic of research (irrigation and 
water distribution) as well as the circumstances in the field (the Post-Soviet context, 
Uzbekistan being a neo-patrimonial state with an authoritarian regime, and the large size of 
the irrigation network).  
Methodology can conceptually be understood as consisting of three levels; (1) the 
scientific model, which constitutes the epistemological and ontological bearings (2) the 
research method or strategy, and (3) the research techniques (Burawoy 1998:6; Alasuutari, 
1995; Bryman, 2004).  
The ways in which these levels are “filled-in” are related to each other, i.e. there is 
coherence between the scientific model, the research strategy and the research techniques. 
Strategies and techniques of a certain scientific model can made to fit other scientific models. 
The basic methodological elements of this study are summarised in Table 2.1 below. In the 
third column of the table the main difficulties encountered in conducting the research are 
mentioned. Also here the issues between the different levels are somewhat linked; the post-
soviet authoritarian regime resulted in the absence of a social science counterpart and fitting 
(applied) theories on the topic of research (first level), the absence of (empirical based) 
information to formulate reasonable hypotheses (second level) as well as high levels of 
distrust among the population and the absence of reliable secondary data (third level). 
Though in the first half year of the field research an approach was developed that 
took notice of the expected challenges, in the course of the research process at each level 
adaptations had to be made in response to difficulties/situations encountered in reality. Not 
always were these conscious choices, there were also de facto implications of certain ways of 
doing that were followed for pragmatic reasons. The methodology discussed in this chapter 
is the result of three years designing and developing an appropriate methodological approach 
for this challenging environment and politically sensitive topic of research. 
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 Basic elements of 
this study 
Difficulties 
encountered 
Emphases and 
adaptations made in 
response to 
difficulties 
Scientific model Critical realist; 
reflexive; making use 
of constructivist and 
ANT concepts 
regarding technology 
No social science 
history in FSU; lack 
of fitting theories; 
little context info; 
many problems in 
‘objectively’ 
abstracting info.  
Focus on identifying 
mechanism; engage 
rather than remain at 
a distance; develop 
theory rather than test 
existing; an integrated 
approach to the social 
and material 
dimension. 
Research 
method/strategy 
Extended case 
method; mix-method 
triangulation; 
technography 
Issues not clear; lack 
of fitting theories. 
Theoretical sampling; 
strong focus on 
empirical grounding; 
riddle solving/ 
defining integrated in 
the research process 
Research 
techniques 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(including 
strategic choices 
of operation) 
(Participant) 
observations, 
household survey; 
non/semi-structured 
interviews; group 
interviews; field note 
diaries;  acquisition of 
secondary data; 
 
Learning Uzbek, live 
in a village, own 
transport 
High levels of 
distrust; unreliable 
statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Huge area/large 
distances, difficult 
language, no good 
research assistants 
Building rapport/ 
finding out slow; 
combine interviews 
with observations; 
acquire secondary 
data at field level;  
 
 
 
Learn Uzbek and live 
part-time in a village 
as well as live  
project’s guesthouse 
and make use of my 
role as outsider and 
irrigation engineer. 
Table 2.1 – overview of the three levels of methodology as applied in this study 
 
 
Methodology concerns the entire research process, which can be conceptualised to consist 
of different phases. These phases could for instance be labelled research design, data 
collection, analysis, interpretation and write-up. In practice these ‘phases’ are not always 
clearly distinguishable, neither as time periods nor as activities. In this study different phases 
and functions were explicitly integrated. This is perceivable in the relation between defining 
the topic, formulating the research questions, production of observations, documenting of 
observations and processing them, i.e. all of this is an iterative, fluid process of going back 
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and forth between theoretic and empirical material. The process of analysis, or unriddling, 
did not wait until after the fieldwork. Rather it is an integral part of the field research process 
and of the preparation process (through reading existing material and formulating tentative 
research questions and hypotheses). Towards the end of the second year of fieldwork the 
main idea for the dissertation had already ripened and during the fieldwork I had already 
written a detailed outline of this dissertation. In my experience, the exercise of riddle solving 
in the first place is a creative process; unstructured writing, active brainstorming, discussing 
with colleagues and silent pondering all played a role in this ripening process. At the same 
time it required discipline in field note taking and systematic ordering of ideas that were 
taking shape during the fieldwork period. 
The chapter is organised around the three levels of methodology as identified above. 
Each level is dealt with in a separate section. They address the reasons for the initially 
adopted methods/approaches as well as practical examples of adaptation. In a separate 
section the selection of case study areas is described, as well as a detailed description of the 
household survey. The chapter concludes with an evaluation resulting in some principles for 
an effective strategy/methodology to conduct social science research in contemporary 
Uzbekistan. 
 
 
2.2. The scientific model  
 
The scientific model underlying this research can be characterised as critical realist with an 
interaction process between the theoretical and the empirical that could be called 
‘retroductive’. It is different from both positivist and interpretivist epistemologies and is 
neither deductive nor inductive in its organisation of theory and observations. 
Critical realism builds on the idea that there is a real world ‘out there’, but that we 
only know it through the constructions that people make of it – the objects of science, the 
things that we study (physical processes or social phenomena) form the intransitive 
dimension of science, the theories and discourses of science are part of its transitive 
dimension (Sayer, 2000:10). Critical realism distinguishes between the real, the actual and the 
empirical. The real refers to the structural possibilities as they exist, whereas the actual refers 
to the way in which things happen. Forces have different effects, that is: there is no linear 
relation between cause and effect. Rather the mechanisms of change need to be studied in-
depth in order to understand social processes of change.  
This sort of analysis process is like solving a riddle (Alasuutari, 1995:6-22) i.e. fitting 
all the clues together in a logical way. Critical realists advocate retroduction as a logic for 
moving between the empirical and theory. Retroduction goes through a ‘mode of inference 
in which events are explained by postulating (and identifying) mechanisms which are capable 
of producing them’ (Sayer, 1992). This is further elaborated in the next section. 
The extended case method has a similar aim; it ‘applies reflexive science to 
ethnography in order to extract the general from the unique, to move from the ‘micro’ to the 
‘macro’ …’ (Burawoy, 1998: 5). Furthermore Burawoy (ibid: 27) argues for a more 
prominent role of existing theory in the research process; ‘the analyst works with a prior 
body of theory that is continually evolving through attention to concrete cases. Theory is 
reconstructed.’ The researcher oscillates between theory and observations; theory guides the 
direction of fieldwork and observations redirect theory. This is different from for instance 
grounded theory, which ideally starts purely from observations and builds theory from 
CHAPTER 2 – RESEARCHING WATER DISTRIBUTION IN POST-SOVIET UZBEKISTAN 
 
 
45
systematically working with the produced empirical material. Also Alasuutari (1995) 
emphasizes the importance of an integrated approach to working with empirical 
observations and theory, rather than starting with a theory and/or hypothesis and testing or 
verifying it through fieldwork.  
This specific vision on the fundamental relation between the empirical and theory 
requires research strategies that provide for the possibilities of being guided by the instances 
in the field or for possibilities of moving between them. This is elaborated in the next 
section. 
The topic of research, agrarian change and the socio-political aspects of irrigation 
management in post-independence Uzbekistan, was part of a largely unexplored field of 
work. Therefore there was a greater scope for theory development than for theory testing; 
there are good opportunities for theory refinement and reconstruction. Also, neither during 
the Soviet period nor in the period after independence social sciences have been established 
in Uzbekistan. Almost all relevant studies conducted in the field are by foreign researchers or 
by Uzbeks at foreign universities. As a result a natural Uzbek counterpart institute for the 
social science component of the ZEF/UNESCO was lacking. 
The object of this study an irrigation network. Elsewhere this has also been called a 
‘water network’ (Van der Zaag et al., 2002; Bolding, 2004; Veldwisch et al., forthcoming 
2008). As in actor-network theory (ANT), the network is understood to be of heterogeneous 
nature, i.e. human and non-human (social and technical) elements are woven together 
(Callon, 1991; Latour 1991). This study builds on the notion that the social and the technical 
are dimensions of the same processes. This understanding has methodological implication, 
which are elaborated in the following two sections. 
 
 
2.3. The research approach  
 
Building on the scientific model as described above a research approach was adopted that 
focuses on the mechanisms of social and political change as expressed in the management of 
natural and technological processes. 
Good analytic case studies of agrarian change processes in Central Asia are scarce, 
which makes it very important to first study the mechanisms of these processes before 
quantifying them (Kandiyoti, 1999). This is one of the important reasons for a strong focus 
on qualitative methods that identify such mechanisms. The absence of (applied) theories and 
analytic case studies also made it difficult to formulate precise research questions at the onset 
of the study. Based on general (not region or situation specific) theories and the (limited) 
available information on the research topic and research area it was imagined what could be 
the possible relevant issues. Working hypotheses were formulated to guide the direction of 
the research. During the study these hypotheses were frequently revised and renewed on 
basis of field experiences. 
 
2.3.1. The basic elements 
The approach builds on three different, yet related, schools of social science methodology; 
grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1998; Bernard, 
2000:443-456), the extended case method (Burawoy, 1998 and 2003) and critical realism 
(Sayer, 1992; Downward and Mearman, 2006). They all have a strong emphasis on empirical 
grounding, the application of mixed methods and advocate an integrated process of the 
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production of observations and theory development. Without clear reference to any of these 
three approaches Alasuutari (1995) also deals with these three issues. He poses that the 
research topic is like a riddle that needs to be solved. Clues are gathered through a variety of 
qualitative and quantitative methods, but in the end they are all clues to the same riddle. 
Qualitative analysis is then the process of unriddling, i.e. fitting all the clues together in a 
logical way. Critical realists advocate retroduction as a logic for moving between the 
empirical and the theoretical and thus integrating existing theories in the process of riddle 
solving. Retroduction goes through a ‘mode of inference in which events are explained by 
postulating (and identifying) mechanisms which are capable of producing them’ (Sayer, 
1992).  
Both existing theory and produced observations are used for the development of 
ideas. Even though grounded theory advocates to build theory purely from observations and 
in that sense is rather different from the approach adopted in this study, some of its 
procedures were adopted with regard to dealing with large amounts of observations.  
Through working with the empirical material, re-reading it, contextualising it, interpreting it, 
and commenting on it, new ideas take shape. This is not reserved for the period after the 
fieldwork, but is rather an integrated process that also informs and steers the fieldwork. In 
grounded theory this is referred to as theoretic sampling, “the process of data collecting for 
generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes and analyzes his data and 
decides what data to collect next and where to find them in order to develop his theory as it 
emerges” (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 45). Alasuutari (1995:13-16) in this respect refers to the 
‘purification of data’, i.e. finding common denominators and formulating rules that apply to 
all data. A single exception is enough to break the rule, to show that one has to re-think the 
whole thing or narrow the formulated rule. 
Earlier observations informed the selection of subsequent cases to be studied. This 
applies to both the selection of farming families to be interviewed and the selection of case 
study WUAs (see the descriptions in section 2.5). Also it informed the choices of topics to 
be addressed and the choices of concrete situations in place and time to be attended and 
observed. Selections were made to shed light on a topic or concrete situation from a 
different point of view, or sometimes to explore new spheres, which were touched upon in 
earlier fieldwork and seemed relevant for the topic under research.  
 
2.3.2. Unriddling, mixed method triangulation as a strategy 
The objective of this study is to contribute analytical descriptions of the processes at play in 
water distribution in Khorezm. Partly such analysis could be derived by theorizing directly 
from the observations (as is done in grounded theory), but more commonly this was 
achieved by interpreting encountered situations through the lenses of existing theories. The 
latter also led to refining and restructuring exiting theory, similar to what was described for 
processes in the extended case method and critical realism. An example of theorising purely 
from observations was the development of an understanding of the Khorezmian agrarian 
system to exist of three distinct forms of production with each an own specific way of 
securing access to irrigation water. In later stages theories were found that fitted the 
observations, which enriched the analysis, but the idea emerged purely from observations. 
This topic is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.  
An example where the interaction between theory and observations played an important role 
was the re-interpretation of how irrigation structures are expressions of social relations. The 
specificities of (post-)Soviet collective agriculture created very different social relations 
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around water distributions. They did not so much affect individual water distribution 
structures as ‘signposts of struggle’ or ‘material interfaces’ between water users, as discussed 
in theory (Ubels, 1989; Kloezen and Mollinga, 1992; Bolding et al., 1995; Mollinga and 
Bolding, 1996; Mollinga, 1998; Veldwisch, 2006). In Khorezm the integration of the social 
and material dimensions in irrigation technology has a different constitution from what had 
been described before. On a deeper level the layout of the irrigation network of Khorezm 
and its technology can still be seen as an expression of a specific socio-political situation. 
Elements from existing theory were used to interpret the studied situation and at the same 
time the body of literature was enriched with the analysis of new case that sheds a different 
light. This topic is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
At the start of this study the concept of triangulation was merely used as in data 
triangulation, which basically is the cross-checking of data acquired in different situation 
and/or at different moments. Often data could not be cross-checked due to sensitivity of the 
information that could put people at risk if shared with others. Therefore I looked deeper 
into the idea of validation through triangulation. ‘Mixed method triangulation’ (MMT) was 
found to fit well to the already adopted approach. With the school of critical realism 
Downward and Mearman (2006) argue for mixed-method triangulation (MMT) as a 
prerequisite for a process of retroduction with ontological depth. They argue that combining 
methods that are connected to different ontological positions provides the opportunities of 
shifting between different interpretations of the same processes and thus generate 
understandings that transcend mere disciplinary perspectives. The combining of methods is 
by means of retroduction, which “is not so much a formalised logic of inference as a thought 
operation that moves between knowledge of one thing to another, for example, from 
empirical phenomena expressed as events to their causes” (ibid.). Therefore retroduction 
makes use of mechanism and relations known from empirical study as well as theoretical 
relations. When in new situations aspects are recognised from earlier encountered 
mechanisms or relations it is wondered whether this is similar to earlier encountered 
situations or phenomena, be it in theory or in empirical study. The explanation is suggested 
by a “concomitance”, i.e. any type of similarity or co-occurrence (Thomson, 2007). Such a 
relation might be a happy coincidence and therefore does not validate a conclusion in the 
sense that it is highly trustworthy. However the approach makes it possible to move between 
different locations and informants and using the findings at one place as a hint for 
understanding what is happening in another situation. The objects of the research are used 
to shed light on the wider subject of research. Practically it implied distilling working 
hypotheses from one specific case and testing that in other situations. As a result the 
processes had to be formulated more precisely and/or the situation in which the process 
occurred was narrowed-down. On top of that the identified processes could be further 
tested and quantified. 
To exemplify this approach I describe one small aspect of my research and how the 
topic, questions, and hypotheses developed. Going through the fields and following the 
canals I once came across an irrigation ditch that was directly connected to a drain. A lot of 
water was flowing unused to the drain. In the weeks that followed I paid special attention to 
this phenomenon and more often I stopped the car at places where this might also occur, 
walked the extra few hundred meters to check the end of an irrigation ditch and asked 
various people why water was flowing unused to the drain. I came across a number of 
similar situations and the only reason that farmers and farm workers gave me was 
‘carelessness’. I hypothesised that this would represent a major item on the (district) water 
balance and that it would only be happening in case when there was water abundance. This 
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has led me to investigate the situation of water shortage and water abundance in more detail 
– the follow up I discuss in Chapter 5. Besides I started to talk about this type of water 
wastage to the district level water management departments and found out that this is a 
major point of attention for their fieldworkers, something they had not told me in earlier 
interviews. In about the same period I coincidentally came across a district water manager 
who was following a large drain to close off any unnecessary outflows of canals. I was told 
this was done in order to increase the efficiencies on district level to have enough water 
available at the tail-end of the district. This reinforced my idea that in case of water shortage 
this type of water wastage would not occur. Going around with a water inspector I found 
out that these connections were ‘illegal’ and that the responsible farmers were fined for this, 
however, not in all cases. At two places where we found water flowing to the drain further 
downstream it was being used again. Drains were being used as irrigation system at places 
that could not easily be reached by irrigation ditches. In both encountered cases the water 
was used for paddy cultivation, which is often illegal. This could have been the reason why 
people were only telling me that it was due to ‘carelessness’. In the proceeding weeks I 
systematically followed the drains that ‘unnecessary’ received water from an irrigation ditch. 
Only in a few cases I found that the water was actually being used. In areas and periods of 
relative water shortage I did not find situations of this direct water loss. This was also 
confirmed by the words and actions of the water inspector, who only checked such 
connections in areas and periods of relative water abundance.  
 
Methodologically integrating the material and social dimension 
The notion that the social and the material dimensions are closely related and often 
inseparable requires a methodological approach that acknowledges this and bridges the 
social-material divide. When studying processes of technological (re)design this is especially 
relevant.  In this context Bolding (2004:111) defined his research methodology as a 
technography; “a methodology that describes and analyses the life of a technology as well as 
the various actors involved in (re)shaping it. Thus technography is a short hand for a 
combination of biography, technology and ethnography.” Irrigation networks are composite 
technologies that often extend over large areas and which in various ways are integrated into 
agricultural production systems. Operationalising technographical research on a large scale 
irrigation system was done through an access strategy that could be called ‘follow the water’. 
Basically this is the same as following the infrastructure. It implies following the water flows 
(canals, but also drains), looking for its sources and destinations. A good technical 
understanding of the various structures is imperative. This entails reconstructing the initial 
purpose of the structure by reconstructing the overall logic of the irrigation scheme and 
working out the hydraulic formulas, boundary conditions, flexibility and alternative uses of 
the structures. However, the interest is not reserved for just the hardware, also the 
connections to social and organisation structures are studied, and people encountered on the 
travelling along the canals are being interviewed.  
Central in this access strategy is the combination of direct observations with 
interviews. Spending time with key actors during their daily activities entails the same 
combination of interviewing and observing. Examples of this are: joining the water guard on 
his patrol along the canals or assisting farmers in the work on their fields. Such a practical, 
on-site approach provided the opportunity to visually verify information provided by the 
informants, it increased trust, and allowed for issues to be observed that would not have 
surfaced in interviews.  
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2.4. Issues regarding research methods 
 
This sections deals with a number of issues that played at the level of research techniques. It 
does not in detail describe the techniques. A separate section (2.5) describes the selection of 
case study areas, the way in which the household survey was conducted and the selection of 
a group of households that were followed during a complete cropping season. 
 
2.4.1. Project and some strategic choices 
At the start of my fieldwork (in March 2005) the interdisciplinary project of which my PhD 
research is part had been operating for about three years (since May 2002). During their field 
work periods in Uzbekistan most researchers were living in the project’s guesthouse. From 
here they jointly commuted to the office building at the university campus of the 
collaborative State University of Urgench, the sole university in the region. Fieldwork was 
conducted in project cars, clearly marked with project logos and blue-coloured UN number 
plates and supplied with a driver. This mode of operation linked well to the natural science 
based experiments and approaches that formed the heart of the ZEF/UNESCO project 
during the initial years of research. It involved making long days and long distances with the 
main concern of solving practical issues. The economic research operated in a similar mode, 
while some of social science researchers without much success had struggled for a different 
regime. 
Changing the mode of operation for at least the social scientists gathered momentum 
in the period that I started this study. Thus it was possible that, contrary to what was 
common, I decided to live in a village rather than in the project’s guesthouse. During the 
first year the project rented a house in a Kishlak (village), where I stayed together with a 
colleague. During the second year I stayed in the same village, but then for a few days and 
nights per week with a host family. Even though most of my active fieldwork was outside 
that village, also during daytime I frequently spent time in the village – working at home on 
my computer, working in the garden or spending time relaxing with neighbours. Living in an 
agricultural community enabled me to observe social life and agricultural practices in a 
relatively unconstrained way; the longer I stayed, the less people seemed to be disturbed by 
my presence. Though very beneficial for my own research there was light pressure from 
within the project to spend more time in the office and/or the guesthouse for reasons of 
integration with other research team members and informal knowledge sharing.  
In the first year the project hired a ‘civilian’ car so that I could to go around without 
a driver and blue-plated project car. This gave me more flexibility in deciding when and 
where to go. Moreover, we would only arrive with two people (me and a translator), instead 
of three (with the driver), which was a bit less of an invasion. However, the travel was often 
long and tiresome, which after a few months made me decide to again go around with 
project cars and drivers. 
 
2.4.2. Entrance to the field and network building 
Before I started my fieldwork various people had advised me to first get permission to do 
the research from the local authorities, especially from the district governor’s office 
(Hokimiyat), as working without such a written permission people would not feel free to talk. 
Officially I did not need such permission, as our project had a ‘blanket permission’ to 
perform research on agriculture in Khorezm, as specified in the three-party agreement. 
Rather than working from the official offices downward, as others within our project had 
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done, I started with building up relations at the field level and moved my way up by getting 
introduction to their peers and bosses. A few people suggested to me that I should ask 
permission from their boss before they would talk to me, but in general it was well possible 
to operate under the radar of the authorities, i.e. I was noticed, but my activities did not raise 
suspicion. It also helped to be explicit about where I lived and worked, mention names of 
people that we mutually knew and to hand over a business card that they could show in case 
someone would come and inquire after me. 
With time the number of informants at higher positions grew, as I frequently worked 
in their areas of jurisdiction and with their staff. I tried to be as open as possible to these 
informants, in order to gain their trust. In situations where I managed to do so they 
instructed their staff to be co-operative as well. On the other hand I did not want to tell 
them explicitly with whom I had talked about what, as that could bring those people in 
difficulties. I was walking the narrow path of on the one hand staying both critical and 
making my own choices on what to do and on the other hand being open about my activities 
and letting me be guided by people at strategic places. I am fully aware that due to this 
attitude I must have missed a number of interesting topics, but practically it was simply not 
possible to operate around these persons and yet get access to people and get reliable 
answers from them. In a similar way I avoided any unnecessary focus on illegal or highly 
sensitive issues, such as bribes. Paddy cultivation and related water use was such a highly 
sensitive issue and yet at the heart of my research – sometimes it was unavoidable to push a 
topic after all. 
 
2.4.3. Distrust and participation 
Is somebody free to decide whether to participate or not? In the Uzbek society the guest is 
considered to be ‘king’, who can not be denied whatever is requested (Wall and Overton, 
2006; Adams, 1999). When approaching people with the question whether they are willing to 
participate, especially as a foreigner, you are almost always instantly hosted and served the 
best food and drink available. It rather requires sensitivity of the guest, in this case the 
researcher, to assess whether the possible informant is really willing to participate. From a 
pragmatic point of view this also makes sense, as continuing with an informant that formally 
consents to participate, but in practice is not willing to talk is a difficult source of 
information. The most important reason for not wanting to participate seemed to be fear of 
being negatively affected by participating. In many cases people tend to take a protective 
attitude. This was one of the main difficulties encountered in conducting the field research. 
Wall (2006a) reported similar difficulties. In interviews people often evaded questions, gave 
vague responses, produced plain lies or simply changed the topic. Often when people 
seemed to be afraid to talk it was not explicitly expressed. However, in a number of cases 
people hinted that the topic brought up was not appropriate to talk about, and in some cases 
explicitly told me so. When people did tell me about things that were obviously politically 
sensitive, after the interview they often asked me not to reveal the source to anyone, which 
made it difficult to cross-check the given account and present it a research finding. 
The decision to keep quiet about issues of dissatisfaction can be interpreted as a 
decision to not discredit the state and/or powerful people. This situation of extreme 
“loyalty” seems to be a forced one, i.e. by the lack of other options. Hirschman (1970) 
analysed three possible responses to an uncomfortable situation: exit, voice and loyalty. Most 
people in Uzbekistan do not have the possibility to leave their country, region or social 
position, nor do they have the position to voice their discontent (except maybe among their 
CHAPTER 2 – RESEARCHING WATER DISTRIBUTION IN POST-SOVIET UZBEKISTAN 
 
 
51
own family and friends). The only reasonable survival strategy is to accommodate, to be loyal 
no matter what.  
During the field research I was followed and checked by people in authoritative 
positions (heads of state organisation, former collective farm managers, etc) or by their 
informants. Several people whom I interviewed mentioned that after contact with me they 
had been approached and were asked about my research and whereabouts. I had the 
impression that people in authoritative positions would have easily been able to block the 
research in case they would have felt it could be a threat to their personal position or to the 
state. Also I was warned by two individual contacts that my work was being monitored by 
the secret police, though seemingly not on a very intensive basis, as it was never openly 
obstructed and I could go and talk to whoever I wished.  
Some topics were found to be more politically sensitive than others. Self-evidently 
corruption by informal payments was a sensitive topic to talk about. Some other sensitive 
issues were the land acquisition procedures, exact sizes and arrangements of land tenure, 
payment of the workers by the fermers, and the negotiations over crop quota. Above all, 
paddy cultivation is perceived as highly sensitive issue, as it requires a lot of water, competes 
with cotton cultivation, is not fully legal, but may provide a major source of income. When 
bringing up these topics more often a protective attitude was encountered.  
 
2.4.4. Building rapport and identity 
The main tactic of overcoming situations of distrust was an extra focus on the building of 
rapport. I tried to build up long term relations, with repeated visits in which I did not just 
focus on getting the data I was looking for, but also reserved plenty of time to listen and 
respond to the informant. The learning of the Uzbek language soon turned out a very 
effective tool to gain the positive attention and trust of the people. Foreigners are clearly 
expected to speak (or learn) Russian, not Uzbek. When I told people (in Uzbek) that I did 
not speak Russian, they often looked at me in disbelief. And it frequently happened that 
people kept speaking Russian to me even when I spoke Uzbek to them. Even though many 
people master basic Russian, it is perceived as the language of ‘the centre’; older people, 
males, educated people, people from urban areas and especially if they come from Tashkent 
or abroad, speak Russian. Learning Uzbek helped me in shifting my bias to the people in the 
margin; the younger people, the women, the uneducated, and the people in the rural areas. 
Although I started studying the Uzbek language from the moment I arrived in the country, I 
never reached the level at which I could conduct interviews on my own. Therefore I 
permanently worked with a translator; over the whole period I hired four different persons, 
who translated between English and Uzbek. In the beginning I was hardly able to have a 
basic conversation, but even then it clearly helped to open up the relation. Later my Uzbek 
language skills improved and sometimes I was even able to discuss simple issues without the 
help of a translator. Also I was often able to get the gist of the story even before it was 
translated. This helped enormously to keep a more natural communication between me and 
the informants; even when I could not speak with them directly, still it was clear that I was 
interested and trying my best to communicate. 
Besides learning a language also the adoption of cultural habits helped in gaining the 
trust of people. Living in a village helped me enormously to adopt such habits and to closely 
observe ordinary people and to get to know their habits. It made me feel more at home, 
even when I was working in other villages. Informants often expected that I was living in 
Urgench, the provincial capital and were amazed when they found out that I was also living 
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in a rural area. Often people did however not understand why I would stay in a village, if I 
also had the opportunity of staying in the city; there is clear cultural understanding that if 
you are doing well you move to the centre. 
Besides assuming the identity of a villager, in some situations I also used other identities to 
gain trust or respect. Obviously I was always a foreigner. I stressed this sometimes in order 
to play the ignorant and inquired about the ‘obvious’. Also it seemed that people were more 
inclined to trust a foreigner with particular sensitive information. In a similar way, in a few 
situations, I stressed my project membership, and connected to that, my status as a 
diplomat8. This always helped to settle difficult questions related to research permissions. 
In encounters with engineers and water managers I often stressed my background as 
an irrigation engineer. Both the identity issue and my basic technical knowledge on water 
issues were beneficial to be able to talk about practicalities and understand the technicalities 
of their problems.  
 
2.4.5. Conversational techniques 
In situations where I noticed that informants were hesitant to talk about a specific topic, or 
when I was aware that the topic was sensitive to talk about, I often introduced it with 
reference to what I had heard before from other people in other situations. This obviously 
helped to break people’s fear of talking about the topic, presumably with the logic that if 
others talk about the topic they can just as well also talk about it. Moreover, as it showed 
that I had more than one source for the information, they would run less risk of being 
exposed as the source of a particular view or comments. I was aware that my strategy might 
just as well distort the answer, as it would be easy for an informant to ‘fool’ me by giving an 
answer in line with the idea that I had sketched. I put up with this risk as otherwise people 
often would not talk about the specific subject at all. 
In the beginning of the research a few times I made use of a dictaphone as some 
people had suggested to me that especially state officials would feel taken more seriously. I 
had the strong impression that it made informants feel uncomfortable. The difference 
between what was said during the running of the tape and what was said once the recording 
was stopped, however, gave interesting circumstantial information.  
In the field I only made use of a small notebook in which I quickly noted down the 
most important information. In the beginning I was often making notes during the 
interview, but in later stages of the research I did it more and more directly after finalising 
the talk. The taking of notes during the talking obstructed the flow of the interview, partly 
because of the distractions and time needed for that and partly because people would be 
constantly aware that I was observing and writing down everything they said. Though 
moving the note taking somewhat out of sight of the interviewees I was not secretive about 
it. I always let people know that I was taking notes and using the information they gave me. 
Postponing the jotting down frequently led to the loss of some details and accuracy, but in 
my assessment the advantages were larger than the disadvantages. 
In principle I tried to ask open questions and let people free in their responses. 
Often I did not get direct answers to my questions and it was difficult to assess whether 
people were on purpose avoiding the question or whether they wrongly understood the 
question9. I usually tried to clarify the question by phrasing it differently. Or when that also 
                                                 
8 As researcher of the ZEF/UNESCO project I had an accreditation as diplomat of a UN-organisation. 
9 Possibly this was also under influence of sometimes precarious translations with field assistants whose 
English was sometimes far from perfect. 
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did not work sometimes suggested a few answers to choose from. Suggesting answers 
certainly made it easier to understand the question, but frequently I had the impression that 
people were trying to give socially desirable answers. In situations where I had the strong 
impression that people were purposefully sketching me a situation or argument that seemed 
highly unlikely to me, I sometimes suggested them my contrary opinion on the case or told 
them about earlier observations that refuted the presented picture. In only very few cases 
this led to a change of the story, so methodologically, it was not very effective. This 
definitely bears the risk of pushing people into a subordinate or defensive position, which 
increases the risks of socially desirable and evasive answers. On the other hand, doing this 
after all made clear that I did not just accept everything and that even though generally 
taking an attitude of listening and asking for clarifications, there were limits. I had the 
impression that in the long run this had the positive effect that some informants took me 
more seriously. 
 
2.4.6. Moving between observations and theory  
Being able to move between theory and observations (see sections 2.2 and 2.3) requires the 
production, storage and analysis of observations in a particular way. Taking field notes and 
working with them is at the centre of the qualitative research process. In the first place it is 
the storage of facts and observations, described as accurately and precise as possible. But 
one also “… tries to get ‘behind’ the observations, … they are not taken at their face value” 
(Alasuutari, 1995:41). Therefore also the contextual information and interpretations are 
added to the field notes. It is, however, important to keep these interpretations clearly 
distinguished from the observations. “The method is without doubt poor if it does not 
enable the data to surprise, if the empirical analysis cannot even in theory give the researcher 
feedback that shows the need for improvements in the hypothesis or the design” (ibid. p.42). 
This ‘surprising’ can be achieved by writing out the observations in detail, without jumping 
to interpretations. Doing this consistently takes time, effort and considerable length of 
writing, but in the end is rewarding as the field notes can be used as ‘raw material’ in which 
also new things can be discovered, on top of what was seen and interpreted at the moment 
of writing. Distinguishing between direct observations, contextual information (for instance 
from earlier fieldwork) and interpretations mostly shows from the writing style, but for 
clarity I often added straight brackets and accolades around the latter two.  
The process of oscillating between theory and empirical material continued during 
the writing process. New codes and interpretations were added to the field notes, while 
existing literature was read or re-read with the objective to apply them to situations 
encountered in the field. Ideas were checked with the empirical material by searching 
through the field notes for good examples and situations that could refute or refine the 
arguments. 
 
2.4.7. Two problems 
The described methodology explicitly took into account the specific difficulties in rural 
Uzbekistan. In spite of this there are two problematic effects with regards to the validity of 
the results. Firstly there was the problem with cross-checking of data though different ways 
of triangulation. And secondly there are biases in the research due to certain groups of actors 
being over-represented.  
The main problem with cross-checking data was the sensitivity of the information 
that people gave me. This could partly be overcome through working at multiple sites and 
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comparing the principles of individual cases with each other rather than fully cross-checking 
the details of reported stories. Also the mixed-method triangulation helped in getting 
different sorts of (contextual) information. However, also in mixed method triangulation 
problems were encountered. Especially the lack of reliable official data was problematic. 
Many researchers in Uzbekistan have reported to receive conflicting data sets as well as the 
suspicion of ‘doctored’ data (Mueller, 2006; Conrad, 2006; Wegerich, 2005). I am especially 
aware of examples of economic data and water discharge data, but this is probably 
connected to the sphere in which our project is active.  
The use of such secondary data was limited and instead I relied as much as possible on data 
that could be cross-checked with own observations in the field. With regard to discharge 
data, which I did use on a wider scale, I used data from the lowest level in the state 
hierarchy. I camera copied this data at the offices where the data was actually collected. The 
people collecting the data were able to explain me in detail the procedures by which they 
collected and administrated data. This data was not of perfect quality, as these measurements 
were not always accurately done and frequently skipped. On basis of other research results, 
especially Conrad (2006) and Wegerich (2005), it was sometimes expected that the 
aggregated data at district level and above, was doctored to show lower water use or more 
equal patterns of water use between districts. On basis of the trust relation that I built up 
with the collectors of the data and the detailed knowledge of the procedures I could be 
pretty sure that the raw data that I received was not doctored in such a way.  
The second problem is that of over representation of some views over others. 
People that have an informed insight on the inner workings of WUAs or the state 
organisation at district level are sparse. The people that also feel free to talk about these 
sensitive topics are even rarer. It soon turned out that many of the key informants are in a 
particular group, which leads to specific biases – in general they are male, they are relatively 
wealthy, well-educated and connected to the local elites, and many of them had a function in 
the state system. Often they had a close relative or other patron at a powerful position, 
which apparently gave them the ability to freely talk about such issues. Besides that it was 
difficult to cross-check the stories that they told (see above). Also, without an exception they 
represented the views of the fermers. Ordinary dekhans often had no insight in the processes 
under research, nor would they have felt free to share it with me. In the absence of a critical 
peasant or farmers’ movement in Uzbekistan it is difficult to generate ideas and critiques 
informed by their insights.  
 
 
2.5. Selection of case study areas and description of methods 
 
This section describes some of the methodological procedures of which it is important to 
describe them in detail in order to be able to assess the validity and representativeness of 
some of the findings. Three elements are discussed; (1) the selection of case study areas, (2) 
the household survey and (3) the selection of a group of households that were followed 
during a complete cropping season. 
 
2.5.1. Fieldwork locations 
The overall fieldwork location is the irrigation and drainage network of Khorezm Province 
(Oblast/Viloyat), which is located in West-Uzbekistan (see also figure 1.1). At the ‘village 
level’ four locations within Khorezm were studied in detail. They are former collective farms, 
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now dismantled into numerous fermer enterprises (private medium-sized farms). At the level 
of the collective farms WUAs have been established to manage irrigation and drainage 
facilities in the area. Four WUAs were selected as case studies (see figure 1.2).  
Karmish WUA and Chikirchi-Angarik WUA were studied during two consecutive 
summers (2005-2006), while Madir-Yap WUA and Tagalak-Yap WUA were added in 2006. 
The two locations selected in 2005 are both located in Yangiarik District, a district in which 
most of the district level work was conducted. Also in Kushkupir District and Khanka 
District, the districts in which the other two WUAs are located, research at the district level 
was conducted. 
In 2005 Karmish WUA was still Khorezm Shirkat, a post-independence collective 
farm in the Northern end of the district, and therefore somewhat in the head-end area of the 
irrigation’s sub-system. The primary reason for working in this location was the possibility of 
living in one of its villages. Chikirchi Angarik WUA was selected in addition, and in contrast. 
It is in the far South of the district and constitutes the tail of the system. The cropping 
season of 2005 was the second year in which it functioned as a WUA with privatised fermers. 
In 2006, after having chosen to in the first place focus on the WUA level, it became possible 
to add another two case study WUAs. These were purposefully selected outside Yangiarik 
District, in order to make the study better represent the diversity within Khorezm. With 
respect to earlier conducted and just starting research in the natural sciences domain within 
the ZEF/UNESCO project, WUAs within the Palvan-Gazavat system were selected that 
had relatively simple hydrographic boundaries, i.e. their water balances could be studied with 
minimal measuring points10. One of them was located very much upstream (Madir-Yap 
WUA) and one of them very much downstream (Tagalak Yap WUA). Both of them were 
functioning as WUAs for the second cropping season, i.e. the collective farms were 
dismantled round about 2004/2005. This was an explicit selection criterion. By this they 
were representative for many WUAs in Khorezm, as the majority was established in the 
period 2004/2006 as part of a country-wide programme to transform all remaining collective 
farms into fermer enterprises with WUAs responsible for water management (see Chapter 6). 
 
2.5.2. The survey 
In order to gather basic statistical data on household composition, land holding and land-use 
a household survey was conducted in the four selected WUAs. The survey served both the 
purpose of being able to compare the four WUAs as well as to generate numbers that would 
be representative for Khorezm as a whole. For the latter purpose the survey has the 
limitation that it was conducted in four concentrated areas (the WUAs), which together not 
necessarily comprise a representative share of Khorezm as a whole. On some aspects the 
variation between the four WUAs is only small and of these numbers it can be expected that 
they are representative for a larger area as well. 
The survey form and methodology for sampling and interview were designed after 
consultation with various researchers in the ZEF/UNESCO project that had conducted 
surveys in Khorezm earlier. As a result the survey form and method of sampling was based 
on the principles of the survey as conducted by Caleb Wall (see Wall, 2006: 87-89). A few 
specific questions regarding agricultural knowledge (his research topic) were removed and 
some questions regarding land tenure and land use were added. The forms (see Annex) were 
completed by the enumerators during interviews with one of the household members. Ten 
                                                 
10 The earlier work referred to is that of Christopher Conrad, the then planned work that of Usman Khalid 
Awan. 
COTTON, RICE AND WATER 
 
56 
percent of the households in each WUA were sampled. In total the sample size is 684 
households. They were selected by walking down the streets and approaching every tenth 
house. If nobody was found at home the neighbouring house was approached, if people 
were at home but did not agree to participate (either at the beginning or in the course of the 
interview) the household was counted in the sample as a refusal. Following Wall (2006) and 
Kandiyoti (1999) the household is defined as the people living together in one house and 
sharing a common household budget 
Regarding the selection of enumerators Wall (2006) argued for selecting suitable 
students at the university in Urgench and let them survey their home village in a rural area. 
For his survey the exact location of the villages was not so important. The survey conducted 
for this study had to be exactly in the four WUAs where other research was already done. It 
turned out to be impossible to find suitable candidates in the four WUAs themselves. Hence 
the best four student candidates were selected without consideration to the location of their 
homes. They worked as a team of enumerators completing the four WUAs the one after the 
other. As a result the effect of the individual enumerators on the results could be filtered out. 
Especially questions referring to the vaguely defined concept ‘enough’ and politically 
sensitive issues resulted in differing responses depending on the enumerator and must 
therefore be considered invalid.  
The four enumerators were trained in conducting surveys. In order to counter the 
expected high levels of distrust to be encountered a lot of attention was paid to how to 
create a comfortable setting in which people would give reliable answers. After initial 
training they were sent out for one day to conduct some interviews and their experiences 
were discussed plenary. This resulted in a few adaptation made to the interview form and 
some suggestions for how to create a comfortable setting. During the initial days of 
conducting the survey the filled-in forms were discussed one-on-one with the enumerators 
in order to clarify any possible misunderstanding and to make sure that they all had the same 
understanding of the questionnaire. 
The basic descriptive statistics gathered from this survey are presented in Table 2.2. 
Further analysis of the data follows in the subsequent chapters. 
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WUA name Karmish Chikirchi 
Angarik
Madir-
Yap 
Tagalak-
Yap
Former Shirkat Khorezm Ak 
Mechit
Yangi 
Hayot 
Obod
Located in district Yangiarik Yangiarik Khanka Kushkupi
r
Irrigation sub-system Tashaka, 
R8
Tashaka, 
R8
Palvan-
Gazavat 
Palvan-
Gazavat
How long a WUA in 2006 1st year 3rd year 2nd year 2nd year
Studied during 2005/200
6
2005/200
6
2006 2006
 
Agricultural area (ha) 
 
2055
 
2289
 
1652 
 
1650
Total population (no.) 9116 10678 8739 6925
Number of households (official 
statistics) 
2241 2589 1187 1364
Sample size (no. of households) 223 212 119 130
Number of fermers in the WUA 255 147 91 81
% fermers as part of total no of 
households 
11% 6% 8% 6%
% of households with tamorka 100% 97% 93% 96%
average size of tamorka in these 
households (ha) 
0.149 0.145 0.143 0.136
Average household size (no. of people) 6.3 7.0 8.0 6.9
Average available workers per 
household 
3.2 3.9 3.8 3.4
% of households with member with 
paid employment 
51% 31% 67% 47%
% of households with member working 
outside Uzbekistan 
16% 21% 8% 28%
% of households with a member 
employed by a fermer 
26% 35% 22% 44%
% of households with a car 30% 37% 50% 39%
% of households with a donkey cart 42% 35% 13% 48%
% of households holding cows 87% 85% 80% 82%
Average number of cows in these 
households 
3.4 2.8 3.2 2.1
% of households holding sheep 18% 24% 12% 31%
Average number of sheep in these 
households 
2.5 3.2 4.5 8.1
Table 2.2 – Descriptive statistics of the four case study WUAs 
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2.5.3. Series of interviews with selected farmers 
At the beginning of the fieldwork period in 2006 in each of the four case study WUAs eight 
households were selected; four fermer households and four dekhan households. All these 
households were interviewed at least once by means a semi-structured interview. Of these 
initial 32 households about 10 were followed in detail throughout that season. Some of these 
people were visited more than five times, others just three times. Some of these follow-up 
interviews took half a day, others were only short incidental encounters. Sometimes these 
meetings were at the farmer’s home, but mostly this was then combined with a joint visit to 
their fields. In this way the semi-structured interviews were combined with direct 
observations of agricultural practices. This was a great aid in overcoming the farmers’ 
hesitance to talk and the frequent miscommunications due to cultural and language barriers. 
Being at their fields we could talk about very concrete agricultural practices like the depth of 
ploughing, the spacing of plants, the method of applying water, the boundaries of plots 
within a field. Indirectly this provided insights in the relations between fermers and their 
workers, between farmers and state organisations as well as between farmers in a certain 
area. Later such issues could sometimes be discussed more directly, but even then it 
remained easier to talk with concrete examples at hand by being at their fields. With the 
passing by of the agricultural season different issues were discussed, partly led by advancing 
insights and partly by the agricultural issues at play at that moment. Early in the season the 
interviews centred on topics like land preparation, leaching, and the seeding of cotton, later 
the first and second irrigation of cotton plants was more important while in May and June 
the planting of rice (and getting permission for it) was a major issue. Only in 
September/October it was easier to talk about yields of cotton and rice, the marketing of it 
and the negotiations for the cropping patterns of the next year. 
Selection of the case study households was through theoretic sampling, i.e. following 
from the issues that were found in earlier fieldwork as well as following from expectations 
based on theories, households were strategically hand-picked. For instance I looked for a few 
large fermers, as I was aware that they have a different mode of operation than the medium-
sized and small fermers. Moreover I especially selected households involved in cropping 
cotton and/or rice as I expected interesting interactions over water along these lines of 
division. Some dekhans were selected for their tail-end position in their WUAs and the 
expected possible effects on strategising for water. 
 
 
2.6.  Conclusion 
 
On basis of qualitative fieldwork material conclusions can be drawn about the mechanisms 
behind the observed phenomena. It is not necessary to systematically follow all the drains in 
a particular area, nor to quantify how much water was flowing directly to the drains and for 
what purposes. The in-depth understanding of the underlying mechanisms makes it possible 
to formulate the general rules behind it, as well as the possibilities and the impossibilities. On 
this basic understanding of the system more pointed research questions and hypotheses were 
formulated that could be tested and/or quantified.  
My experience with approaching a politically sensitive topic through an integrated 
approach and mixed methods triangulations results in a number of recommendations. First 
of all a bottom-up approach that starts with living in a village, learning Uzbek and slowly 
building-up rapport with ordinary people has proved effective – it seems unnecessary to start 
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with the authorities and work ones way down to field level. This is however only possible 
when permissions have been pre-arranged, for instance through working in a large research 
project. And still, it requires sensitivity in working with people in official positions. In my 
experience it is more useful to once in a while be sent around to places and people that tell 
the official story rather than to be seen as somebody working outside the set boundaries. In 
the latter case people do not feel free to talk and if they do they might bring themselves into 
trouble. Similarly I never explicitly sought to research illegal activities. Though at some point 
paddy cultivation did have my attention, I did not look into the issue because of its illegality, 
but because of its strong influence on water distribution. 
The use of a professional identity proved very useful if I compare my work with that 
of some colleagues, who had difficulties in finding a credible excuse to ‘hang around’ in the 
field. Not only the identity, but also practical and thorough technical knowledge of the 
research topic are an enormous advantage. This also helps to position oneself in action 
situation, where interviews can be combined with direct observations. In general it is a big 
advantage to be able to do direct observations compared to just interviews, as people tend to 
be more at ease when engaged in activities, it often leads to practical questions that also have 
a deeper meaning and observation of the activities also lead to new insights.  
Above all, the mixed method triangulation with a retroduction or riddle solving 
approach has proved particularly useful in a problematic research context. It provides the 
opportunity for trying a variety of methods and assessing the practical advantages and 
disadvantages of each in the particular setting. This flexibility is necessary to be able to 
respond to the many difficulties encountered in the field. Also the approach was apt to be 
deployed in a situation where only very little was known on the research topic. The approach 
allowed for theory development and restructuring rather than for theory testing. In the 
current environment it will be difficult to reliably quantify the identified processes. However, 
there are good opportunities for theory refinement and reconstruction.  
Just as some topics were avoided during fieldwork, also in the written material 
(papers and dissertation) some topics as well as some concrete references will be omitted. 
Partly this is a result of lacking field material and partly because it might threaten my 
informants or the ZEF/UNESCO project of which this research is part. Such self-
censorship is not strange to Uzbek media and society (Shafer and Freedman, 2003). For me, 
however, it is a new phenomenon. Within the ZEF/UNESCO project we have had 
recurring discussions on what we can and what we cannot write in order not create threats to 
the continuation of the project and/or the personal safety of the people that we work with. 
It is a sad thing that this must be an issue and it is a compromise to academic standards that 
even we have to conclude that in some ways we have to restrict ourselves. To me the bottom 
line is that it should at least be possible to publicly state that, to our own perception, we 
cannot write everything, i.e. we actively and consciously censor our work to keep it 
acceptable for the Uzbek government.  
There are serious limitations to conducting social science research in Uzbekistan, yet 
this research has been able to gain access to issues and developments in Uzbek society that 
were unknown before. Among other things this research sheds light on state control in 
practice, socio-economic differentiation processes in agriculture and the practice of new 
institutions that are implemented under influence of worldwide neo-liberal agendas (such as 
Water Users Associations and water pricing). These are valuable findings that may have their 
effect on research and implementation processes and eventually they might inform rural 
transformation processes and in that way benefit the people of Uzbekistan. 
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3.1. Introduction 
 
Since its independence in 1991, Uzbekistan’s agricultural system has been in transformation. 
The moving away from a collective and command economy has been slow, but has had 
important effects. In agriculture the main changes took place through land reform and 
reforms in state planning of production. This has led to the formation of new agricultural 
production units, changed rural livelihood patterns and differentiation in the rural social-
economic structure. 
In this chapter the most recent phase of Uzbek agrarian reform is discussed. It 
consists of the dissolution of all remaining Large Farm Enterprises (LFEs)11 and the 
allocation of land use rights to family based fermer enterprises. The following questions are 
addressed: who are the actors in agricultural production, how do their current positions 
relate to their position in former phases of agrarian reforms, and what are their relations vis-
à-vis each other? The answers to these questions concern three actors (or groups of actors): 
the dekhans (which are peasant-like), the fermers, and the state. Also after the most recent 
agrarian reform the latter remains a strong regulator and driver of agricultural production.  
The story presented in this chapter concerns a limited time slot in an ongoing 
process; i.e. the Uzbek agrarian system is still in slow, yet continuous, change. Even though 
this change process is frequently labelled as a transition process to a market economy it is 
not easy to distinguish where it is moving to. Certainly it was not a market economy in the 
period under study. Policies frequently contradict each other, as the government 
simultaneously aims at economic and socio-political stability through keeping a strong hold 
on agricultural production, and at improving efficiency through introducing market forces, 
which implies de-regulation (cf. Mueller, 2006:17). Easier than knowing where Uzbekistan is 
moving to, it is to see where it is coming from; i.e. a former Soviet republic with a collective 
agricultural system and a strongly plan-driven command economy. 
Formally the Soviet Union had an egalitarian society, while in practice there were 
important differences in position and opportunities. Furthermore the collapse of the Soviet 
Union led to ‘a significant increase in differentiation and stratification, growing inequality 
within and between different strata of the population, and rising poverty’ (Wegren et al. 
2006: 372). As a result there are ‘winners and losers’ in the rural economy. In their study, 
Wegren et al. (2006) address the question whether in rural Russia classes are developing. 
Subsequently they show that in Russia the upper and the lower strata differentiated 
substantially on five axes of analysis that they defined: income, land holdings, capital stock, 
class consciousness and shared attitudes and values. On the basis of this increased 
differentiation and stratification they argue that a new class structure is emerging in rural 
Russia.  
The Uzbek path of transition has been quite different from that of Russia, yet the 
process is analogous and the question to class formation through socio-economic 
differentiation and stratification is relevant for Uzbekistan as well. In Uzbekistan this process 
has not evolved far enough to make similar assessments and interpretations as in Wegren et 
al. (2006). However, the distribution of the means of production (particularly land) is highly 
unevenly and this could provide the lines along which classes will stratify and differentiate. 
                                                 
11 Here the term large farm enterprise (LFE) is adopted to cover the broad spectrum of types and terminology 
of agricultural enterprises in state and collective agriculture. In most situations these differences are 
unimportant and hence it is clearer to use just the term LFE instead of kolkhoz, sovkhoz, shirkat, collective, co-
operative, etc. 
CHAPTER 3 – LAND REFORM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS 
 
63
Access to In section 3.2, on Uzbekistan’s path of transition, the agricultural reforms are 
discussed along the topics of ‘land reform’ and ‘command economy reform’. 
Though the land tenure arrangements and accompanying regulations have a strong 
influence on how farm enterprises are organised the differentiation in the management of 
farm enterprises is not merely a bifurcation between fermers and dekhans. In section 3.3 and 
3.4, respectively the practices and social relation of dekhan-families and the fermer-enterprises 
are described. These are formal categories that contain a heterogeneous set of strategies and 
forms of enterprise organisation. Farm enterprises have different ways of shaping their 
relations of production, both the internal relations of production (e.g. the control over business 
capital, land rights, operations, and labour relations) and the external relations of production (e.g. 
technological dependencies, credit relations and  marketing linkages)12. On basis of this 
recognition a typology is developed (section 3.5). The concept of subsumption developed by 
Whatmore et al. (1987a and 1987b) is used to describe the reduced autonomy of farm 
enterprises in relation to wider relations of agricultural production.  
In the concluding section (3.5) also the increased dependency of ordinary rural 
households (the dekhans) on the fermers is discussed. Socio-economic differentiation has 
become visible and is expected to further increase. This poses serious questions regarding 
equity and development that are relevant for both the Uzbek government and international 
organisations working in Uzbekistan.  
 
 
3.2. Uzbekistan’s path of transition 
 
The new states that emerged from the Soviet Union have followed very different paths of 
agrarian transition (Spoor and Visser, 2001). There were early, late and non-reformers 
(Gleason, 2004). Uzbekistan is considered a late reformer. Others refer to the Uzbek model 
as ‘step by step’ (Bloch, 2002:5 in Conti, 2004:78) or ‘gradual reform’ (Pomfret, 1999 and 
2000; Auty, 2003). ‘Gradual reform’ is not a euphemism for ‘no change at all’. Especially in 
agriculture, reform has proceeded very slowly in the first decade after independence 
(Pomfret 1999: 7–8). This gradual reform has been a deliberate choice by the Government 
of Uzbekistan. In the first decade this resulted in a stable economy when compared to the 
more radical reforms initiated by other republics of the former Soviet Union (Spoor and 
Visser, 2001; Ho and Spoor, 2006). 
The agrarian structure of Uzbekistan still strongly bears the marks of the Soviet era. 
The land tenure system until very recently reflected the remnants of collectivisation, while 
the input-output regulations resembled a partial plan economy. Firstly the history of land 
reforms and the current land tenure system are presented (3.2.1). This is followed by an 
elaboration of the remaining state regulations in agriculture (3.2.2).  
 
3.2.1. Land reforms  
The reforms after the collapse of the Soviet Union cannot be considered to be a ‘restoration’ 
or ‘back to what was’; i.e.  
 
Private property arrangements have been disrupted for more than a century, first by 
Russian colonialism and then by 70 years of Soviet-style socialism. Indeed, in many 
areas there is no historical record at all of private property rights in water and 
                                                 
12 See also the discussion in Chapter 1 
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agricultural land. In most areas, geophysical and cadastral surveys of the land do not 
exist and may never have existed.  
(Gleason and Buck, 1993:522). 
 
Over the first 15 years of post-independence the major part of the agricultural land in 
Uzbekistan was distributed as land use entitlements on basis of farming capability (technical, 
socio-economic as well as political). Only a limited number of households got such 
entitlements. Around the moment of independence all rural households received an 
additional household plot (ko’sumcha tamorka). As a result about 20% of the arable land is 
now in use as household plot. None of this land re-distribution was on the basis of former 
ownership13. 
Figure 3.1 shows that in the first 15 years of independence the shares of agricultural 
land that are cropped privately (in white) and semi-privately (in light grey) have both steadily 
increased. At the same time the area cultivated under a collective and state regime (dark grey) 
decreased. Below the transition from the Soviet Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz towards fully de-
collectivised agriculture (in 2006) is discussed in three phases of reforms. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 – Land use change in post-independence Uzbekistan 
Source: own compilation on basis of a figure by Trevisani (forthcoming 2008) 
 
 
                                                 
13 This is very different from the post-communist land reforms in most Eastern European countries, where 
land was often re-distributed on basis of historical claims (see for instance Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004). 
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The first round of reforms (in figure 3.1 marked by the symbol ‘c’) consisted of three 
aspects. 
(a) In the direct aftermath of independence, the ‘large, inefficient’ sovkhozy (state farms) 
were simply transformed into ‘large, inefficient’ collective or cooperative farms 
(World Bank 1994:39, cited in Spoor, 1999). The collective land was still cultivated 
by work brigades. Officially workers no longer received a monthly wage, but rather a 
share of the collective’s production, but in practice these were only paper shares 
(Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004). 
(b) At about the same time each rural household was given an extra household plot of 
about 0.13 irrigated hectares (ko’sumcha tamorka). This was in addition to the 0.12 ha 
housing plot or garden (tamorka). The new household plots were established on 
former collective land; large fields were taking out of collective production and 
divided into small plots. These distant household plots were therefore located as 
aggregated groups throughout the Kolkhoz. The allocation of extra household plots 
was a move in response to the shortfall in grain (and other food products) right after 
the break-up of the Soviet Union and was meant to secure enough food production 
on the household level (Kandiyoti, 2003a:228) and as a compensation for the 
shortcomings in payment by the state and collective farms (Patnaik, 1995:156; 
Trevisani, 2007b). In 1989 between one third and half of the population in Central 
Asia lived below the poverty line (Patnaik, 1995:154). By the enlargement of the 
households plots rural households moved towards self-sufficiency, which helped to 
counter this poverty. The enlargement of the household plots formed the basis on 
which the Uzbek government in later periods renamed the kolkhoznik a dekhan (lit. 
small farmer or peasant). Trevisani (forthcoming 2008) states that this specific 
wording has been chosen ‘for its ideological reference to the ‘historical’ sedentary 
Uzbek oasis dweller, who used to make his living out of agriculture’. 
(c) Since 1991 long-term private leaseholds on pieces of collective land were slowly 
introduced (ijara-contracts; lit. ‘rent’). In the following rounds of reforms these sorts 
of contracts gained importance and the area which they covered slowly increased. In 
the academic literature till about 2000 they are referred to as ‘independent farmer’, 
‘private farmer’ or ‘dekhan’14. The family-based agricultural enterprises that were built 
upon these ijara-contracts are in this study referred to as ‘fermers’. Officially the land 
remained state property while fermers got land leases or partial usufruct rights. The 
allocation of land went through the powerful governors and mayors, a process which 
at the onset especially benefited the rural elite (Spoor, 1999:10; Trevisani, 2007b).  
 
The second phase of reforms (in figure 3.1 marked with ‘d’) confirmed the direction of 
development and took it a step further: 
(a) In 1998/1999 all kolkhozy were renamed into shirkats (‘association’ in Uzbek), while 
the work on collective land was reorganised from work brigades into family pudrats 
(after the Russian-Uzbek root for ‘contract’). A pudrat is a small work brigade 
organised on family relations; each family bearing the responsibility for (part of) a 
field. The same people continued to work on the same collective fields. However, as 
pudrats they entered directly into a sort of share-cropping arrangements with the 
shirkat rather than being brigade members, i.e. workers. 
                                                 
14 The latter should not be mistaken with came to be known as dekhan after about 2000, i.e. a rural household 
with only a household plot. 
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(b) The number of fermers, with leased land as enclaves within shirkats, slowly increased. 
(c) In the same period some of the most unprofitable shirkats went through a ‘sanitation 
programme’, which aimed to reform unproductive agricultural enterprises. It 
consisted of a period of two years in which the creditworthiness and economic 
viability were re-established. The enterprises that showed improvement remained 
shirkats, while the rest were liquidated and transformed into ‘Associations of Private 
and Dekhan Farmers’. The former collective land was distributed among fermers. Such 
areas de facto already reached a situation as depicted in the fourth column of figure 
3.1. 
 
In the third and most recent round of reforms (in figure 3.1 marked with ‘e’) the path of 
de-collectivisation was continued. 
(a) All the remaining collectives followed the liquidation path. Almost all land was 
redistributed to fermers, while a small share of between 10 and 20 percent initially 
remained on the accounts of the ‘Motor Tractor Parks’ (MTPs). It was intended that 
the major part of this would also be distributed to fermers in the years following. 
(b) In the collective farms many functions had been integrated. After liquidation of the 
farm these functions were partly transferred to the fermers, partly transferred to 
government organisations at district level and partly continued in separate 
organisations like the MTPs. Within the MTPs the major part of the heavy 
machinery that remained of the collective farms was accommodated. 
(c) Water Users Associations (WUAs) are bestowed with the responsibility to manage 
and maintain the irrigation and drainage infrastructure. The institutional aspects of 
water distribution at this level are elaborated in Chapter 5. In Yangibazar District 
(Khorezm Province), this third phase of reforms already took place in 2001/2002 as 
part of a nation-wide pilot study. On basis of these (and other) experiences, similar 
reforms were implemented in the whole country during 2005 and 2006.  
 
This chapter, and in fact the major part of this study, is about the third phase of reforms and 
the socio-political dynamics of water distribution in the situation as represented by the 
fourth column (Figure 3.1).  
 
3.2.2. Regulation by the state 
Above it was explained that land under state/collective production was slowly but surely 
transferred to private and semi-private forms of production. This is transformation through 
de-collectivisation. One of the other axes of transformation is the de-regulation of state 
agricultural production. 
As a continuation of Soviet planning in a command economic mode the Uzbek 
government still prescribes fixed quotas for crop production of wheat and cotton. Wheat is 
deemed essential for national grain self-sufficiency, while cotton has been a favoured cash 
crop for at least two centuries.15 Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, grain was 
delivered to Uzbekistan from other areas within the Union. At independence Uzbekistan 
                                                 
15 In the first half of the 19th century Russia important cotton from Central Asia. The American civil war 
(1861-65) caused a drop in American cotton delivery and stimulated Russia to find their cotton elsewhere 
(Pierce, 1960 in Wegerich 2002). Cotton was also one of the main reasons for Russia to conquer Central Asia 
between 1864 and 1885 (Lipovsky, 1995 in Wegerich, 2002). 
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started aiming at, and meanwhile has achieved, self-sufficiency in grain production, partly at 
the cost of cotton production.16  
The break-up of the Soviet Union and the cut-off from Soviet budgetary grants 
pushed the Uzbek government to seek its own revenues. Initially these revenues were 
generated through continuation of the state order system for the production of cotton: 
production quotas for shirkats and fermers were set by the government and raw cotton was to 
be sold for a fixed (or negotiated, but de facto fixed17) price to the state (Kandiyoti, 2003a; 
Pomfret, 1999:9). The system functioned through pre-financing of subsidised inputs and 
cheap credits to LFEs and fermers, while at the end of the season these debts were deducted 
from the amounts paid for the yield. The height of the payment for the raw cotton was very 
low in comparison to what the government got for sale of the processed cotton and by-
products after processing. Overall a net flow of value out of agriculture was taking place, 
especially because of the arrangements around cotton production (IMF, 1998 in Spoor, 
2004; Djalalov, 2005; World Bank, 2005). These regulations actually put strong disincentives 
on the production of cotton (World Bank, 2005).18 Thus there were high economic costs to 
maintain the system, which were borne by the tillers of the land, not by the controlling elites 
or the state organisations. The financial margin for the actual producers is very small and 
sometimes even negative, yet producers also profit from a stable and therefore predictable 
‘market’. 
Meanwhile the ‘implicit taxation’ of agricultural production has decreased, among 
others due to increased cotton prices that the fermers receive. The IMF (1998, in Spoor, 2004) 
in 1995 estimated a net outflow of resources from agriculture at $0.9–1.2 billion. In the 
following two years (1996–1997) transfer out of agriculture dropped to somewhere between 
$250 and $550 million. The WorldBank (2005) estimated that in the period from 2000–2004 
this number fluctuated between $285 (2000) and $150 (2003) million.  
 
 
3.3. Dekhan livelihoods 
 
By referring to the pre-collectivised term dekhan, the Uzbek government stressed the 
independence of the rural households as well as its ability and need to sustain itself. The 
term dekhan could possibly be translated with ‘peasant’, which has a connotation of small and 
production for subsistence. The nature of the peasantry has been hotly debated in academic 
literature. Bernstein and Byres (2001:6) explain how in different ways peasants have been 
defined, though they themselves are critical of such definitions.  
 
The qualities of an essential ‘peasantness’ can be constructed in formal theories of 
peasant behaviour […] and in sociological and cultural(ist) conceptions of what 
makes peasants different and special (contrasted explicitly or implicitly with 
proletarians on one hand, market-oriented and entrepreneurial ‘farmers’ on the 
other). Such essentialist constructions acknowledge the relations of peasants with 
                                                 
16 As earlier noticed by Spoor (2000) the area grown to cotton decreased from 1,666,680 ha to 1,487,300 ha 
between 1992 and 1996 while the area grown to grain increased from 626,990 ha to 1,328,600 (FAOSTAT, 
2007).  
17 Prices are de facto fixed as the State functions as monopolistic buyer. 
18 The World Bank estimates that with a change in tax structure an increase of 50% in the output of cotton 
would be possible, which would result in the same revenue for the state. 
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other social groups and entities – landlords, merchants, the state, the urban in 
general – and typically view them as relations of subordination and exploitation. 
 
At this place I do not intend to analyse the Uzbek dekhan in the very broad literature of the 
peasant debate. Therefore the issue is not so much about the definition of the peasant and 
its role in agrarian change, but rather the focus is on the actually existing (and changing) 
social relations of dekhan families, which have some likening to what in ordinary speech is 
understood as a peasant. Also I do not argue that dekhans are a social class, as it is not clear 
to what extent this group of households share values and have similar income strategies. 
Certainly their relations to markets and other forms of trade are not uniform, neither is the 
income from paid labour and sharecropping arrangements. In this study, all rural households 
that are not fermers, are considered dekhans, no matter whether they are officially registered as 
such or not. Thus it is a very large group of households that is certainly not homogeneous. 
In the four case study areas dekhans accounted for 89–94%19 of the rural households. 
They are the tillers of the land and provide the workforce for all agricultural production, also 
on the fields of the fermers. All rural households have been granted household plots20, which 
in Khorezm province make for about 15% of the arable land21. The produce from these 
plots provides for a basic living. Surplus production is bartered with neighbours or sold on 
local markets (cf. Djanibekov, forthcoming 2008). In addition people take paid jobs outside 
the village and engage in small-scale animal husbandry, sharecropping, long-distance trading 
and labour migration. These livelihood activities are discussed in more detail in this section. 
 
3.3.1. Defining the household 
A household can be defined in a variety of ways. For the survey conducted as part of this 
research it was defined as the people living together in one house and sharing a common 
household budget. The official number of households is much higher than the number of 
households that qualifies under the adopted definition. The reason for this is that newly wed 
couples are registered as separate households as soon as possible in order to get assigned a 
housing plot as well as an (agricultural) household plot22. However they remain part of the 
                                                 
19 Karmish WUA 89%; Madir Yap WUA and Tagalak Yap WUA 92%; Chikirchi-Angarik WUA 94%. 
20 The survey results also show a very small group of households (3%) that does not have (or use) an additional 
household plot (tamorka).  
21 The numbers for Yangiarik District, which I know well and was able to cross-check on the ground, showed 
that it is almost 20%. The official number for Khorezm is 14%, which makes a fitting calculation with the 
average households size from my survey (7 persons), land sizes of 0.25 ha/household, a total population of 1.4 
million people, 80% of the people living in rural areas, and a total arable area of 275,000. 
22 The number of households registered in the village’s office (shora office) was higher than the number of 
actual households. To estimate the real number of households the average household size of the official 
statistics and that of the survey were compared with each other. This ratio can be assumed to be the same ratio 
as between the registered and the real number of households. In the total survey the average household size 
was for instance 6.9 persons, while the official numbers reported an average household size of 4.8 persons; a 
difference of a factor 1.4. An average household therefore consists of 1.4 registered households. 
 
In an interview this was confirmed to my by a former kolkhoz manager. 
 
GJV: There is also a difference as a result of the official households being more than the real houses. People 
get assigned a new plot, but still live together. [Respondent]: Yes, there are about 200-250 households that are 
actually part of another household. I know this very well, as for a long time I was the one handing out these 
plots to new households. Now the Shora office together with the Hokimiyat has become responsible. They will 
do this on fermer land when there is need. In that case the Shora will tell the Hokimiyat that there is need for new 
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household of the parents of the husband until a house has been built. This can take years. 
The family of the youngest son usually remains in the house and takes care of the parents 
and inherits the house. 
Kandiyoti (2003a) defined the household on the basis of the sharing of the kazan, the 
cooking pot, i.e. a common food budget; if people share their food it is one household. Even 
when a couple moves out of the natal house the food budget remains partly linked for some 
time. This leads to an understanding of households as extended families, which historically 
are large and culturally strong (cf Patnaik, 1995). The survey that was conducted as part of 
this research shows an average household size of 6.9 people (varying between 6.3 and 8.0 
between the four case study areas), with on average 3.6 people available as workforce. The 
extended family is a unit of consumption, distribution and production (Trevisani, 2007b). 
The patriarch manages the family budget, assigns labour tasks and decides about all matters 
of economic and social importance. The wife, sons, daughters (if living in the house) and 
daughters-in-law are expected to hand over their salaries and ask for money in case of 
‘special spendings’, while they usually also have some pocket money. 
Agrarian labour tasks are often divided along gender lines. Women are typically 
responsible for gardening on the household plots, weeding, silk production, milking cows, 
and the processing of food. Co-ordination of these tasks takes places by the mater familias. 
Task that are typically in the male domain are the arranging of contracts and inputs, 
arranging irrigation turns and irrigating the household plots. Women represent a large part of 
the workers on the fields of the LFE and fermers, which dekhan families crop under share 
cropping arrangements (see below). Feminisation of agriculture is taking place as an effect of 
temporary labour migration by men (see below) and increasing unemployment, which affects 
women more than men (cf. Trevisani, 2006a; Wall, 2006). 
From when children are about ten years of age they frequently work along with the 
adults in the fields (cf. ICG, 2005). At even younger ages the boys herd animals and girls 
assist in gardening, processing of food and domestic work. Elderly parents living in the 
house often look after the very young children and provide extra cash income through their 
pensions.  
Trevisani (forthcoming 2008) reports that to live a respectable life in the rural areas 
means: to eat meat once or twice a week, to be able to serve guests a bottle of vodka, to give 
parties at the important life events, to be able to build a house for the sons. Dekhans are the 
rural poor and among them a number of families struggle to even fulfil these basic 
conditions. 
 
3.3.2. The household plots 
The household plots provide a basic livelihood for almost all dekhans. The area usually 
consists of two (or more) separate plots; there are tamorkas and ko’sumcha tamorkas (i.e. plots 
and additional plots). Tamorkas are situated around the house and are fenced off with clay 
walls. In Khorezm they are often referred to as the backyard garden (bog’). The ko’sumcha 
tamorka is usually some distance away from the house.  
                                                                                                                                                 
land and they will decide which land will be used. (…) The Shora might give you a number of 1,200 households, 
but in reality it could be 900. [from field notes on 12/06/2006] 
 
At that place the official number of households was 1,364, and the correction factor 1.36, which would imply 
that actually there are only 1,003 households. This is very similar to the account by the former kolkhoz 
manager. 
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The attached plots are intensively cropped with potatoes and a variety of fruits and 
vegetables. The layout of beds is planned in detail, based on knowledge of the local 
conditions (soil quality, water availability, and light conditions)23. The soil is completely tilled 
by hand, shovel (bil) and hoe (ketmon). People use a variety of double cropping systems, 
which involve the early (sometimes over winter) cropping of potatoes, onions and garlic 
combined with the late cropping of mung beans, carrots, (green) tomatoes, onions and 
mixtures of maize, sorghum and millet as animal feed. From interviews and observations it 
showed that the distant plots were typically double cropped with wheat (over winter) and 
rice or maize (in summer). Of the respondents that provided data on the use of their distant 
plot 88% reported to crop wheat, while 60% reported to grow rice and 38% reported to 
crop maize24. Mostly also these distant plots are tilled by hand, though sometimes they are 
ploughed by tractor. 
The production on the tamorka plot provides for the basic needs of an average 
family, but it is a fragile base as the margins are narrow.25 Potato, vegetable, fruit and bean 
production in the gardens provides for food diversification. In addition to that, about half of 
the households have access to other sorts of land, as discussed in the following sections. 
 
3.3.3. Animal husbandry 
The survey that I conducted in the four case study areas shows that 84% of the households 
hold cows, 76% chicken, and 21% sheep. Wall (2006: 107), in his survey, even reports a 
number of 90.8% for households holding cows.  
A large proportion of the animal products come from the household smallholdings. 
Ilkhamov (1998) reported that in 1995 76% of the total meat production, 81% of the milk 
production and 66% of the eggs in Uzbekistan came from household smallholdings. Animals 
are indeed kept for provision of dairy and meat products for home consumption, sharing 
with neighbours and for selling to a butcher. Especially the rearing of cows is considered a 
lucrative business (cf. Wall, 2006:99). Besides, animals serve as capital stock. One of my 
informants referred to cows as ‘walking money’. Though there are (health) risks associated 
with the maintenance of this capital (cf. Wall, 2006), this way of stocking is generally 
preferred over bringing money to the bank. Animals are turned to cash or used as direct 
payment in case of large investments, such as the building of a new house and the major life-
cycle expenditures, such as the dowry and wedding celebrations (Trevisani, 2007b). A sheep 
that we had left as present of thanks to our host in the village was later passed on to a 
neighbouring family that had to organize a funeral, and which otherwise would have lacked 
the money to provide for a decent meal. 
As the household plots for most families are too small to produce animal fodder in 
addition to food production for home consumption, fodder has to be acquired elsewhere. 
Cows used to be taken grazing on the fields of the collective, which was considered a benefit 
                                                 
23 Wall (2006) elaborates on local knowledge in relation to household agriculture. 
24 All these three are planted on (almost) the entire plot (on average 0.14 ha); i.e. the average area for wheat and 
rice is 0.14 ha and for maize 0.13 ha. The total is more than 100% as most of this land is double cropped; after 
the wheat grown over winter people plant rice or maize. 
25 An estimated production that is possible on the distant plot gives: 0.13 ha x 4 ton wheat/ha + 0.13 ha x 3 
ton rice/ha = 910 kg/year. The average household consists of 4.8 persons (the average from official statistics 
from 4 WUAs). The production on the distant plot would then amount to 190 kg/person/year, which is less 
than the 230 kg per year that the World Food Program uses as the minimal cereal requirement (WFP, 2007). 
The backyard garden can provide some additional energy, especially through the production of potatoes, which 
is cropped by 85% of the households in the survey and grown on 35% of the total backyard garden area. 
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that belonged to workers of the collective farm. In the de-collectivised situation of 2006 
dekhans usually bargained grazing rights with a fermer (Trevisani, 2007b). Also cotton cakes 
that remain after pressing oil from the cotton seeds is used for fodder (Mueller, 2006). These 
cakes partly return to the fermer after his yield is processed and through that channel become 
available to the dekhans. 
Dekhan generally keep their animals at the back of the house, where there are animal 
sheds and storage of dry fodder. Cows and sheep are sometimes temporarily pegged in the 
fields or taken out grazing along the roads and canals, generally by children. The dung that 
the cows produce is in the first place used as organic fertilizer on the household plots. The 
surplus dung is provided to fermers as part of multiplex relations that are maintained between 
dekhans and fermers. Jozan et al. (2006) report a similar situation for the sharing of dung in the 
Uzbekistani part of the Ferghana Valley. 
 
3.3.4. Sharecropping and rental land 
Dekhans engage in various forms of sharecropping, i.e. they provide labour in exchange for 
other benefits. Until the third phase of reforms this used to be with the LFE, in the de-
collectivised situation this is with fermers. Characteristic for these sharecropping arrangements 
is that the mutual conditions are not cast in concrete, but that they are negotiable during the 
advancement of the season. Some relations can almost be characterised as pure wage labour, 
but in most of these labour relations cash payments played only a secondary role, i.e. the in 
kind payments and indirect benefits are more important (cf. Kandiyoti, 2003a). 
Though according to the government fermers should provide work to the dekhans who 
were the tillers under collective agriculture, upon de-collectivisation immediately a tendency 
to hire family members, neighbours and friends occurred. This ‘familiarization’ of the fermer’s 
workforce means the loss of opportunities for some. Under the third phase of reforms the 
plot of mulberry trees that for years had been cultivated by a dekhan family that I knew well 
was privatised in 2006 and given to a fermer. This fermer did the work on that plot with 
household labour and thus the dekhan family lost their access to silk production, which for 
years had been an important source of income. The change also provided new chances for 
others, especially those who were well connected to fermers. For example, a poor female-
headed dekhan household that I worked with, in 2006 gained access to a lucrative 
sharecropping arrangement when a somewhat distant relative became a fermer and mainly 
employed relatives, neighbours and friends. 
Some dekhans indicated that the ability of fermers to decide whom to employ also had a 
positive effect on the benefits they could negotiate in return for their labour and knowledge. 
Especially in the first year of full de-collectivisation fermers had difficulties getting qualified 
personnel. Some experienced and skilled dekhans used this situation to bargain a better 
position and payment. In the spring of 2006, just after the third phase of reforms was 
implemented in the area where I lived, I observed that fermers were actively looking for 
workers and that dekhans were finding out and discussing amongst each other where they 
could get the best deals. The following quote from an interview with a well-respected and 
experienced dekhan touching upon some of these issues. 
 
GJV: Is there a shortage of workers […]? Do fermers have difficulties finding enough workers? [Dekhan]: 
Well, the problem is that all fermers want the qualified and well experienced workers. The people who 
were the first to become fermers took all the good workers and now the others have difficulties finding 
good workers. GJV: Who for instance took the good workers? [Dekhan]: [mentioned two very large 
fermers in his area]. GJV: and which fermers are the least lucky ones? [Dekhan]: Workers will change their 
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employer if they will not pay well. Sometimes they also give pieces of land in exchange for working for 
them.26  
 
This implied higher payments for some and seemingly a strengthening link between 
performance and merit. Another change that was frequently mentioned by dekhans was the 
improved actual (cash) payment of their work; not the height of the payment, but the 
reliability of payment. 
 
3.3.5. Trade, barter and solidarity exchange 
During fieldwork I found three different forms of exchange of agricultural products; trade 
(selling for money), barter (in kind exchange for something else) and solidarity exchange 
(cultural forms of sharing without direct return benefit). The first two categories were 
included in my survey, while on the latter I have anecdotal evidence. 
On average 40% of all the surveyed households reported to sell at the market 
themselves. This ranged between 25–50% in the four case study areas. 25% of all the 
surveyed households sold products through traders that come to purchase agricultural 
products in the villages. Only 8% of the surveyed households reported to engage in barter, 
while this ranged between 4–15% in the four case study areas.  
The survey results show a high variance between the four case study WUAs where it 
comes to barter and trade. There are slight indications that this maybe connected to the 
distance to markets; i.e. in areas close to markets barter plays a smaller and trade a larger 
role. Chikirchi-Angarik WUA is the case with the largest deviations from the average; 15% 
of the households barter goods while only 25% sells directly at the market. Chikirchi-
Angarik WUA is an isolated area in the tail-end of the irrigation system. Tagalak-Yap WUA 
is possibly even more isolated, at the border with Turkmenistan. However there is a weekly 
market very close which is of importance for regional and even cross-border trade. In this 
WUA the numbers are deviating in the other direction; 6% for barter and 50% for market 
sales.  
After observing the frequent exchange of fresh agricultural products between 
households in the village where I lived, I expected the numbers on barter to be much higher 
than the 8% that showed from the survey. However, many of the exchanges that I had 
observed were not barters in the strict sense. If a household would have an abundance of 
fresh fruits, vegetables, milk, or meat this was generally shared with neighbours, friends and 
family. No direct return favour was expected, but of course the other households would 
return the favour when they had plenty. In some situations it was more formalised, for 
instance through an (informal) rotational schedule of slaughtering a cow and sharing it 
within a fixed group of households. Rasanayagam (2002) observed that also in the Uzbek 
Ferghana Valley reciprocal exchange through informal networks of kin, neighbours and 
friends function as strategies for coping with material hardship as well as a strategy to gain 
access to scarce resources. 
 
                                                 
26 Field notes 14/03/2006 
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3.3.6. Wage labour 
About half of the surveyed households (46%) reported to have at least one person in their 
household with a paid job outside agriculture. On average these households each have 1.5 
person with such a job. On the percentage of households with access to paid jobs the 
variation between the four case study areas is high, ranging from 31% to 66%. The numbers 
indicate that this could be connected to the degree of urbanisation and the distance to urban 
centres. 
 
3.3.7. Labour migration 
The Soviets stimulated people living in rural Central Asia to migrate to areas with better job 
opportunities. Patnaik (1995) showed that at that time these people were among the ones 
most difficult to get migrating in the USSR. Currently, many people from Khorezm 
seasonally migrate for employment. They are almost without exception males that travel to 
Kazakhstan or Russia where they mainly work in agriculture and construction. Even though 
this sort of labour migration can be quite profitable, the activity is connected to poverty and 
shame. People frequently talked badly about others sending their son for work outside the 
country or proudly told me that they did not send their sons to work in Russia.  
For instance at the start of interview with a dekhan, just after introducing myself and 
my research he started explaining his view on the connection between water shortage, 
poverty and labour migration as a means to cope with poverty. 
 
[Dekhan]: We have problems with water. If we have water and artificial fertilizer we work well in this 
area. Especially water is a problem. It is a month since I watered my garden. And it is not only me, but 
also the people in the village {indicating in the direction of the asphalt road}. Without water it is 
difficult to make a living here and that’s why our younger generation has left to work outside 
Uzbekistan. If there would be water there would be no need to leave.27 
 
People explore other options first before engaging in labour migration. A medium-sized 
fermer for instance explained it to me as follows. 
 
GJV: I heard from many people that they have household/family members working outside 
Uzbekistan, do you have that as well? [Fermer]: Ah, you know about such practice?! No, I do not have. 
GJV: Why not? [Fermer]: Think for yourself, it’s not difficult to understand; if you can have work here, 
why would you leave? 
 
Clearly he was indicating that households that have to send their sons for labour migration 
are the people without other opportunities. 
Trevisani (forthcoming 2008) also reports that ordinary people do not like to talk 
about migration, while a police officer indicated to him that this is because migration is 
perceived to be shameful for the government, as it would imply that Uzbekistan is not able 
to feed its people. Wall (2006:89) mentions the issue of labour migration as one of the 
sensitive aspects of household economics and puts doubts on the number that he found 
from his survey. Though I agree that the issue has some sensitivity, my survey results do not 
indicate this. On sensitive topics (e.g. land titling and informal subleasing) there were high 
variations between the answers that the four enumerators retrieved. It was quite apparent 
that some of them were better able to gain trust of the interviewees than others. However, 
                                                 
27 Field notes 01/06/2006 
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all enumerators reported very similar numbers on labour migration.28 Also in discussing 
afterwards with the enumerators they reported that this was not a difficult issue to get clear 
answers on. The number of households with at least one member working outside 
Uzbekistan that Wall reported for Khorezm (16%) comes very close to what I found in my 
survey (19%). What does stand out as remarkable is the high variation between the four case 
study areas, ranging between 8 and 28%. The highest number occurs in the area furthest 
away from a regional centre (Tagalak-Yap WUA) and the lowest occurrence is in a place 
which is almost grown together with one of the large district centres (Madir-Yap WUA). The 
lack of paid employment opportunities in the vicinity of a village might bring people to look 
for opportunities further away.  
 
 
3.4. Fermers and fermer enterprises 
 
Only 5–10% of the rural households have become fermers. Yet these families manage the 
production on 70–80% of the land. Formally the state distinguishes the following three fermer 
types, as laid down in their business plans: (1) animal husbandry farms, (2) crop farms and 
(3) horticulture and orchard farms (cf. Mueller, 2006:18). Fermers in the first two categories 
range from intermediate size to large size (in my case study areas this ranges from about 5–
50 ha, with exceptions up to 100 ha). Fermers in the last category are generally small (from 1–
3 ha, incidentally up to 5 ha). These usually produce fruits or silk, making use of their own 
household labour. Underneath the trees they plant other crops, typically wheat followed by 
vegetables. As such the land use is very similar to that on household plots, though the legal 
status of these small fermers is essentially different. Their business model is that of a 
commercialising peasant, i.e. the major part of the yield is sold through markets and traders. 
In the collective farm period these fermers were sometimes ordinary farm labourers. Though 
their sizes are small, in some former collectives they make up for over 50% of the total 
number of fermers29. 
The animal husbandry farms must have a minimum of 30 animals. They are not just 
dekhans with a lot of animals, but privatised parts of the former collectives. Because of their 
small number and minimum effects on water distribution they do not receive special 
attention in this study. Rather the focus lies on the crop farms; i.e. those fermers that subject 
to the state order on cotton and wheat. In general they employ dekhans as wage labourers and 
quasi sharecroppers on their land. It is in this sense that they could be considered ‘landlords’, 
i.e. they are gatekeepers for the access to land that often they do not till themselves. The 
relation between the fermer and the tillers has characteristics of that of a patron-client 
relation. However, it is clear that the position of the Uzbek fermer is essentially different from 
for instance the Latin American landlords. In the first place they have a very different level 
of operational freedom; so far the Uzbek fermer enterprises have remained heavily regulated 
by the state. Secondly the Uzbek fermer is the (active) manager of an agricultural enterprise, 
                                                 
28 All four conducted different numbers of interviews in the different case study areas. As there were big 
differences between these four areas I calculated the percentages that they each reported for each area. Then I 
averaged these four percentages per enumerator according to the weight of each WUA in the total number of 
households in the survey. The resulting weighted average per enumerator was now comparable with the overall 
average, which was 18.6%, while those of the enumerators varied from 18.3 to 19.6%. 
29 In Karmish WUA this even amounted to 166 out of the 255 fermers, i.e. 64%. The area covered by these small 
fermers is only 247 ha out the total 1697 ha assigned to fermers, i.e. 14%. 
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i.e. the fermer is not primarily a rent seeker over managing the access to land (absentee 
landlordism). 
Within this group of crop farms there are the really big ones, which have a distinct 
management pattern as compared to the smaller ones. They are almost exclusively held by 
people who have an important role in the state hierarchy; mostly heads of district or 
provincial organisations (cf. Trevisani, forthcoming 2008). Often they are practically managed 
by somebody else; in all cases encountered this was a close relative, typically the younger 
brother or eldest son. Sometimes the leaseholds are formally registered on the wife’s or a 
son’s name, as people employed by the state cannot officially hold a land lease (Trevisani, 
2006b: 8). Also for accumulation of even more land this sort of proxy leaseholds are created, 
making the actual farm size sometimes even larger (Pillai, forthcoming; Trevisani, 2007b). 
The tables and figures below (3.1 and 3.2) show the distribution of land over 
different categories of fermer enterprise sizes of two of the case study WUAs. For the other 
two WUAs it was not possible to get detailed enough information to construct similar tables 
and graphs. The most striking difference between the two cases is the number of small 
fermers (almost a factor four). The majority of the fermer land belongs to enterprises between 
10 and 40 ha; this is the case for 70 and 71% of all the fermer land in these two WUAs. Land 
holdings above 50 ha are exceptional. 
In my survey income generation by fermers and dekhans have not been assessed on 
such a scale that they could be the basis for statistical analysis. However, there are clear 
indications of the differentiation between fermers and dekhans. For instance I observed that 
many fermers have been quick to renovate their houses, acquired cars and new television sets, 
and sometimes agricultural machinery. The control over a part of agricultural production has 
put the fermer in a position where he can control flows of benefits. At the same time some 
fermers perceive their acquired land as a liability as it puts them in a vulnerable position vis-à-
vis the government and at risk of going bankrupt. 
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Figure 3.1 – Land distribution of fermer enterprises in Chikirchi-Angarik WUA 
Source: own compilation on basis of data provided by the WUA 
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Figure 3.2 – Land distribution of fermer enterprises in Karmish WUA 
Source: own compilation on basis of data provided by the WUA 
 
Table 3.1 – Land  distribution of fermer enterprises in Chikirchi-Angarik WUA  
Table 3.2 – Land distribution of fermer enterprises in Karmish WUA  
Table 3.1 – Land distribution of fermer Table 3.2 – Land distribution of fermer 
enterprises in Chikirchi-Angarik WUA enterprises in Karmish WUA 
category 
(ha) 
no. % of 
fermers 
total 
area 
(ha) 
% of 
land 
 category 
(ha) 
no. % of 
fermers
total 
area 
(ha) 
% of 
land 
1 to 5 46 35% 73 4%  1 to 5 166 65% 245 14%
5 to 10 21 16% 158 9%  5 to 10 18 7% 142 8%
10 to 20 33 25% 487 29%  10 to 20 48 19% 653 38%
20 to 30 15 12% 357 21%  20 to 30 16 6% 375 22%
30 to 40 10 8% 360 21%  30 to 40 5 2% 177 10%
40 to 50 3 2% 131 8%  40 to 50 1 0% 48 3%
50 to 60 0 0% 0 0%  50 to 60 1 0% 57 3%
60+ 2 2% 129 8%  60+ 0 0% 0 0%
total 130  1695   total 255  1697  
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3.4.1. The land allocation process 
Various people explained the land allocation procedure that was used to distribute the major 
part of the collective lands among new fermers to me. The quote below is from an interview 
with the head of an agricultural department at district level. 
 
GJV: Now, with the introduction of WUAs, and the complete land distribution to fermers, there was 
need for 2–3 times more fermers than last year. Was it difficult to find suitable people? [Respondent]: 
No, not really. There were competitions between candidates. Every shirkat made maps of its areas and 
composed contours [borders] around fields, making a ‘lot of fields’. This was done by the shirkat 
disbandment committee that was established for every shirkat and consisted of 5–6 people. All the 
lots were given numbers and the map was presented to the group of people interested to become a 
fermer. People could than hand in small papers stating their interest in certain lots. For each lot there 
had to be at least 3 candidates, otherwise the procedure would start again. Then all candidates were 
given points according to various criteria, for instance education, agricultural experience (if any, at 
least 10 points), available technical material, ploughing tractor (10 points), lorry (5 points), funds in 
the bank, etc. All the points were then added-up. The best two went for examination. They were 
tested on all kind of knowledge; agricultural, business management, finance, etc. The one who scored 
best [at the exam] got the plot of land.  
 
There were highly contrasting accounts on the practical implementation of these procedures. 
Many new fermers, district officials and members of the allocation committees stressed the 
high degree of transparency, while in other interviews it was hinted that many contours were 
simply sold to people willing to pay. It was impossible to discern what had happened in 
reality and whether the processes were essentially different from what Trevisani 
(forthcoming 2008) reported for the pilot process in Yangibazar District, implemented a few 
years earlier. He analysed that behind the official complicated procedure there was a very 
straightforward process of allocation that secured that the social ranking inherited from the 
kolkhoz remained intact. Moreover he analysed that the number of capable applicants was 
very small; many people were simply not able and experienced enough to run a farm. 
Therefore the people that made the old system work (i.e. brigadirs and other Kolkhoz 
managers) were identified and transposed into the new system. Wegren et al. (2006:373) 
describe for Russia that ‘the transition from a communist economy has been marked by the 
rise of new classes on the basis of position, skill, income, ownership of economic resources 
and economic power’. The same could be said about Uzbekistan (cf. Trevisani, forthcoming 
2008). 
Also in my four case study areas the majority of fermers had been involved in 
agricultural management, had a good educational level, were socio-politically well connected 
and had money to invest30. These were the people that were considered to be able to make a 
fermer enterprise ‘work’.  
 
3.4.2. Labour organisation 
Most households in the rural areas depended to a large extent on the collectives for their 
livelihoods; the collectives provided both jobs for money as well as secondary benefits. Now 
fermers partly fulfil this role, mostly in exchange for work on the land of the fermer. Before the 
                                                 
30 A survey among almost 50 fermers, conducted by Zavgorodnyaya (2006: 116), shows that at least 66% of the 
respondents was highly educated. At least 43% of the respondents had been involved in agricultural 
management or had a technical specialisation in agricultural operation, while of another 34% (accountants, 
engineers and economists) it remains unclear whether they were professionally involved in agricultural 
management or administration. 
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third stage of land reform the common way for a dekhan to work on the collective fields was 
through a pudrat-contract. In the four case study areas these contracts usually concerned 1–2 
ha of cotton, as part of a larger field. Except for the labour, the collective provided all 
inputs, including the ploughing and mechanical sowing. All the manual work was done by 
the pudrat and his household members.  
Many fermers have propagated this form of labour organisation. Formally the pudrat 
contract does not longer exist, but in colloquial speech people still refer to such contracts as 
pudrat. The pudrat is paid a wage of typically 7–10 US$ per hectare per month for the period 
that his household takes care of the growing plants. During the harvest period the wage is 
stopped and the payment limited to a payment per kg of harvest. Many fermers indicated that 
they prefer such a labour organisation above full-time workers, especially because of the 
difficulty of mobilising labourers during the cotton-picking period. In case of a pudrat this 
responsibility is transferred and a whole household will work together for a single income. In 
addition or in substitution of this income the fermer provides other benefits. Among these 
other benefits I observed: cotton stalks (which are used as firewood), payment with rice, 
wheat or other basic food, granting of a use-right for a piece of land, lending of money, gifts 
on special occasions and prizes for accomplishments at work.  
Frequently it was observed that fermers continued with the pudrats that used to work 
on the fields that they acquired, also because of their detailed knowledge of those fields. 
However, in some cases fermers started hiring their own family members, neighbours and/or 
friends. Also when pudrat positions became vacant they were often filled in by trusted 
people. Trevisani (2007b) reports a similar process.  
These networks of trusted people around a fermer could easily develop into strong 
patron-client networks with multiple links of exchanges and mutual dependencies, in which 
the fermer of course maintains the strongest position. The quote below shows a little bit of 
how such relations can become multiplex. 
 
GJV: What about your sons, for who do will they now work? […] [Dekhan]: One of them will work 
here [in the village, in agriculture], my youngest son, but I haven’t let him sign up with a fermer yet. But 
he will probably work for [the fermer that] is also the owner of the rice field at which I always work. 
We made an oral agreement about this. […] In exchange for that [arrange on the rice field] my son 
will work at his [cotton] fields and we will get 1–1.5 ha of wood [cotton stalks, which are used for 
cooking].  
 
Later in the season this deal was indeed made. Moreover I observed that the dekhan 
frequently assisted in work to be done at the household of this fermer. Probably also the 
surplus dung produced by the cows of the dekhan was applied at the cotton fields of the 
fermer, as was reported in many other cases. 
Analogous with this, fermers are pushed into positions in which they become the 
benefactors of the village (cf. Kandiyoti, 2003a; Rasanayagam, 2002). In one case a fermer 
explained that the Shora office assigned all the fermers in their village a number of poor 
families to look after.  
 
[Fermer]: Also I give part of the harvest to the Shora office for poor people; every fermer has 5 families to 
take care of. (…) GJV: Is it a change from [how it worked] before? [Fermer]: Yes, before the state was 
taking care of this. 
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Similarly Trevisani (forthcoming 2008) reported that fermers in Yangibazar were pushed to 
take responsibility for the renewal of school buildings and the enlargement of the district 
hospital, for which the local government lacked budget. 
 
3.4.3. Fermers and the state 
The limited reform of the command system makes that even though the jargon is about 
privatisation, fermers are not free entrepreneurs. Formally fermers lease the land from the state, 
but in practice they are subordinates who have to comply with instructions by the state 
hierarchy (Trevisani, 2007b), i.e. they are ‘state-steered, but privately-owned and family-
managed enterprise’ (ibid:14). This directing by the state in practice means setting strong 
boundaries of what a fermer can and cannot do on his fields. This starts with the decision on 
what to plant and where to plant for all crops, but for the ‘state strategic crops’ also includes 
agricultural management decisions like the depth of ploughing, the planting date, the amount 
and way of applying fertilizer, and many others. This is checked by the government through 
a scheme of frequent visits to all fermer fields throughout the agricultural season. 
A high official within the department of agriculture explained the purpose and 
organisation of such visits to me. In colloquial speech they are referred to as ‘groups’. 
 
GJV: [With regard to] ‘the group’ that you were talking about […], at what different moments, for what 
crops do you actually go to check the fields? [Respondent]: Well, we start in winter, when we begin the 
leaching. We are divided in groups, each responsible for a different area. The main task is to check 
whether leaching is done in a proper way, whether the drains around the fields are dug properly. We also 
check whether the lands are level. If one side of the fields is higher than the other side it is not good, 
otherwise there will not be an equal distribution of water over the field. Also we check whether people 
leach 3 times.31 
 
Further in the interview he explained that these groups are put together by the district level 
representation of the department of agriculture (what used to be AgroProm), by order of the 
Hokimiyat. Groups usually consist of four to five people, but sometimes only two, depending 
on the issue to be checked. Those are representatives of the different government 
departments; the biological laboratories, the department for fertilizers, the department for 
pests and diseases, the water department, etc. They are made responsible for the area of a 
former LFE, i.e. the area of one WUA. 
The main focus is on checking the cultivation of cotton and wheat, as these are state 
‘reserved’ crops. In every phase of the growing period of these crops the fields are checked 
on all management aspects32 according to the state norms and specific orders by the Hokim.  
Fermers run the risk of going bankrupt and thus of being expelled from their (leased) 
land and left behind with debts. The profit of fermers very much depends on the terms of 
trade that they manage to negotiate with various governmental organisations. The allowances 
to grow rice and other favourable allowances play a crucial role in this. Examples on the 
input side are for instance the share of diesel and fertilizer actually delivered. On the output 
side the grading, weighing and valuing of the harvested products is exemplary. These 
mechanisms are elaborately discussed in Chapter four, in the section on the state ordered 
form of production. 
                                                 
31 Field notes 29/05/2006 
32 For various periods the informant gave a long list of aspects being checked, similar to the example for the 
leaching period given in the quote; see also table 4.1. 
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In essence there are still soft budget constraints in the sense that the fermer’s 
budgetary balance is determined by the negotiations with various governmental organisations 
over the terms of trade. Fermers that followed the procedures, the state norms and the 
instructions by checking government ‘groups’ did not get into trouble, even if the yields were 
bad. For people the trouble starts when they operate outside the norms and control of the 
state. The head of an agricultural organisation at district level made the difference between 
fermers that did not fulfil the plan, but had ‘arranged everything officially’ by early reporting 
difficulties to the authorities, and fermers that simply did not make the plan. The latter 
category of fermers was expelled from their land33. I also observed a case in which a fermer, 
without permission, changed his cotton to rice and got cut off from water deliveries. Until 
he had informally arranged the permission with the district authorities, he irrigated the field 
with drainage water34. 
As many fermers have held management positions in the former LFEs or even higher 
in the state hierarchy, they are the continuation of what in the Soviet era were the rural 
nomenklatura, i.e. ‘the named ones’, the rural elite. Officially people with a governmental 
position cannot at the same time be fermer. However, through proxy arrangements many 
people in governmental management positions control a fermer enterprise.  
In principle the re-distribution of land provides the opportunities to further de-
regulate and privatise agricultural production. Thus far it has largely been a re-regulation of 
the agrarian relations without turning around the classes that were present in the Soviet era; 
kolkhozniks became dekhans, the rural nomenklatura became fermers and the aparatjiks became 
managers in the state political system.  
The control that the state exerts over fermer enterprises partly functions to control 
people that since long have been part of the rural elite, but at the same time it can be seen as 
the long-time rural elite setting up boundary constraints for people to join this group of 
elites. It is clear that both for the government as well as for the old rural elites it is a 
threatening social development if ordinary rural households through fermer-enterprises could 
emerge as autonomous and economically capable entrepreneurs that could challenge the 
political status quo (cf. Trevisani, 2007b).  
 
 
3.5. Conclusions 
 
Two themes have been discussed here. The first one is that of newly established agricultural 
enterprise and their relation to the wider political-economic systems of production. The 
second theme is that of socio-economic differentiation and the consequences for social 
safety nets and future developments. 
 
3.5.1. The subsumption of newly create farming enterprises  
Since independence, and especially since the third phase of agrarian reform, there is clearly 
socio-economic differentiation in rural society. This differentiation is somewhat along the 
same lines of division between dekhans and fermers. However also within these structural 
categories there are big differences. Some dekhans have benefited from the reforms while 
                                                 
33 Based on field notes 11/03/2006 
34 Interviews with this fermer (25/08/2005), another fermer (08/08/2005), the responsible district official 
(18/08/2005) and the Mirab (18/08/2005), as well as own observations. This example has also been discussed 
in Veldwisch (2007). 
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others run the risk of falling through the social safety net. At the same time some fermers 
struggle to run their enterprises profitably while others are earning huge amounts of money. 
In terms of income and standard of living fermers are not per definition better off than 
dekhans. The structural position of farming households is not linearly connected to empirical 
characteristics like income. Therefore comparing households on just income or land holding 
is not enlightening in itself, analysing the mechanisms of changing relations of production 
does give us new insights in the drivers of change. 
I use the framework of analysis on subsumption of internal and external relation of 
production to look at the integration of farming enterprises (points of production) into the 
wider systems of production. As a result I describe five ‘ideal types’ of farming enterprises 
with different degrees of subsumption of internal and external relations of production. The 
context of recently de-collectivised land use and the establishment of individually managed 
‘family farms’ is quite different from the process studied by Whatmore et al. (1987a and 
1987b), which looked at ‘tradition family farms’ getting subsumed into British capitalism. 
There are two other important differences. Firstly, the wider system into which farm 
enterprises are subsumed is itself in transition; from a socialist plan economy into a hybrid 
economy with some capitalist characteristics developing. And secondly, there is not only 
integration, but also disintegration from the system, i.e. the establishment of individual 
farming enterprises has increased the degree of control and ownership of the various 
elements of the relations of production by individual households. In the developed typology 
I try to give both a discussion on the current state of subsumption as well as the observed 
direction, i.e. the parameters on which further subsumption or dissociation is taking place. 
The division between fermers on the one hand and dekhans on the other is not only as 
a formal category, but also on basis of land holding sizes and the forms of regulations. 
Furthermore I consider two sorts of dehkan enterprises and three sorts of fermer enterprises. 
 
1. Marginal or ‘closed’ dehkan households 
These are households that limit their agricultural activities to production in their backyard 
garden and distant plot; they do not work on land under fermer leasehold, neither as a 
worker of a fermer. The survey showed that 47% of all non-fermers fall in this category. The 
land tenure is secure and inheritable, while the dehkan is free to decide how he/she uses the 
land. Labour is almost purely provided by the household itself, with exchange with 
neighbours playing a small role. The way in which production on the household plots is 
organised requires minimal cash, while seeds are often re-produced on the own plots or 
exchanged with neighbours. The produce is almost exclusively consumed within the 
household. If there is excess it is sold at small local markets, but only 29% of the households 
reported to do so. In 45% of these households there is somebody with a paid job (apart 
from agricultural labour), which is a similar number as for the other group of dehkan 
households (44%). The average available labour per household is 3.0 person. 
Neither direct subsumption (of internal relations) nor indirect subsumption (of 
external relations) is observable. Though the base for subsistence is minimal, many of these 
households will continue these practices, as a provision for basic living. 
 
2. Partially subsumed dehkan households 
The difference with the marginal dekhan category is mostly on the subsumption of external 
relations that do not directly affect the internal relations of production. The difference is 
almost exclusively due to expansion of their cropping activities onto fields under fermer 
leasehold, be it through wage labour, sharecropping arrangements or renting. These land 
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tenures are far less secure and frequently only for a period of a year. In the case of 
sharecropping-like arrangements the control over operation lies partly with the fermer. When 
it concerns cotton and wheat cultivation the fermer himself is in turn checked and controlled 
by state organisations. In these situations dekhans are also technologically dependent and not 
fully free in their choices and operations. In the case of rice cultivation on rental land dekhans 
often have to borrow money for the capital intensive inputs. The produce is marketed for 
cash money at fluctuating prices. Their internal decisions remain relatively autonomous 
although when choosing to engage within some activities they are restricted in the way they 
operate. 
More often than the marginal dekhans these households sell produce at the bazaar; 47% of 
these households reported to do so. The average available labour per household is 4.2 
person, 1.2 more than in the marginal dekhan households. The availability of labour could be 
one of the important aspects that influence the engagement in agricultural production on 
fermer land. 
When using fermer land these dehkans enter a different domain, which is more 
subsumed into the system. When the wider system of production would be further de-
regulated, for instance by abolishing the state order, this would increase the room available 
for arrangements with fermers, both in terms of area and in conditions. A part of this group 
would further commercialise on basis of their entrepreneurial use of their detailed 
agricultural knowledge. 
 
Though the group of fermer households is much smaller than that of the dekhan households, 
the differentiation within this group is much larger. On basis of their degree of subsumption 
I distinguish three categories. 
 
3. Small, indirectly subsumed fermer enterprise 
These are the small fermers (1-5 ha) that mostly have business plans for fruits, silk (mulberry 
leafs) and/or vegetables. They have long-term leaseholds which are relatively secure when 
compared to fermer leaseholds for cotton. The owners are also relatively free to operate their 
land as they want, though the production is monitored by the state. Sale of the produce is 
through market channels, but these fermers are also forced to sell part of their produce to 
(state-owned or -controlled) processing industries. State control is principally restricted to 
the external relations of production. Depending on the size of the land holding and the 
available labour within the household the work is either completely done by family labour 
and/or a few permanent workers. In peak periods extra labour is hired. Capital investments 
are small so that these enterprises are not dependent on credit systems. Also technological 
dependency is low.  
Through the forced sale of produce (implicit taxation) and the threat of loosing the 
land, these enterprises are indirectly subsumed into the system of bureaucratic control and 
surplus abstraction. Internally these enterprises are relatively free, except for the fact that 
their crop is prescribed in their business plan. These enterprises have better and more secure 
access to land than dekhans depending on access to fermers land. However they only gained 
this in exchange for a restricted freedom of operation. 
 
4. Medium-sized cotton/wheat fermers  
This group of enterprises is to a very high degree integrated in the wider political-economic 
production system, both through direct and indirect subsumption. In almost all respects they 
are limited in their control and ownership over agricultural production, both regarding the 
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external relations of production (they are dependent on the state for credits, marketing and 
technology) and the internal relations of production (their land tenure is insecure, they have 
little own capital and in cotton production even the cultivation procedures are forced onto 
them). Only in the organisation of labour they are free. Some of these enterprises manage to 
do the work purely on basis of family labour, but most of them work with a number of 
dekhans through sharecropping like arrangements. The somewhat larger ones often also 
employ one or more permanent labourers. Also the cropping schedule is externally 
controlled, though some enterprises manage to arrange larger portions of land to be free to 
choose what and how to crop than others.  
The very high degree of subsumption of these enterprises into the bureaucratic 
system of control and surplus abstraction also implies that these are the ones that will mostly 
feel the transition in the wider context of agricultural production. With ongoing re-regulation 
of agricultural production it is unclear whether these enterprises will keep their high degrees 
of subsumption or whether they will dissociate from the wider system. Many of these 
enterprises will probably keep a high degree of subsumption with a privatised and 
commercialised cotton industry that manages its supply through contract farming 
arrangements. It could become easier to switch to alternatives, and the internal relations of 
production could become less strictly regulated, but the indirect controls through 
dependence  on technologies, credits and markets will probably remains strong. 
 
5. Large partially dissociating fermers  
These enterprises are not merely distinguished on their area size, but rather on their ability to 
accrue substantial capital that is reinvested into the enterprise. Partially this is connected to 
size, but to quite some extend it also depends on the success of the fermer to negotiate 
profitable terms of trade and the production that he is able to make. Size of the land holding 
and successfulness to negotiate are both in some way connected to the socio-political 
position of the fermer. By increasing (productive) capital the fermer reinforces his position 
and increases his freedom of operation. Especially the ownership of pumps, tractors, and 
sometimes even combines, increases the ability to operate independently. Though external 
relations of production remain strongly subsumed in the system these enterprises increase 
their control over internal relations of production and dissociate from the wider system of 
agricultural production. 
 
Marginal dekhans are relatively least subsumed by the system, while medium sized cotton and 
wheat producing fermers strongly face subsumption of both external and internal relations of 
production by the state bureaucratic regulation system. Both the very small (economically 
insignificant) and the very large (socio-politically powerful) enterprises are somewhat outside 
the state control system. When in a diagram we would project the degree of subsumption 
against farm size it would result in an inverse U-shaped graph. 
 
3.5.2. Socio-economic differentiation, dependencies and changing safety nets 
Research results presented in this chapter show that in the four case study WUAs 89–94% 
of all rural households are peasant-like households (dekhans) rather than fermers. The mutual 
dependency relation that earlier existed between collective farms and rural households has 
been replaced by a mutual dependency relation between fermers and some dekhan households. 
With the final abolishment of the LFE the tripartite structure of rural society (collectives, 
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fermers and dekhans), as discussed by for instance Ilkhamov (1998) and Kandiyoti (2003b) no 
longer exists.  
Regarding the situation in that earlier period both Ilkhamov (1998) and Rasanayagam 
(2002) stressed interrelatedness and the mutual interdependence of household production 
and production by the collective farms. In the third wave of agrarian reforms the collective 
enterprises have fallen away and only the fermers and the dekhans remain. With a monopoly on 
large-scale production, fermers have become the single gatekeepers to a variety of income 
possibilities of dekhans; e.g. agricultural wage labour, cotton stalks and grazing areas. At the 
same time fermers are somewhat dependent on the dekhans; e.g. as workers in the labour-
intensive agriculture and as providers of manure. The tendency observed is a strengthening 
of these relations and the formation of strong patron-client networks with multiplex 
relations between the two parties. A large number of dekhan households (46%) does not 
engage in these relations, at least not by providing labour to fermers. 
For the dekhan these strengthened dependency relations are important as safety net 
constructions, which replaces a variety of social security services that used to be provided by 
the state and/or by the collective farms. The degradation of the welfare state has led to a 
situation of increased vulnerability for the dekhans. Their reliance on strengthening their 
relations with fermers means a personalisation (and informalisation) of social security 
provision.  
Patron-client networks often bear a component of demand for political support 
from below, i.e. patrons need their clients for political support. In Uzbek society political 
legitimacy is almost exclusively granted from above and hardly depends on the support from 
below, unless the mechanism of ‘fulfilling the plan’ would be seen as politically legitimating 
the position of the fermer, for which the fermer partly depends on the co-operation of his 
workers.  
The relations between fermers and the state apparatus have strong parallels with the 
relations between dekhans and fermers. Like fermers are gatekeepers for many opportunities of 
dekhans, the state agricultural apparatus strictly controls the access to (cheap) inputs and 
profitable terms of trade. For this reason fermers cultivate their relations with (people in) 
these agricultural government organisations. On top of that they confirm their loyalty to the 
state system by complying with the instructions they receive and by fulfilling the state plan. 
Both the dekhan-fermer and the fermer-state relations are unequal in their power-
balance and in both relations produce/surplus is handed ‘upward’ in exchange for money 
and the granting of other benefits. Partly these benefits are channelled through by-products 
and left-over land. In both sets of relations the terms of co-operation are ill-defined or 
flexible, which implies that they are negotiable throughout the season. This regards both the 
production targets and the benefits. This flexibility of terms is often detrimental to the 
weaker party in such arrangements. 
However, similar to the dependency of fermers on their labourers, local state 
authorities and the heads of agricultural organisations are dependent on the fermers for the 
fulfilment of the state plan, which is crucial for reproducing their (political) position. To 
some extent also the state-fermer relation qualifies as a patron-client relation. 
The transition away from a communist/collective production system has increased 
the risks of individual rural households. In this context personal relations have become more 
important as providers of social security. This leads to reinforced relations of mutual 
dependence on an unequal power basis. It is well perceivable that patron-client relations will 
be further strengthened around fermer enterprises that for dekhans will remain the prime 
access channel to land.  
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3.5.3. Differentiation and implications for development 
The land reform has led to very unequal distribution of arable land with about 70% of the 
land concentrated in the hands of 6-11% of the rural households. The large majority of 
households only have small pieces of land that are barely sufficient for feeding the 
household. For additional agricultural activities they depend on access to fermer land. 
The Uzbek government chose this path of land reform that concentrates the land in 
the hands of few over a redistributive land reform that would have distributed the land more 
or less equally among rural households. According to some, one of the main reasons for this 
was the objective to keep control over production, which is easier with a limited number of 
fermers and substantial farm sizes35. With a redistributive land reform it would have been very 
difficult for the state to maintain the degree of control over agricultural planning and 
production that it has been showing to date. The command system still plays a central role in 
agricultural planning and production. An abolishment of the command system or even a 
further reform of it would signify a structural change away from the path of development 
that the Uzbek government has followed so far. It is an imaginable step if one thinks of the 
Uzbek agrarian reforms as the step-by-step transformation to a market economy, but quite 
unimaginable if one thinks of the Uzbek state striving after control over agricultural 
production. 
However, it is difficult to interpret the Uzbek model on basis of its intentions. In the 
first place I did not study this, secondly the state is fairly inaccessible and finally it is not 
singular in its objectives, i.e. there are both reformist and conservative forces. Even though 
the objectives and the dynamics underlying the reforms remain opaque still the structural 
effects and the reality of the reforms can be assessed. I summarise this as follows. 
 
(1) State control over production and the abstraction of surplus remains to play an 
important role. 
(2) The reforms favoured the formation of farm enterprises with considerable sizes over 
an equal distribution of land and the large majority of the people have become near-
landless agricultural labourers. 
(3) For these dekhan households the land is just about enough to produce sufficiently for 
home consumption, but the land is not enough for making a business of, neither is 
there active state support for this small-scale farming sector. As a result these people 
need to work either elsewhere in agriculture or outside of the sector to provide for a 
decent living. 
 
Almost a fifth of the land is held by dekhans. Per household this is a small area, but altogether 
it is a substantial part of the agricultural system. In this respect it is surprising how both the 
Uzbek government as well as international organisations have largely ignored this part of the 
agrarian economy when looking at issues of development and poverty alleviation. Both 
Griffin et al. (2002:300) and Wall (2006) have made similar observations. This emerging 
pattern of social differentiation raises serious concerns about equity and livelihood security. 
                                                 
35 Personal communication with Max Spoor, following his insights as a member of a UNDP mission in 2003-
2004 that advised the Uzbek government on its land reforms policies. 
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4.1.  Introduction and conceptual framework 
 
In Chapter 3 it was shown that the post-independence tripartite agrarian system of collective 
farms, private farmers and household production has transformed into a dual system of just 
fermers and dekhans. The state still plays an important role, but does not directly run its own 
agricultural enterprises anymore. From the discussion it has become clear who the main 
actors in agricultural production are: fermers, dekhans and the state; the latter in the form of 
various governmental organisations that control agricultural production. With the state 
withdrawing from running its own agricultural enterprises one could hypothesise that water 
distribution is shaped by the competition over water between the primary water 
users/producers (fermers and dekhans), while the state assumes a regulatory role. This research 
however shows that water distribution follows different lines of division. It is not so much 
the users that compete with each other over water, but rather the different ‘uses’. This 
chapter discusses three ‘forms of production’. They can be seen as three different logics of 
productions. Each form of production has a different rationale, its particular functions, its 
own economic characteristics and its typical socio-political control systems. Also they each 
have their specific water distribution arrangements, but this is only discussed in Chapter 5. 
I distinguish the following three forms of production for the Khorezmian agrarian system.  
 
(1) state-ordered production, which includes the production of cotton but also some of the 
production of wheat; 
(2) commercial production, which is very obvious in the production of rice, but to a lesser 
extent also observable in the production of vegetables and fodder; and  
(3) household production, which primarily aims at home consumption, but which also 
includes barter arrangements and small scale selling at local markets. 
 
Such an analysis is based on ‘the labour process approach’, which is the study of the ‘forces 
of production’ and the ‘relations of production’, as discussed in section 1.3.2. The 
appropriation of surplus from direct producers is one of the main subjects of the labour 
process approach. Burawoy (1985) argues that such studies should be wider than just looking 
at the process of exploitation and thus propagates to look at all the different relations of 
production between actors involved in the production process.  
Burawoy (1985), and other labour process authors, speaks of ‘modes of production’, 
which are characterised on the way in which surplus appropriation takes place. Thus he 
recognised a capitalist mode of production, a state socialist mode of production, and a feudal 
mode of production. There are essential differences in the rationale and organisation of 
these production processes. In the initial understanding the concept ‘mode of production’ 
referred to production under a certain political economic state system; i.e. capitalist, state 
socialist or feudal. Burawoy (ibid.) however also distinguished two modes of production that 
take place within the socialist state, but which have characteristics that distinguish them from 
the state socialist mode. These two are petty commodity production, which is based on self-
employment and production for small-scale sale, and the domestic mode of production, which 
aims at self-sufficiency. These economic activities also depend on the state sector in a 
number of ways. Later the concept was also extensively used for a ‘peasant mode of production’. 
This developed into lengthy debates on the nature of a ‘mode of production’, which address 
whether a mode is a separate system, how they reproduce and how different modes relate to 
each other and depend on each other. As a result the concept ‘mode of production’ can no 
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longer be used in a non-complex way, i.e. without answering the list of difficult conceptual 
questions raised in this respect. 
This chapter presents a strongly empirically based account of the organisation of 
agricultural production. I look at how systems of production are configured, at the internal 
logic of organisation, i.e. the links between the organisation of inputs, land, management, 
labour and outputs. In this study they are referred to as ‘forms of production’36. In this 
chapter the three forms of production that were identified during the fieldwork are analysed 
on their logic of production, their practical organisation and the connections between the 
different forms. 
 
 
4.2. Three forms of production 
 
The forms of production, which are discussed in separate sections below, have strong 
parallels with what Ilkhamov (1998) coined the ‘tripartite agrarian structure’. In his model 
this referred to three different enterprise models: the large farm enterprise (LFE), the 
privatised farmer (later referred to as fermer), and the dekhan (the peasant). Now the LFEs 
have been dissolved, but the essence of the production processes has remained. Though 
distinctly different on the rationales, the three forms of production can not be understood 
without each other. There is integration within agricultural enterprises, as well as within the 
wide structures of for instance agricultural regulation and the organisation of labour. This is 
especially apparent in the relation between state-ordered and commercial production, which 
are both produced on fermer land, under management of the fermer. State-ordered production 
is driven by state interest, and commercial production driven by private economic benefits. 
Furthermore in all three forms of production dekhans do the hard manual labour and thus 
the majority of households are involved in all three forms of production. 
Table 4.1 presents a summary and overview of the three forms of production on a 
number of aspects. 
 
                                                 
36 This has similarities with what Burawoy (1985) labeled ‘modes of production’. However, modes of 
production refer to the wider political-economic system of production, for instance the capitalist mode of 
production or the state socialist mode of production. Forms of production exist more or less at the level of 
‘faming systems’. 
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Form of 
production 
State-ordered Commercial  Household 
Main crops Cotton, winter wheat Rice, vegetables, fodder In the garden:  
fruits and vegetables 
On the distant plot:  
winter wheat and rice 
Crop schedule Cotton from March/April to 
September/October 
Winter wheat from October 
to June 
Rice from May/June to 
September/October 
Vegetables and fodder 
mainly in that same period 
Winter wheat from October 
to June 
Rice from June to October 
Land tenure Long-term leaseholds; 
insecure as these can be 
withdrawn at will by the state 
Long-term leaseholds; 
fermers grow it in their ‘free’ 
area; insecure as can be 
withdrawn by the state 
Full fledged ownership of 
gardens around the house 
and distant plots  
Management 
decisions 
Fermers under strict state 
control (field checks) 
Fermers; or when rented out: 
the renting dekhan  
Dekhans are free to make 
decisions 
Organisation of 
inputs 
Subsidised inputs through 
state controlled networks 
Through informal and 
commercial networks; capital 
intensive  
Minimal capital investments  
Labour 
organisation 
Pudrat; sharecropping-like 
system on typically1-2 ha 
Hired workers and/or renting 
out of small plots to dekhans 
Household labour 
Possible net 
profit 37 
For cotton 0-250 US$/ha, 
also negative profits 
1500-3000 US$/ha for paddy Negligible - not for money 
Role of the state Forcing centrally determined 
quotas onto individual 
fermers 
Mandated by important 
individuals within the state 
hierarchy 
Allocation of plots; securing 
enough available land  
Economic 
rationale 
Administrative/plan economy Cash economy Home consumption and 
barter economy 
Technological-
administrative 
task 
environment 
(TATE) 
Detailed system of state 
rules and norms for 
agricultural management; 
inputs and technologies are 
selected and prescribed by 
the state; enforcement 
through field checks and 
control over settlement 
accounts 
Strongly restricted by system 
of permissions to grow, 
enforced by field checks; it is 
easier to get permissions for 
water-logged and saline land 
By definition small areas that 
require manual operation; 
seeds are often reproduced 
and exchanged locally 
Political and 
ideological 
apparatus of 
production 
Production is ordered and 
controlled by the state. 
Surplus extraction takes 
place through fixed low 
prices and compulsory sale. 
Threat of going bankrupt or 
land lease being withdrawn. 
Used as gateway to more 
profitable farming 
Patrimonial; allocation on 
basis of loyalty and position 
in the socio-political 
hierarchy; parts of the 
benefits are passed onward 
The household production 
has been given the role of 
social security safety net. As 
such it provides socio-
political stability. 
Commercialisation is limited 
by taxation at markets and in 
transport. 
Table 4.1 – Summary of the three forms of production 
Source: own compilation on basis of fieldwork 
                                                 
37 These possible net profits have been calculated on basis of interviews with a small number of fermers 
regarding their inputs, costs, yields and marketing. The numbers in the table are indicative and in reality heavily 
depend on a number of parameters, not in the last place on soil fertility and the ability of the farmer to 
negotiate the terms of trade. 
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4.3.  State-ordered production 
 
Though a form of production is not per definition linked to the production of a particular 
crop, the state ordered form is limited to cotton and wheat. Although the state also controls 
cropping areas of other crops, only for cotton and wheat there are assigned quotas and 
forced sale to the state at fixed prices. All of the produced cotton has to be sold to the state, 
while of the wheat yield only a part has to be sold to the state (typically 50% of the expected 
yield). Also in the labour requirement, the need for (and organisation of) inputs and the 
characteristics of the produce there are difference between the production of cotton and 
wheat. In this section the production of cotton is discussed, as a typical type of the state-
ordered form of production. 
 
4.2.1. The planning process 
Fermers that are characterized as dekhanchilik38 fermers in principle (by state order) have to grow 
60% of their area to cotton. However, the exact area depends also on the soil characteristics, 
and the crop rotation schedule.  
In reality the areas are negotiable. Fermers individually have to arrange permission 
with the branch office of the Department of Agriculture for their cropping plan. The (yearly) 
cropping plan is based on the long-term business plan of the fermer and can only contain 
crops mentioned in the business plan. The cropping plan does not only concern the state 
order crops, but all crops the fermer grows.  
In the agricultural state hierarchy quotas are assigned to provinces and from there down to 
the districts. Therefore there is some flexibility in assigning quotas to individual fermers. In 
practice the district Hokimiyat plays an important role next to the branch office of the 
ministry of agriculture. 
I found that some fermers actively made plans and negotiated with the district 
authorities for their cropping plans. Other fermers indicated that they are just told what to 
grow and that their wishes did not play any role in the decision.  
 
The cotton [ginnery] makes a contract with [the Department of Agriculture] about how much cotton is 
needed. If the mill needs 80%, [the Department] tells 80% to the fermers. GJV: What did [the 
Department] tell you to plant this year? [Fermer]: [They] told me to plant 12 ha of cotton and I did so39. 
 
And in another situation: 
 
GJV: You said that you have to plant 70%, but actually you planted much more, maybe even 90%. Why 
is that? [Fermer]: I wasn’t told to plant 70%, I was told to plant minimum 70%, 75-80% is also fine. I 
myself made the plans to plant such a large area with cotton and then went to [the Department of 
Agriculture] to ask for permission40. 
 
The quota specifies both the area and the expected yield. The production target per area 
largely depends on the soil quality, which for each field is determined once every five years. 
Some fermers were told on what plot to grow the cotton, but mostly fermers were free to 
decide where to plant what, although the field should be suitable for the chosen crop. 
                                                 
38 Arable crop fermers; this separates them from fermers dealing with animal husbandry and orchard fermers 
(explained in more detail in Chapter 3). 
39 Field notes 10/05/2006 
40 Field notes 08/05/2006 
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4.3.2. Organisation of inputs 
Almost all inputs for cotton cultivation are subsidised by the state and supplied through state 
owned (or at least state-controlled) chains. Fermers pay for these inputs through bank 
transfers from bank accounts that are very similar to the Soviet’s settlement accounts; they 
are strictly state-controlled and in principle the amounts on these accounts cannot be turned 
into cash money. 
Subsidised fertilizer for cotton is rationed according to area and soil quality. The 
fertilizers acquired through this subsidised system are about half the price of those not 
destined for cotton. They are distributed by the Agro-Chemicals Department, which has 
branch offices in all former LFEs. 
Seeds are multiplied in state research centres and on land of selected fermers. The 
types of cotton that will be grown by each province and district are centrally bred, selected 
and imposed. Fermers can usually choose between two or three different types and are 
supplied with these seeds by the Department of Agriculture. 
For tractors most fermers still depend on the state-owned (or at least state-controlled) 
Motor Tractor Parks (MTPs), which prioritise activities for the production of state ordered 
crops over activities for other forms of production. Also fermers are entitled to a certain 
amount of subsidised diesel when growing cotton. The storage of this as well as the actual 
use or supply is also controlled by the MTPs. 
Regarding the supply of these subsidised input various fermers mentioned that usually 
not all allocated inputs actually reach the fermer; a certain amount is kept by the supplier. This 
especially happens with fertilizers and diesel, which can easily be sold again and thus provide 
an extra source of income for the state official. 
For cotton cultivation special credit is available at very low interest rates through a 
specialised ‘cotton bank’. Just for this special credit some fermers prefer to grow state-ordered 
crops over private, commercially grown crops. This is illustrated by the following quote from 
an interview with a fermer growing far more cotton then he would need to according to the 
state order. 
 
GJV: Why did you want to plant such a large area? [Fermer]: Because it is better for my farm. For 
planting cotton you can get a lot of support from the state; you get credits from which you can pay 
diesel, fertilizers, laboratories, the WUA and even the salaries of the workers. The total costs [of 
production] were 7 million and 20 thousand soum and I took a credit of 3.5 million. You see, you can 
use state money to make a business with. This is the advantage of planting cotton. Also for planting 
wheat you can get these benefits. This year again I took credit, for both wheat and cotton. For other 
crops they don’t give credit41. 
 
Water is, of course, another important input, but in this chapter it is left out of the picture, 
as the organisation of water management is separately dealt with in Chapter 5. Here it can be 
mentioned that also water is subsidised, in the sense that all water is essentially supplied for 
free. Most of the costs for operation and maintenance of the infrastructure are carried by the 
state. With the recent establishment of WUAs the operation and maintenance at this level 
are now to be carried by the users, i.e. the fermers.  
 
4.3.3. Management decisions 
The timing of crucial actions in the cotton cultivation process are centrally announced by the 
Department of Agriculture. This particularly pertains to the periods for planting and 
                                                 
41 Field notes 08/05/2006 
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harvesting. Even though these mandated periods are not strictly adhered to by everybody, 
this resonates that the state is still the driver behind the cotton production.  
During the cultivation period the fermers are continuously checked on their actions at 
the cotton fields. Groups consisting of agricultural experts from a variety of state 
organisations regularly go round through the area that have been assigned to them in order 
to check various aspects of agricultural management. The groups are co-ordinated at district 
level by the Hokimiyat and the department of agriculture, to whom they also report (see 
section 3.5.3.). Each period of the season the checklist is different, and the groups are 
composed of experts of the organisations that relate to the topics to be checked. Most of 
these checks refer to a state norm, which play important roles in state control over 
agricultural practices (cf. Wall, 2006). For a list with some examples of the things being 
checked see Box 4.1. The checks are not limited to those listed. 
One of the specific things to be checked is whether the subsidised inputs are indeed 
being applied to the cotton. This especially concerns the fertilizers. These are typically 
distributed on the day of application and a state official remains at the field to see to it that 
the fertilizer is indeed applied at the cotton fields. This story was told to me by various 
fermers and following to that I also observed this in the field. There are many people needed 
to supervise this and therefore various people are temporarily employed that are not fully 
committed to enforcing the fertilizer application. It can be assumed that due to this still a lot 
of the subsidised fertilizer is diverted to other forms of production, while the temporary 
workers get some side-benefits.  
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Leaching 
- Check whether the drains around the fields are dug properly 
- Check whether the fields are level; for equal water application 
- Check whether people leach 3 times. 
 
During the wheat season 
- Check whether irrigated at the right moments and whether not over-irrigated 
- The chemical department divides the fertilizer among fermers  
- Checks whether the application of fertilizer is done properly 
- Check for the weeding and the irrigating with dung  
- Just before harvesting: check whether there is any grass in between the wheat  
 
Land preparation and sowing of cotton 
- Check whether the soil is ploughed deep enough  
- Check whether ploughed at the right time; otherwise the soil will be hard 
- Give advice on how deep to plant the cotton seeds 
- Check whether rightly ‘thinned’; every meter there should only be 4-5 plants 
 
During the cotton season 
- Check furrows and ridges; often the ridges are too wide 
- Check the weeding and the work with the ‘cultivator’ 
- The chemical department divides the fertilizer among fermers  
- Check whether the application of fertilizer is done properly 
- Check whether irrigated according to the norm 
- Check whether level for homogenous water application, otherwise divide the furrow 
in shorter parts 
Box 4.1 – Some of the checks executed by ‘groups’ of governmental organisations on fields of fermers 
with state-ordered production. 
 
Though not all fields and not even all fermers are checked on all aspects, at the moments that 
they are checked in detail this means that the fields are almost directly managed by these 
governmental organisations. Still it is the fermer that is (held) responsible for the management 
of agricultural production on his fields. He is instructed and warned to follow the state 
norms, and held responsible if his decisions have adverse effects on the yield. Examples of 
the fermer’s room for management are the exact planting date, the number of water 
applications for leaching, the moment of thinning, the application of defoliant or not, the 
timing of water gifts, and the moment of topping the cotton plants. There are plenty more 
examples possible. The exact room also depends on the fermer’s relations to state officials and 
his level of experience and agricultural knowledge.  
Beside being limited in their decision-making over management of the production on 
their fields, fermers are maybe even more limited in their management by the ability to 
mobilise the right resources at the right time. This pertains especially to tractors and other 
agricultural machinery, which at crucial moments are only very limitedly available. Fermers 
perceive the early planting of cotton as a big advantage, as this assures an early harvest, i.e. 
starting late summer. If the cotton is planted later the harvesting can be delayed into 
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November, when it is much colder and as a result the cotton bulbs do not open well, the 
cotton quality is lower and the work on the fields harder. In order to harvest early, fermers 
have to plant early, and therefore be early with land preparation. The few fermers that have 
their own tractor do not have to run after the tractors of the MTP, but can prepare and plant 
at the time that they want, while they rent out their tractor afterwards. 
 
[Fermer 1]: I planted on the 27th of April and will start picking after Independence Day, on the 2nd of 
September42. My planting is quite in the middle; there are also fermers who are 1 month later than I. 
There were no tractors available at the right time, and therefore I got a bit late. But I am a committed 
fermer and take care of the land as I would take care of my own [household plot]. I will find a tractor and 
when I find it I will bring it back with me to the field43. 
 
And in another situation: 
 
GJV: Once the planting will start will you be late or early in the schedule? [Fermer 2]: I do not depend on 
the schedule as I have my own tractor. It’s a Kazakh tractor with caterpillar mechanic44. 
 
The mechanisation of large scale agriculture during the soviet period never reached high 
levels in Central Asia (Patnaik, 1995) and Khorezm was no exception to this (Wall, 2006: 
168-172). Since independence investment in agricultural machinery has been very low. High 
import taxes on machinery moreover created an unfavourable situation to renew the existing 
machines. As a result the number of tractors, as well as their capacity has slowly declined. 
Still, in cotton cultivation ploughing, sowing and spraying with pesticides continues to be 
done by tractor. Other activities are done manually. 
 
Parallels with contract farming 
The state-ordered form of production has a number of parallels with production under 
contract farming schemes. Contract farming is the co-operation between farmers and 
processing industries through contracts that specify the duties and obligations of both 
parties. Through such contract farmers often get access to credits and inputs, the costs of 
which are settled when delivering the yield to the processing industry. Table 4.2 is copied 
from a FAO manual on contract farming. It specifies the advantages and problems often 
experienced in contract farming, separated according to those experienced by farmers and 
sponsors (processing industries). Most of these are the same in state-ordered cotton 
production in Uzbekistan. The ones that do not match the Uzbekistani situation are put in 
Italics. 
 
                                                 
42 The expected ‘official start’ of the cotton picking season, which actually turned out to only start on the 8th of 
September. 
43 Field notes 23/08/2005 
44 Field notes 06/04/2006 
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 FARMERS ‘SPONSORS’ 
Advantage - Inputs and production services 
are often supplied by the sponsor 
- This is usually done on credit 
through advances from the 
sponsor 
- Contract farming often introduces new 
technology and also enables farmers to 
learn new skills 
- Farmers’ price risk is often 
reduced as many contracts specify 
prices in advance 
- Contract farming can open up 
new markets which would 
otherwise be unavailable to small 
farmers 
- Contract farming with small 
farmers is more politically 
acceptable than, for example, 
production on estates 
- Working with small farmers 
overcomes land constraints 
- Production is more reliable than 
open-market purchases and the 
sponsoring company faces less 
risk by not being responsible for 
production 
- More consistent quality can be obtained 
than if purchases were made on the open 
market 
 
Problems - Particularly when growing new crops, 
farmers face the risks of both market 
failure and production problems 
- Inefficient management or marketing 
problems can mean that quotas are 
manipulated so that not all contracted 
production is purchased 
- Sponsoring companies may be 
unreliable or exploit a monopoly 
position 
- The staff of sponsoring 
organizations may be corrupt, 
particularly in the allocation of 
quotas 
 
- Contracted farmers may face land 
constraints due to a lack of 
security of tenure, thus 
jeopardizing sustainable long-term 
operations 
- Social and cultural constraints 
may affect farmers’ ability to 
produce to managers’ 
specifications 
- Poor management and lack of 
consultation with farmers may 
lead to farmer discontent 
- Farmers may sell outside the contract 
(extra-contractual marketing) thereby 
reducing processing factory throughput 
- Farmers may divert inputs 
supplied on credit to other 
purposes, thereby reducing yields 
Table 4.2 – Advantages and problems faced by farmers and ‘sponsors’ in contract farming 
In italics the ones that are not applicable to state-ordered production of cotton in Uzbekistan 
Source: Eaton and Shepherd (2001) 
 
 
The five indicated differences between contract farming (in general) and state ordered 
production (of cotton in Uzbekistan) can be reduced to two main differences.  
Firstly, state ordered production of cotton has a long history and is conservative 
rather than innovative. Farmers do not profit from the introduction of new crops and new 
technologies, but they are rather restricted in their room to innovate. Rather than helping to 
overcome production problems this rigid approach preserves production problems. Whereas 
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in contract farming quality management is often one of the main objectives, in state ordered 
production of cotton this has remained largely unexplored. 
Secondly, both the marketing of cotton and marketing relations in Uzbekistan are 
different from many other markets. Due to the share volumes of the produce and the 
specific requirements for processing, in combination with strong state control over business 
and trade, cotton cannot be sold to others than the state processing industries. Except for 
filling a few cushions, cotton can hardly be used directly by the producers. As a result extra-
contractual marketing hardly happens. Also, the processing industry wants every last bit of 
cotton, rather than finding ways to evade the contract and not buy the agreed amounts. 
 
4.3.4. Labour organisation  
Cotton in Khorezm is cultivated in a labour intensive way, i.e. many tasks are performed 
manually. Especially the cotton picking by hand requires a lot of manual labour in a limited 
period of time. This puts fermers in a difficult position, as they are responsible to mobilise this 
labour force. Most fermers follow the strategy of organising the labour through pudrat 
contracts with dekhans. These pudrat contracts bear strong resemblances with sharecropping 
arrangements. In Chapter 3 it was already discussed that these labourers are neither wage 
labourers nor tenants. They are responsible for the manual labour on part of a cotton field 
(typically between 1 and 2 ha). Their payment is partly in cash, partly in kind and partly in 
social capital that can be cashed in cases of need. The payments and other benefits are often 
not clearly pre-defined, they are negotiable and to some extent depend on performance 
(yield). 
Both fermers and their pudrats consistently explained that the fermer is responsible for 
all mechanised work, the arranging of inputs, the maintenance of external relations as well as 
making agricultural management decisions. The pudrat is only responsible for manual labour. 
The differences in yields between the pudrats on one field are minimal, and both fermers and 
pudrats often perceive this to be mainly the effect of difference within the field/soil rather 
than in the operation by these pudrats.  
 
GJV: How did you divide the work on cotton fields between your workers? [Fermer]: The 10 pudrats 
that worked for me each got 1 to 2 ha of which they took care. GJV: What do you give them in 
return? [Fermer]: I give them a monthly wage, according to the labour contract. They work from 
March till December. But if the worker comes with his family he will finish the work in 1-2 days and 
during the rest of the time he will do work on his own land. GJV: Do you mean that you give a piece 
of land to a pudrat and that he can decide for himself how and when he works on it? [Fermer]: No, I 
control them and tell them when to work. I usually tell them to finish particular tasks in 2-3 days. I 
gave them 8,000 soum/month for 4 months. After that I gave water melons as a payment. I also 
award prizes for the first person to finish weeding, making rows {… mentioned another few 
activities}, the first flower, the first cotton picked and the highest amount of cotton45. 
 
 
4.3.5. Marketing 
The estimated yield from each cotton field is several times re-assessed during the cropping 
season and in accordance the state order for the field is adjusted when necessary. The latter 
is a process of negotiation which some fermers are better at than others. The fact that the 
expected yield is closely monitored during the season makes it difficult to sell part of the 
yield somewhere else, as this would be noticed. Another difficulty is the absence of a free 
                                                 
45 Field notes 08/05/2006 
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market for cotton. Even though some cotton gins have been privatised there is basically still 
a state monopoly, as the prices throughout the processing chain are centrally set (Rudenko, 
forthcoming). Also there is not much use for raw cotton, which would allow for side 
marketing. This is one of the characteristics that makes the wheat production process 
different from the cotton process: wheat is also produced outside the state-ordered form of 
production and used on a wide scale in every household. Therefore there is a market price 
for wheat flour, which makes it easier and more profitable to try and market the produce 
through other channels than the state (cf. Bobojanov and Lamers, forthcoming 2008). 
Fermers get different prices for different qualities of cotton, but otherwise the prices 
are fixed, i.e. there are no market prices. This grading is based on the quality of the cotton 
fibre as well as the pollution with other materials. Besides, the price is adjusted for the 
moisture content. The process of cotton delivery at the ginnery, the weighing, the grading 
and determining of the moisture content is not a very reliable process. Fermers stressed the 
importance of being physically present at the moment of these measurements in order to 
avoid manipulations of the result and hence the value of their produce. Overall this makes 
that also the output prices are negotiated prices that depend on the fermer’s ability to get a 
good price. 
The payment from (state) ginnery to fermers is through state controlled bank 
accounts. The money on these accounts can be used for paying for the inputs on cotton, as 
described above. It is very difficult to withdraw money from these accounts, which makes 
that the cotton production forms a somewhat separated, administration-based economic 
system. Fermers do find ways to withdraw cash from these accounts, but this is to a cost of 
about 5-10% of the value46. 
 
4.3.6. Final remarks 
The profitability of cotton cultivation for fermers depends on a variety of conditions that need 
to be negotiated; e.g. the actual delivery of the assigned inputs (especially fertilizer and 
diesel), the ability to mobilise tractors at the right moment, the ability to get water at the 
right time, and the negotiation over recognition of the cotton weight, quality and moisture 
content. This form of production is strongly integrated into the wider relations of 
production and the autonomy of farmers is very low. The Technological and Administrative 
Task Environment (TATE) consists of an integrated network of state institutions that 
regulate all aspects of the production process – from seed selection and credit provision to 
method of ploughing and control of marketing channels.  
Depending on their field characteristics and the negotiated boundary condition many of the 
fermers that I interviewed made some money out of cotton production, while only a few 
fermers were able to make good profits. Some fermers reported that almost every year they 
loose money on cotton production. One of the main benefits of growing cotton seems to be 
that it provides access to commercial production on the area not used for state-ordered 
production. Also this benefit is negotiable and the ratio between state-ordered and 
commercial production differs hugely between fermers. 
The economic surplus generated by the production of cotton through the use of 
knowledge and labour of fermers and dekhans, and state-coordinated supply of inputs, is 
                                                 
46 Money is transferred to the bank account of a business that is entitled to provide services or goods to fermers, 
but instead of providing the goods or services 90-95% of the cash money is paid out to the fermer. Fermers 
themselves considered this an illegal practice. 
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extracted through an economic-administrative system. Thus the economic benefits are 
mainly for the state through implicit taxation.  
 
 
4.4.  The commercial form of production 
 
The Uzbek agrarian commercial form of production is a variation to the capitalist mode of production. 
Through the slowly implemented privatisation, opportunities are created for making private 
profit through the use of private capital, and employment of wage labourers. There are many 
aspects of the capitalist mode of production that are non-existent in present-day Uzbekistan; 
there is no private ownership of land, there is no free output market, and there is a strictly 
regulated input market. 
The core of the commercial production form is an orientation to relatively free 
markets, the taking of private risks, the investment of money with chances on high returns, 
and production relations that are characterised by cash exchanges. Concretely the 
commercial form of production is what fermers produce next to their state-ordered 
production. This includes the production of vegetables (melons, potatoes, carrots, cabbage) 
and fodder (maize, sorghum, alfalfa), but is especially apparent in rice production. In 
Khorezm rice represents a larger area than fodder and vegetables47, it is the preferred crop of 
fermers and has a very clear link to the cash economy. Chapter 5 shows how the production 
of rice puts demands on water management that are very specific. As rice production is 
exemplary for commercial production in post-independence Uzbekistan, and as it represents 
a large area in Khorezm, I have studied it in detail. In the remainder of this section rice 
cultivation is discussed as an example of the commercial form of production.  
Rice cultivation is not limited to the commercial form of production; also in the 
household form of production rice plays an important role. This is discussed in section 4.5. 
 
4.4.1. Rice land 
Commercial rice is grown on two different types of fermer land. 
  
1. Land that is suitable for nothing else but rice 
2. As a second crop on land that during winter was cropped to wheat 
 
Land in the first category is colloquially referred to as ‘lake land’. Often this is land that has 
recently (less than 10 years) been reclaimed from a lake. The ground water levels in these 
areas are naturally high and the soils are said to be very saline in the first years of use. When 
these soils can be drained well and are systematically leached they are said to become good 
soils in about 10 years. However, due to their situation at low places the drainage of these 
soils is often difficult, which means that the ground water and salinity levels remain high. 
This makes them unsuitable for cotton and wheat cultivation and they are therefore not 
considered for state ordered production. These lands are either sown to rice in early June or 
left fallow all together. Within this category there are also fields that during some years are 
too saline for anything else but rice, while during other years the situation is much better. 
                                                 
47 It is difficult to assess the exact area cropped to rice, as it heavily depends on the availability of water and 
therefore fluctuates over the years. Moreover, rice cropping is somewhat secretive and areas are not centrally 
administrated, or at least not openly available. In wet years the (commercial) rice area in Khorezm possibly 
constitutes about 20% of the total area (Veldwisch, 2006). 
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During the rice cultivation there is, due to the growing in standing water, almost always a 
downward movement of water. The side effect of these percolation losses is the leaching of 
salts, which makes that the next year the soil is much less saline. The choice whether to grow 
a state order crop or rice on such fields is subject to disputes between fermers and the 
Department of Agriculture.  
In a typical case a fermer had been told to plant cotton on a medium saline field. After 
a few weeks it became apparent that the cotton was growing badly due to high salinity level. 
This well-connected, but not experienced fermer arranged with the Department of Agriculture 
that he could destroy the young cotton plants and plant something else instead. He was 
instructed to plant maize. Instead he planted rice, without permission. As a result he was got 
cut off from water deliveries and, until he had (informally) arranged the permission with the 
district authorities, he depended on drainage water for irrigation of his rice. 
Land in the second category becomes empty by the end of June, when the wheat has 
been harvested. This is late for rice sowing, but transplanting is still possible. Usually after 
the wheat harvest a second crop is planted. In the cropping patterns that are decided before 
the season starts a second crop is not included. This implies that fermers have to arrange 
special permissions for this second crop, be it maize, melons or rice. Most fermers prefer to 
plant rice, as it is in the current situation it provides the most profitable option.  
The growing of wheat provides a good option for afterwards using the land for 
commercial production later in the season. This is essentially different from cotton 
cultivation, which spans the full period in which rice is grown. Pillai (forthcoming) shows 
that fermers already early in the season opt (and negotiate) for a state plan for wheat in order 
to avoid cotton and have the land available for a second crop in June. 
Some researchers suggested that rice is sometimes grown on fields destined for 
cotton cultivation. The only case that I encountered was the situation described above on 
saline land and where the cotton was initially planted and only destroyed with the consent of 
the Department of Agriculture. This does not imply that it does not happen at all. Similar 
situations were indirectly referred to in interviews. It was unfortunately not possible to verify 
these accounts. It is possible that this does happen, but it must be on a very small scale 
and/or very well kept away from public discussion. Even in the one case encountered people 
were very hesitant to talk and it was often stressed that this was an illegal activity. In this 
situation I had observed that first cotton had been planted on this field, otherwise I might 
never have heard about this case at all. The fields destined for cotton, but actually cropped 
to rice are probably left fallow until the sowing of rice. In that case it is even more difficult 
to observe this in the field. 
Due to the very well elaborated system of checks and control over agricultural 
production it is unthinkable that rice could be grown instead of cotton without getting 
noticed. Therefore if indeed this happens at some level it has to be ‘legalised’, i.e. somebody 
in a government office will have to agree in one way or another. The payment of bribes 
could play a role in such sorts of agreements (as for instance suggested by Wegerich, 2006), 
but when a fermer wants to arrange permission to grow rice, long-term relations with people 
at key positions in the Department of Agriculture seems to be of greater importance.  
Also for land in the first and second category the final permission has to be arranged 
to plant rice on this available land, but even this process remained misty to me, as people did 
not like to talk about the issue. In a few cases people did expand on the issue when asked. In 
those cases the reliability of fulfilling the production quota for state-ordered crops was 
frequently mentioned as a beneficial factor, as for instance in the following quote. 
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GJV: I understood that different land needs different permissions to grow rice, how is that for you? 
[Fermer]: On the wheat field I didn’t plant, because it is too close to my cotton fields; that would be bad. 
At the other fields a person from [the Department of Agriculture] came to have a look and gave 
permission. GJV: How much do you pay for that? [Fermer]: I don’t pay for that. If you make your cotton 
targets there is no problem planting rice. Some people might be paying, but I never did48. 
 
Also it has become clear that the total area that can be permitted to grow rice on by the 
governmental organisations is connected to water availability from the Amu Darya. The 
discharge of the Amu Darya partly depends on rainfall, which is irregular and difficult to 
predict, but to a larger extent it depends on melting water from the Pamir Mountains, and 
thus can be reasonably estimated from snowfall over winter. Moreover there are many 
storage reservoirs in river by which its flow can be minutely regulated49.  
In May and June 2006 through different channels in the agricultural hierarchy 
messages were coming across to the WUAs and via them to the fermers regarding the 
availability of water for the ensuing agricultural season. These messages were combined with 
advice on whether or not to plant rice. Most of these messages were stressing that not much 
water would be available and thus aimed to limit the expectations of fermers with regard to 
rice production. These messages seem to somewhat refer to a situation of anticipated water 
shortage, but clearly also serve the purposes to limit the rice growing area. The 2006 
agricultural season eventually turned out not to be water short at all. 
In May and June fermers were waiting to get the permission to plant rice. A few of 
them I repeatedly visited in this period and monitored their success in getting permission. 
Eventually these permissions never came in writing, but rather as vague indications that it 
would be alright and most of them at some point were confident enough that they could 
plant rice without afterwards getting trouble.  
 
4.4.2. Organisation of inputs 
The inputs for rice cropping are not supplied through the state system. Fermers need to 
organise these either outside the state system or through ‘leakages’ within the state system. 
Subsidised inputs, which are meant for the state ordered form of production, are sometimes 
diverted for commercial rice cultivation. Well known is the example of cheap fertilizers that 
do not end up at the cotton field, but rather at the fermer’s rice field (Trevisani, forthcoming 
2008). 
As the profits on rice are bigger and in cash, the fermer usually has more cash 
available for arranging the inputs for rice cultivation as well. For instance investments for 
hiring a tractor are done easier for rice than for cotton. 
 
4.4.3. Labour organisation & management decisions 
The labour demand on rice cultivation is concentrated during the planting and harvesting 
period. The nursing of the upcoming crop requires minimal effort if the water level in the 
basins is kept high enough. If rice is sown (in May) it is broadcasted by hand (see figure 4.2). 
When grown after wheat this is not possible, as the rice would ripen too late. Therefore in 
June rice is only transplanted from seedlings that were first raised in beds. These beds are 
often prepared in a corner of the wheat field.  
                                                 
48 Field notes 25/07/2006 
49 The regulation of the Amu Darya and the intake of irrigation water into Khorezm is discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 5. 
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The harvesting of rice mostly happens by hand and after drying it is threshed by a 
stationary combine. Occasionally harvesting combines are employed directly at the field. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 – Transplanting seedlings  and broadcasting rice seed by hand 
 
Fermers organise the labour for commercial rice production in different ways. I identified at 
least three basic types.  
In the first sort of set-up the fermer remains strictly in control over all management 
decisions, while employing labourers to do the job. They are paid money for their labour and 
in addition usually receive some rice. In this set-up the fermer usually employs dekhans that 
also work as pudrats on his cotton fields. It is possible to employ the workers as labourers 
rather than as sharecroppers because the labour requirement on rice is much lower than on 
cotton. The exception is when the rice needs to be transplanted. This is usually done by 
labourers that are paid per day. It is a hard job and the wages for this are relatively high; 
about 50,000 soum for 1000 m2, which takes 3 people about 3 days, which thus amounts to 
5,500 soum per person per day.  
 
In the second sort of set-up there is a real sharecropping arrangement between a fermer and a 
dekhan. The fermer supplies all the inputs; seeds, fertilizer, tractor for ploughing, combine, and 
water. The dekhan household does all the work and in return gets a fixed percentage of the 
yield. This is typically 30-50%, while the remaining 50-70% goes to the fermer. A variation to 
this is the setting of a threshold; e.g. the fermer gets the first 3 ton and all that is produced 
extra is for the dekhan. 
In the third set-up the fermer does not crop the fields himself, but rather rents them 
out divided into small plots of typically 1000 m2 each. The rent is net profit for the fermer. 
The prices paid for this differed per case, depending on the location, the soil, the relation to 
the fermer, and the moment of arranging. For rice plots this varied between 40 and 60 
thousand soum per 1000 m2 plot. This sort of arrangement also takes place for other crops 
than just rice; especially for large fields of carrots planted after the wheat harvest this was 
frequently observed. Rental prices for such plots were about 25 to 40 thousand soum per 
1000 m2. 
 
4.4.4. Marketing 
Rice is sold for cash money, either at the market or to traders that travel to Khorezm from 
various parts of the country. The rice is sold throughout Uzbekistan. Rice from Khorezm is 
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considered to be of a good quality and specifically marketed as Khorezmian rice, especially 
in Tashkent (see figure 4.3). 
The market price of rice highly fluctuates, both throughout the year and between the 
years. Based on weekly market surveys Bobojanov (2004) showed fluctuation in the Urgench 
market price of 1 kg of rice between 250 and 1000 soum between 2002 and 2004. The price 
of rice seems to have a strong negative relation to the availability of water; in water scarce 
years the rice price goes up, in water abundant years the price goes down. 
Besides the relative ease by which rice is exchanged for cash money, it also functions 
as a currency in itself. Labourers frequently are paid their wage in kilograms of rice instead of 
cash and various fermers mentioned that big purchases (for instance tractors) are paid in bags 
of rice. In explaining the importance of rice for the welfare of Khorezm, a high level 
government official even literally told me that ‘rice is the currency of Khorezm’50. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 – Khorezmian rice is sold throughout Uzbekistan as a high quality product 
The pictures was taken at a market in Tashkent 
 
 
4.4.5. Final remarks 
The production of rice has since long played an important role in Khorezmian agrarian 
production. In the soviet period this was produced on specialised rice sovkhozy and on 
marginal land within the other LFEs. Since independence the production of rice has proved 
to be very lucrative, and even more so when the state order for rice production was lifted. 
Many of the ‘rice fields’ in the LFEs were informally leased out to fermers and well-off 
dekhans. In the latest phase of the land reform also these rice fields were privatised and 
divided among fermers. The access to the commercial form of production is the metaphorical 
carrot that drew people into starting fermer enterprises that would in the first place manage 
state-ordered production. 
The Department of Agriculture is merely the controller of the area planted to rice. 
Different from cotton production the government does not get involved in the management 
                                                 
50 Field notes 02/05/2006 
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decisions of rice production, neither into the input supply or the regulations of the output 
markets. The extraction of surplus from rice production is primarily in the hands of the 
fermers; they control the distribution of benefits. These are sometimes shared with their 
workers, but in those cases it is considered as payment or reward for other duties. 
 
 
4.5.  The household form of production  
 
Agricultural production in the ‘household form of production’ is part of the dekhan 
livelihood, as described in Chapter 3. Here the focus is purely on the production on the 
dekhan’s own fields, not on all the additional activities and sources of income. Rural 
households have a house with an adjacent plot (the tamorka or ‘garden’) and a plot further 
away from the house (the ko’sumcha tamorka or ‘distant plot’). The total area is about 0.2 ha 
per household, typically divided in 0.06 ha as a garden and 0.14 ha as a distant plot. On the 
garden fruits and vegetables are grown, while the distant plot is used for double cropping to 
wheat and rice.  
There is no mechanisation in the household form of production, so both land 
preparation and harvesting are done by manual labour. Labour is provided by the household 
itself, or sometimes through help by the wider family and/or neighbours.  
Also the selection of seeds to a large extent takes place within the household and/or through 
exchanges within the village. Wall (2006) for instance describes how certain tomato seeds 
spread primarily through mother/daughter meetings, and in this way moved between 
villages. Both manure and (artificial) fertilizers are applied, whereby fertilizers represent a 
major capital investment compared to the otherwise very low investments in this form of 
production. 
The produce from the two plots provides for a very basic living. Often there is no 
surplus to what the household will be eaten itself. Surpluses and shortages of particular 
products are settled through informal sharing/exchange networks with neighbours, bartering 
and small scale sale at local markets. The rationale of the household form of production is 
that of basic food provision, and hence, livelihood security. Money plays a subordinate role 
in organisation of inputs, in labour and in use of the produce. 
 
 
4.6.  Rice-cotton interactions 
 
The three forms of production can be seen to be in competition with each other over the 
limited available resources. This is particularly clear in the land use planning and land 
allocation procedures. Especially the relation between cotton produced under state order and 
the commercial production of rice can be seen as a relation that is shaped by conflicting 
interests and contestation over resources. The discussions above have shown that the rice 
and cotton production processes have very different benefits for different actors. Moreover, 
the labour demands are different and to some extent conflicting. Therefore the conflict is 
not expressed as a conflict between agricultural enterprises; after all, there are no separate 
state enterprises and commercial enterprises. Rather the conflicting interests show 
throughout the agrarian structure as a whole; it is an issue for the state, the fermer as well as 
the agricultural labourer. The position of each is discussed below. 
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The state ordered production is strongly linked to the interest of the state, and 
therefore to state officials, who for their position in the agricultural (and political) hierarchy 
depend on their ability to deliver the requested cotton quotas. Though delivering cotton is 
not the only criterion, the accountability mechanisms for state officials are almost only 
upward; i.e. even Hokims (Governors) depend on their superiors rather than on constituents. 
Still, it is also in their interest to allow for substantial areas of rice to be planted. This is 
because they have a role as benefactor and patron in their communities and at the same time 
it creates opportunities to gain some personal benefits.  
The state hierarchy is not easily accessible for research and people are not inclined to talk 
about either issues of upward loyalty or issues of personal benefits through rice allowances. 
Therefore it is difficult to be certain about the exact processes steering the balance between 
cotton and rice production. It seems, however, logical that the Hokim more than the 
Department of Agriculture is interested to increase the rice area cropped in his district. The 
somewhat conflicting messages in May and June 2006 over whether it was allowed to plant 
rice or not followed directly from the differences between the agricultural hierarchy and the 
Hokim51. 
In the fermer enterprise the two forms of production come closest together. In 
practice the fermer manages both the commercial and the state-ordered production processes. 
However, the fermer’s management capacity is limited on the one side by checks and controls 
imposed by the state and on the other side management responsibilities are partly contracted 
out to labourers.  
Some fermers limit themselves to cotton production, as they have a lot of practical 
experience with its cultivation, the concomitant credits provide good opportunities for 
investment without own capital, it has a rather stable output price and builds socio-political 
capital with the state authorities. However, in general fermers also try to get permission to 
cultivate some rice. The socio-political capital accumulated through reliable cotton delivery 
can be used as leverage to acquire such permission. Fermers with socio-political power that is 
vested in their job position, network or descent are often able to acquire rice permissions for 
relatively large areas. 
Both for the Department of Agriculture and for the fermer crop planning is central to 
agricultural production strategy. Controlling the cropped areas is the main mechanism of 
governmental control over agriculture. The organisation of all other agricultural inputs is 
subordinate to the crop planning procedure. Still, also in the distribution of inputs there is 
interaction between the two forms of production. A fermer who grows both cotton and rice 
has to balance the investment of inputs between the two processes. Above the classic 
example of diverting subsidised fertilizers was already mentioned. Also the subsidised 
(cotton) credit can be used for investments in rice production. In a similar way fermers have 
to distribute their time, tractor use, and labour allocations over these processes.  
Whilst almost all of the dekhan households are working in cotton cultivation only a 
limited number is involved in the commercial production of rice. Working in cotton 
cultivation serves as the entrance to other benefits to which the fermer is a gatekeeper. 
Granting access to commercial rice cultivation is perceived as on of the best rewards, 
especially when the dekhan household has a great degree of freedom over the rice cultivation, 
which results in good economic returns. This can take place either through permanent 
employment contracts or profitable sharecropping arrangements. This sort of access to land 
is very limited for dekhans and in principle only available to households closely connected to 
                                                 
51 For a more elaborate discussion of this see Chapter 5 
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a fermer. Beside the control over land, there are a number of other benefits that were 
previously distributed through the collective farms, but which are now only accessible 
through fermers. This involves for instance the cotton stalks that are used as firewood, access 
to grazing areas, and provision of informal credits.  
Thus, dekhans for the access to various benefits depend on fermers. On the other hand 
fermers are very much in need of labourers in cotton cultivation, which is perceived as hard 
labour for a minimal wage. This situation leads to the formation of dependency or patronage 
networks in which the production of cotton serves as an upward delivery, which is 
compensated with access to commercial rice production. This pattern exists both in state-
fermer and in fermer-dekhan relations. 
The dynamic interactions between the rice and cotton production processes are an 
expression of the relation between private and state interests. This is not to say that there is 
an interface between the state and the ‘society’. It has been argued before that the distinction 
between state and society does not really exist in post-Soviet Uzbekistan (Jones Luong, 
2004). This blurring of boundaries was an explicit aim during the Soviet reconstruction of 
society. In the current organisation of agriculture it is still visible that all agrarian actors are 
mobilised in the exercise of state production. Conversely, the state does not operate as a 
single body, but is subject to internal dynamics and personal preferences of actors within it. 
By the change of agricultural production from LFEs to household-based enterprises like the 
fermer enterprise, there is an increased sense of private ownership.  
 
 
4.7.  Conclusion  
 
When analysing the roles of different actors in agricultural production from independence 
till 2006 only little transformation is discernable; co-ordination of agricultural production is 
still in hands of the state, agricultural management rests with the rural elites (those who had 
management positions in the kolkhoz), and manual labour is still done by the same 
households – in the past they were called kolkhozniks, now they are dekhans. However, as 
shown in Chapter 3, the units of enterprise and governing principles between these groups 
of actors have considerably changed. In this chapter it was shown that the dynamics between 
these three groups of actors take shape in the three forms of agricultural production. That is, 
the state controls household production differently from commercial rice production and yet 
differently from state-ordered cotton, yet in all forms of production the state is in a position 
of control. In the same way labour relations (often between fermers and dekhans) are organised 
differently in each form of production, yet in each form of production the dekhans are the 
labourers. 
The way in which agricultural production is organised reflects the diverse economy 
of post-Soviet Uzbekistan. The Uzbek economy is not a transition economy in the sense that 
step-by-step its economy is transforming from a state-socialist economy into a capitalist 
economy. Rather it is constantly transforming and in that sense it could be called a 
‘transition economy’ after all. Characteristic for this economy is its diversity of (production) 
rationales rather than the transition from one ideal-type of economy into another. Moreover 
the current diverse situation is a situation to stay. At this moment all three strands of the 
agrarian economy have a reason for existence and the stability of the system is created by the 
interaction and exchange between the three forms of production. Sooner then that this 
interrelated system is going to change each form of production in itself might change. 
CHAPTER 4 – THE AGRICULTURAL FORMS OF PRODUCTION 
 
107
The household form of production. For most rural families there is no outlook on a stable 
source of income that would reduce their dependability on production for home 
consumption on their household plots. However, with additional sources of income from 
labour, either in or outside of agriculture, the room for experimenting and investing in 
intensified and commercialised practices could develop. The share of production that is 
traded at local and regional markets (or even internationally) could then increase. 
The commercial form of production. When state control over cropping would be further 
reduced, large-scale commercial production could be extended to a larger share of the arable 
land. Paddy cultivation which is currently the dominant practice of commercial production 
will probably not increase much because of the high water requirements. Commercial 
production could diversify to include other potentially profitable crops like potatoes, dry 
land rice and more fodder crops. As long as the state order for cotton remains the 
commercial form of production will probably remain controlled as well. Access to the 
commercial form of production would then keep the role of reward for loyalty and the stable 
fulfilling of quotas.  
The state ordered form of production. With a reduction of the quota for cotton and wheat 
this form of production could become less dominant. However even with abolishment of 
crop quotas for cotton, its production will probably remain. Production on the fields of 
farmers is only one link in the value chain of cotton production. Currently the chain is 
regulated by the state. With further privatisation and less regulation this role could be taken 
over by the processing industries that depend on a stable production by farmers. In other 
parts of the world this is often organised through contract farming arrangements in which 
the processing industries offer credits and other support in exchange for guaranteed sale of 
the produce. This form of organisation has strong parallels with the state-ordered form of 
production as described for Uzbekistan in this study. If the state order falls away there is 
good change that cotton production will be organised in a contract farming set-up. Cotton 
production would probably become more profitable for farmers. Still they would heavily 
depend on external institutions for credit and guaranteed output channels. Farmers would 
probably increase their control over the internal relations of production, i.e. the exact ways 
of operation on field level will no longer be checked and enforced, while the external 
relations of production would remain heavily regulated. This external regulation could 
extend to the choice of variety and demands on the quality. 
If the state order would disappear, and cotton production would be organised in a 
contract-farming sort of set-up, fermers will probably further diversify along the lines of the 
ability to invest own capital and the willingness to take risk. Those who can invest money 
and are willing to take risk will then focus more and more on commercial production for 
dynamic markets, while those who don’t have money to invest and/or are less willing to take 
risk will turn to the privatised cotton processing industries that provide credits and 
guaranteed output prices. 
This study shows that many fermers successfully tapped into the commercial form of 
production next to their necessary production under the state order. The delivery of outputs 
in the state-ordered form of production is an important requirement for being allowed to 
develop the commercial production. Though the management of agricultural production 
within the commercial form is in principle free, indirectly it is still strictly controlled by the 
state. Commercial production is only attainable through showing loyalty in production for 
the state. Socio-political capital created through state-ordered delivery is transformed into 
cash money through the commercial production of rice. This position of forced loyalty in 
which fermers are kept by the state is very similar to the situation that fermers keep their 
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workers in; when they are loyal and work hard on the cotton fields they get better rewards. 
The access to land on which rice growing is allowed plays an important role in this reward 
system. 
This chapter on the three forms of production, together with the preceding chapter 
on fermers and dekhans in relation to the state, provides an analysis of the dynamics of 
agricultural production in Khorezm. The organisation of labour and agricultural inputs, the 
different economic systems, the output relations, and the systems of control and surplus 
abstraction have been analysed. The role of water in this system has explicitly been kept out 
of the picture. The next chapter analyses how water distribution patterns relate to the 
discussed dynamics around the three forms of production. 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
The preceding two chapters show that important parts of agricultural production in 
Uzbekistan are still under strong state control, in which cotton production plays a central 
role. The subject of this chapter is the effect of this state control on water distribution 
processes at the district level (rayon/tuman), i.e. the interactions between state organisation, 
the newly established Water Users Associations (WUAs), fermers and dekhans.  
In this chapter it is shown that Khorezm has an authoritarian, top down system of 
irrigation management. This system is deployed to strengthen the state’s control over 
agricultural production, especially that of state-ordered cotton. However, also commercially 
produced rice and household production, the two other forms of production, are 
satisfactorily supplied with water. The three different forms of production each have their 
own typical feedback loops that inform the water managers about water demands at field 
level. A situation of relative water abundance combined with strict state control over 
cropping patterns, makes it possible that the water distribution largely follows the demand 
signals.  
This chapter is based on research conducted on district and provincial level and 
interviews with state organisations operating at these levels. During the fieldwork period in 
2005 once every two weeks I travelled to about 20 different division points at provincial 
level. Mostly I was accompanied by a water manager; sometimes I travelled alone. This was 
complemented with a number of interviews at offices in Urgench, the provincial capital. At 
district level I conducted interviews with state organisation officials throughout the research 
period. Sometimes these took place in the offices and sometimes we went to the field 
together. Many processes going on at these levels are difficult to observe and often 
informants were hesitant to talk. Because of this, after the first year of research I doubted 
whether it was not wiser to complete focus my research at WUA level and below. In 2006 I 
got access to better sources than I had hoped for and due to the long period of interaction 
with a number of informants and the variety of sources it was possible to construe this 
chapter. 
Section 5.2 describes the various levels in the irrigation and drainage network and the 
organisations that are active at each level. Also the essentials of irrigation and drainage in a 
delta are explained. In section 5.3 it is argued that both the physical and the administrative 
infrastructure are well functioning systems that make it possible to effectively control water 
flows. In section 5.4 the water requirements of current agricultural production patterns are 
analysed and compared with the water availability from the Amu Darya. It is concluded that 
there is a situation of relative water abundance. In section 5.5 it is discussed how allocation 
and scheduling of irrigation is arranged, as well as how the system responds to the day-to-
day demands from field level.  
 
 
5.2. The water distribution network 
 
5.2.1 The wider organisational network 
 
Three different types of organisations are involved in the distribution of water; the 
administrative branch offices (the Homiyats), and the branch offices of MAWRwater 
department and the branch offices of the agricultural department. Until 1997 water and 
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agriculture had their separate ministries, but these were then merged into a joint Ministry of 
Agriculture and Water Resources. This also entailed the merging of the branch offices at the 
lower administrative levels (province and district). In 2003 Irrigation Management 
Authorities were created on hydrological boundaries within the joint Ministry. The branch 
offices of the water department are now organised on basin principle and therefore 
separated from the branch office of the agricultural department.  
Wegerich (2005) coined this process the de-merger of two ministries. However, it 
was not so much a de-merging of the two departments, but rather an attempt by the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Water Resources to distance the water department from the influence by 
the Hokims (Yalcin and Mollinga, 2007a). In spite of this strategic re-organisation Hokims still 
have a strong influence on water distribution, as discussed later in this chapter. 
A fourth line of organisation is constituted by the international co-ordination of 
water distribution between the former soviet republics that share the Amu Darya and Syr 
Darya Basin. The Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) was created soon 
after independence (in February 1992), while the two Basin Management Organisations (the 
BVO Amu Darya and the BVO Syr Darya) already existed since the 1980s (Spoor and 
Krutov, 2003). The BVOs are inter-state organisations responsible for allocation and 
management of international water.. Within each irrigated region the BVOs have an 
executing organisation that manages the inter-state canals. For Khorezm this is UPRADIK 
(Administration of Amu Darya Delta Irrigation Canals).  
Only the organisations marked in blue in figure 5.1, physically handle water; the thick 
blue arrows signify the flow of water. The other organisations in the figure are involved in 
supporting, checking and/or instructing these organisations.  
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Figure 5.1 – The main organisations involved in the organisation of water for agriculture in Khorezm 
BUIS – Basin Department of Irrigation Systems 
BVO – Basin Management Organisation 
ICWC – Interstate Commission for Water Coordination 
MCM – Main Canal Management 
UIS – Irrigation System Authority 
UPRADIK – Administration of Amu Darya Delta Irrigation Canals 
Source: own compilation 
 
 
5.2.2. Khorezm Province 
 
In Khorezm Province (Oblast/Viloyat) there is a total of about 270,000 irrigated hectares. At 
the provincial level there are three main organisations involved in water distribution, (1) the 
Administration of Amu Darya Delta Irrigation Canals (UPRADIK), (2) the Lower Amu 
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Darya Basin Organisation (BUIS – a branch office of the Water Department, and (3) the 
Department of Agriculture (provincial branch office). 
UPRADIK is responsible for operation and maintenance of all inter-state and most 
inter-district canals within Khorezm, as well as for the off-takes from the river and for the 
water division structures in these canals. UPRADIK is part of the BVO structure. For its 
activities in Uzbekistan the BVO Amu Darya receives its money directly from the Uzbek 
Ministry of Finance. UPRADIK receives its funds from the BVO and therefore is not part 
of any Uzbek ministry. In Urgench UPRADIK shares an office with the BVO branch for 
the lower Amu Darya. The responsibility of UPRADIK is basically to carry out the 
allocations by the BVO to the water managers at district level (MCMs/UISs, see below). 
Figure 5.1 shows a map of the canals that are managed by UPRADIK, while figure 5.2 
shows pictures of a river off-take and one of the main water division structures managed by 
UPRADIK. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 – The main canals and collectors of Khorezm Province 
Source: Conrad (2006) 
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Figure 5.2 – One of the river off-takes (at Tashsaka) operated by UPRADIK 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 – Tashsaka Zaruzenya one of the main division points operated by UPRADIK.  
The inflowing canal has a design capacity of about 500 m3/s (1st till 3rd picture) and splits into canals 
with capacities of about 250 m3/s (4th picture) and 200 m3/s (5th and 6th picture) plus a few smaller 
ones. The pictures were taken by Jan Sendzimir 
 
 
The Lower Amu Darya Basin Department of Irrigation Systems (BUIS), responsible for 
agricultural water distribution in both Khorezm and Karakalpakstan has its head office in 
Nukus, Karakalpakstan. The Urgench branch office in popular speech is still referred to as 
OblVodHoz (the former Provincial level Water Management Organisation). The BUIS co-
ordinates the tasks of its lower branch offices; i.e. the division of budgets, the planning of 
major maintenance works and the water allocation process. The water allocation process is 
closely linked to the planning of agricultural production, which is co-ordinated by the 
Department of Agriculture. At provincial level the BUIS and the Department of Agriculture 
therefore closely work together. 
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Beside co-ordinating agricultural planning between the districts, the provincial 
branch office of the Department of Agriculture also gives institutional support to the newly 
established Water Users Associations (WUAs). Neither the UIS, nor the Department of 
Agriculture at provincial level are organisations that actually handle the water themselves. 
The canals at this level are managed by UPRADIK. UIS is the support and control 
organisation for the MCMs that distribute water within the districts (i.e. the delivery-side), 
while the Department of Agriculture at this level is the supporter of WUAs and the 
Departments of Agriculture at district level (i.e. the request-side). 
Beside these three organisations also the Provincial Hokim probably sometimes 
interferes in decisions of water distribution between the districts. Yalcin and Mollinga 
(2007a) analyse that one of the main reasons to re-create separate organisation of the Water 
Department at the district and provincial level is to reduce the influence of the Hokims. 
Despite this change in organisational structure, Hokims influence the water distribution at 
these levels. Also there are the support and control organisations called the Nasos Stantsiya 
(lit. ‘pump station’), which supervises and controls the use of (state owned) pumps 
throughout the province and the Water Inspection Department, whose tasks are discussed in 
section 5.5.5. 
 
5.2.3. Tezim52 
The Tezims (Uzbek for ‘system’) are branch offices of the Lower Amu Darya Basin 
Department of Irrigation Systems (BUIS). Their working areas are based on hydrographic 
boundaries and consists more or less of three to four clustered districts. This type of 
organisation has been formed in 2003, as part of the re-organisation of the Water 
Department to hydropgraphic boundaries. In Khorezm there are four Tezims (see figure 5.4). 
By the creation of this new organisation an extra level has been established in the Water 
Department’s hierarchy. This is similar to the organisation that existed in the Soviet period. 
The Tezims took office in existing regional offices buildings of the Water Department; the 
main office of Tashaka Tezim is for instance located in the former office of Bagat’s Water 
Department.  
By the formation of the Tezims tasks that were executed by the district office have 
now been clustered, especially where it comes to heavy machinery. One of the advantages 
frequently mentioned by the people working in these offices are the economies of scale; the 
same work is done with fewer people and less equipment. Besides, also the (administrative) 
budgets and cash flows are controlled by the Tezim main office. The Tezims do not practically 
distribute water themselves; this is done by their lower level branch offices (see below). At 
the inter-district level UPRADIK is the organisation responsible for the operation of 
structures, the measurement of canal flows, maintenance of structures and canals.  
                                                 
52 This is also referred to as UIS - Irrigation System Authority 
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Figure 5.4 – The four Tezims of Khorezm Province  
The red lines are district boundaries; pink: Tashaka-system; bright green: Palvan-Gazavat-system; 
light green: Shavat-Kulavat-system ;and yellow: Karamaz-Klichbai-system. 
Source: picture taken from a map at an office in Khorezm (Christopher Conrad) 
 
 
5.2.4. District level and MCM 
 
For the discussion of the district level Yangiarik District is used as a case. It covers about 
17,500 cultivated hectares spread over ten WUAs and a few other water users, which include 
a fish farm, a bee farm and a cotton ginnery. The district capital (Yangarik Centre) has a 
branch office of the Water Department. In popular speech this office is referred to as 
RayVodHoz, which is the old Russian acronym for ‘District level Water Management 
Organisation’. Officially they are now organisations for Main Canal Management (MCM). 
With the 2003 reforms according to hydrographic boundaries the district is no longer a water 
management unit. However, in Yangiarik the changes were minimal as the district is almost 
completely supplied by one main canal, the ‘R8’ canal. The responsibility of the R8 MCM is 
therefore almost equal to that of the former Yangiarik RayVodKhoz53.  
The R8-MCM receives its water from UPRADIK at the place where the R8 canal 
connects to the main canal system (see figure 5.5). First the R8 flows through Khanka 
district for a distance of about 20 km without irrigating much land around it. At its start the 
R8 canal has a capacity of roughly 60 m3/s. When it reaches the boundaries of Yangiarik 
District it branches off in many smaller canals (see figure 5.6 and 5.7). This makes that the 
                                                 
53 An area of about 1,000 ha of the district is supplied by another canal system, while the R8 canal also supplies 
about 1,500 ha of Khanka district. This is not the case for all districts and the reforms of 2003 required more 
changes in those areas. Still, each district has an MCM office. 
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systems consists of twenty different canal stretches. For each section a hydrometer, who is 
employed by the R8-MCM, is responsible for daily management. They measure the water 
flows and control the outflows to the WUAs. For each delivery point from the MCM 
managed canals to the WUAs, a diary is kept in which both the delivering and receiving party 
sign for each water measurement (see figure 5.8). There are gravity off-takes and pumped 
off-takes (see figure 5.9). 
In total the R8-system has about 100 employees, of which the majority are employed 
at the four field offices at the main division structures. The majority of these are water 
managers, both hydrometers and hydrotechnicians. The first bear the prime responsibility for flow 
management and measurements, while the latter are responsible for operation of minor 
structures and for small repairs. Besides, each MCM has a Maintenance Department that is 
responsible for cleaning of canals and repairs, and a Mechanical Department that is 
responsible for its machinery. 
The head of the R8-MCM frequently travels between Yangiarik and Bagat, where its 
Tezim office is located. The MCM depends on this office for budget regulations, cash 
handling and co-ordination of some of the larger maintenance machines. During the 
fieldwork period for this study there was still frequent contact between the MCMs and the 
office in Urgench, similar to the situation before the reforms.  
Besides the MCM also the Department of Agriculture and the Hokimiyat are involved 
in the distribution of water at district level. As with agricultural planning in general (see 
Chapter 4), the Hokim strongly guides the distribution of water, especially where it possibly 
affects state ordered production. Officially water distribution is outside the jurisdiction of 
the Hokims, but even people at the lower reaches of the water hierarchy seemed to ‘know’ 
that the influence of the Hokims is often strong. However, many people were not well 
informed about this and/or did not feel free to talk about it. A pensioner with a life-long 
experience in the water department at district, and still somewhat involved in the operation 
of a large division structured did elaborate to me on the topic. In the context of talking 
about the merger between the ministry of Agriculture and the ministry of Water Resources 
this man explained that   
 
their tasks remained the same, but they had to pay more attention to agriculture. The Hokim started to 
tell them [of the MCM] what to do. Before the merger this was not so. Further he told that they [of 
the MCM] mostly do what [the Water Department] tells them. In the Rayon also the deputy Hokim 
gives orders, even though he officially has no authority. He comes himself or sends his people to the 
[MCM] office to tell that they have to take more water for the Rayon. But in the end [the MCM] is 
responsible for monitoring “the limit”54. 
 
Some managers from within the Department of Agriculture and MCMs explained that the 
various agricultural organisations at district level in general work as one ‘team’ under the 
guidance of the Hokim. These short links in many respects seem to be more important than 
the more distant links to the head offices within the departments. 
A high level official of a Department of Agriculture at district level explained it to me 
as follows. 
 
GJV: Now who is the head of [the Department of Agriculture at district level], is it [the Department of 
Agriculture] at Oblast level or also the Hokimiyat? […]. [Respondent]: The Hokimiyat. [Translator]: And 
further? [Respondent]: Also to Oblast level. Officially we fall under Urgench, there is a representative 
                                                 
54 “The limit” is the allocated amount of water, see explanations in section 5.4.2. 
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from [the Department of Agriculture] in Urgench, but the Hokim can order us as well. Also [the MCM] 
falls officially under the Tezim, but the Hokim can also order them, because he is the head of the Rayon. 
If the Hokim orders to let water flow to […] the very last area in our Rayon, we let the water flow there. 
He can order. We [of the different departments] have to collaborate with each other55. 
 
In another district the head of an MCM explained me the following. 
 
GJV: Since when are you the head of this office? [Respondent]: Since 6 months. GJV: What did you do 
before that? [Respondent]: I worked at the [Agricultural] department, that is Agroprom. (… some 
questions from his side [directed at my translator] about what is better: being a teacher or a translator 
…). GJV: What is better: being the head of the [MCM] office or working at Agroprom? [Respondent]: It’s 
the same. Agroprom, Tezim, mechanisation department, etc. we do not really make distinctions between 
these organisations. GJV: In practice do you then still have the same boss? [Respondent]: No, also at 
Agroprom I was the head myself. Then I was asked to become head of the Tezim office. GJV: Who asked 
you? [Respondent]: The Hokim did. I was planning to leave for Tashkent, but he asked me to stay. I 
think because I am doing a good job and he wanted me to improve the functioning of the [MCM] 
office. GJV: But are you then not asked for this position by the head of [your] Tezim? [Respondent]: 
No56. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5 – The start of the R8 canal 
At the background Tashsaka Canal flowing from right to left. 
 
                                                 
55 Field notes 29/05/2006 
56 Field notes 02/05/2006 
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Figure 5.6 – Schematic overview of the R8 MCM area.  
The blue lines are canals; the half circles are water division strictures and the small flags along the 
canals are off-takes from the canals to the WUAs. The dotted lines are the WUA boundaries.  
Source: R8 MCM – scan of original drawing 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7 – One of the larger water division structures in the R8 system (‘Navruz Zaruzenya’). 
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Figure 5.8 – Booklets with registration of water supply to WUAs 
 
 
Figure 5.9 – Gravity and pumped off-take from main R8 system to WUAs 
 
 
5.2.4. Drains, collectors and groundwater 
The Khorezm area is very flat with slopes of on average 0.00015 (Dzhabarov, 2005), due to 
which natural drainage is minimal. Since the 1940s an elaborate network of drains and 
collectors was constructed in Khorezm. The saline and polluted excess water flows to desert 
sinks where it evaporates. This construction of a drainage system followed on a period of 
increasing groundwater levels that eventually led to extensive water logged and salinised 
areas. This water logging was the result of the construction of large division structures in the 
main canals in the period 1939-1942 and the consequent expansion of the irrigated area 
(ibid.). By means of the structures the water levels in the main system could be kept at a high 
level, which made it possible to irrigate large areas by gravity. In earlier periods the main 
canals were constructed relatively deep in the soil, making it necessary to lift the water when 
putting it onto the fields. This was done by water wheels, either by animal traction or 
automated on the speed of the water flow. As the irrigation canals were constructed at a 
deep level they functioned at the same time as drains for the excess water supplied to the 
field (see figure 5.10). 
 
CHAPTER 5 – WATER ALLOCATION, ADAPTATION AND DISTRIBUTION 
 
121 
Figure 5.10 – Schematic of deeply constructed irrigation canals that also fulfil a drainage function 
The arrows indicate the flow of water, the dotted line the groundwater level. 
 
 
In the current situation most of the irrigation canals are relatively shallow, which implies the 
need for an extensive network of drains and collectors. Water that is transported through the 
irrigation canals and onto the fields leaves the area again as both water vapour 
(evapotranspiration, (ET); both through the plant and directly from the soil) and as drainage 
water. Possibly there is also a small amount that disappears as deep percolation. For a 
schematic overview see figure 5.11. 
The inflow (irrigation) and outflow (drainage) are in balance with each other, with 
the storage in the soil (groundwater) as buffer. Irrigation water reaches the groundwater 
through direct seepage losses from the canals, as well as through the soil when more water is 
applied than can be held by the soil. Partly this is done on purpose in order to create a 
downward flow that takes away the salts that would otherwise accumulate in the soil. Also 
there are direct (not sub-surface) contributions of irrigation water to the drains (operational 
losses). 
 
 
Figure 5.11 – Schematic of irrigation canals that can supply by gravity 
The arrows indicate the flow of water, the dotted line the groundwater level. 
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Through capillary rise the groundwater contributes to the soil moisture that is available to 
the plant, and to evaporation at the soil surface. The rising height and amount of capillary 
contribution depends on the soil type. The groundwater level is in certain periods kept high 
on purpose so as to contribute water available to plant growth. This is called sub-surface 
irrigation and is widely practiced in flat, deltaic areas, also outside Uzbekistan. 
During the germination and initial growth of cotton farmers keep the groundwater 
levels high by keeping the irrigation and drainage ditches full with water by blocking their 
outflows. Later in the season, when temperatures are higher and thus the risk of salinization 
is greater, the small dams are removed and the groundwater is lowered.  
Forkutsa (2006) monitored actual irrigation practices at field level by a farmer. She 
showed that the contribution by subsurface irrigation in one of the fields was as high as 277 
mm.  In another field cotton was even grown completely on the ground water contribution, 
i.e. without surface irrigation. The number of water applications to a cotton field during one 
growing season highly depends on the groundwater contribution. Some fields are only 
irrigated ones or twice while others are irrigated up to five times. Beside the beneficial effect 
of a high groundwater table, it also increases the risk of salinization. For the Khorezmian 
situation Ibrakhimov (2005) identified that the groundwater level should be between 1.2 and 
1.5 m below the ground surface in order to avoid the risk of severe salinization. 
Akramkhanov (2005) for Khorezm states that 80% of the irrigated soils in Khorezm are 
estimated to be saline, ranging from slightly saline to highly saline. The UNDP (2007) 
reports an increase of the saline land area in the Amu Darya basin of 57% between 1990 and 
2000. The groundwater level is not always kept high on purpose.; there are also other 
reasons for a high groundwater table in Khorezm. Firstly the capacity of the drainage system 
is a reduced due to irregular cleaning. Secondly many drains are not deep enough due to 
unstable sides, which is related to the soil characteristics (Dzhabbarov, 2005).  
When compared to other systems the outflow of drainage water in comparison with 
the inflow of irrigation water into the Khorezm network is very high. Conrad (2006) reports 
that during the agricultural season the outflow from different sections of the water network 
is between 45 and 60%, while the total outflow from Khorezm over 2004 and 2005 was 50% 
compared to its total inflow. This corresponds with what Dzhabbarov (2005) reports for 
each year in the period from 1970 to 1990, which for the whole of Khorezm fluctuated 
between 48 and 64%, with an average of 56%. 
The amount of outflow partly depends on the ‘leaching fraction’, i.e. the amount of 
water that on purpose should be supplied on surface in order to generate a downward flow 
that washes away the accumulating salts. This leaching can be done in a separate period 
(when there is no crop on the field) or during the cropping period as part of the normal 
water supply57.  
 
 
                                                 
57 There are many models to calculate the leaching fraction, which generally depend on the salinity of the 
applied water, and the salinity of the drainage water (Corwina et al., 2007). The 50% of outflow in Khorezm is 
much higher than what would be needed to maintain a steady state of salinity in the soil if all the water would 
drain through the soil. The difference can be accounted to seepage losses from the canals as well as operational 
losses. Why and where these losses occur is further discussed in section 5.3.1. 
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5.3. Maintenance and measurements 
 
Investment levels in the large-scale irrigation systems of Central Asia have dramatically 
dropped since independence of its five republics. “From 1991 to 2001, the state share of 
investment in agriculture was reduced from 27% to 8%, and capital investment in the water 
sector was reduced by almost 5 times” (UNDP, 2007: 39). With respect to Turkmenistan, 
O’Hara (2000:365) describes how “Problems emerged almost immediately with lack of funds 
virtually halting maintenance programmes and the system rapidly deteriorating.” O’Hara and 
Hannan (1999:38) expected that (in Turkmenistan) “a gradual deterioration through neglect” 
would lead “to widespread failures in the system”. Wegerich (2003:15, 21-2) suggests that in 
Khorezm staff and fund reductions had big implications for the possibilities of operating the 
irrigation and drainage system at a local level, which are leading to water management 
problems and water wastage. Conti (2004:144-6) describes how the state of the irrigation and 
drainage systems in Central Asia was already very low at independence, but only worsened 
since then. This has even led to “the complete abandonment of many secondary and tertiary 
canals.” In a recent study the UNDP (2007) assessed the maintenance level of the irrigation 
and drainage infrastructure throughout Uzbekistan and concludes that both for the on-farm 
as well as the main canal more than 50% is in need of reconstruction or repair. 
From these descriptions it could easily be understood that irrigation systems in 
Uzbekistan are on the verge of total collapse. However, my findings in Khorezm give a 
rather different picture; both the infrastructure and the managerial system are fully 
functional, though probably under more pressure than in earlier times.  
 
5.3.1. The state of the infrastructure 
The whole system is an open canal system with almost only unlined canals. Dzhabbarov 
(2005), reviewing various studies on water efficiencies of canals in Khorezm, reports losses 
in the canals operated by UPRADIK of about 4-8%, losses in Main Canals of 5-15% and in 
irrigation ditches losses of about 11-15%. When using the average of each level this would 
amount to an overall conveyance efficiency of 74%. This excludes operational losses and 
losses at field level. 
At the division points in the main canals concrete division structures were built, 
mostly dating back to the period 1939-1942, but which were upgraded since then. Usually 
these structures have sliding gates. Some were constructed as half-automated gates, but 
currently they are all operated manually. They are controlled by workers of the MCMs, who 
have small field offices next to these structures. The managers use their own rules of 
thumb58 to set the gates to the discharges for which they get instruction from the main MCM 
office. Regularly they check whether their gate settings indeed result in the ordered 
discharges by measuring the discharges in the canals downstream of the division point. 
The dramatic reduction of the budget available for maintenance after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union is clearly felt at the MCM level. Still, the various water managers whom I 
interviewed did not report any major collapses due to this. Neither did I observe any such 
sort of incidence in the period of two agricultural seasons that I intensively travelled along 
the canals. At small division points sometimes the gates are missing, which makes it more 
difficult to regulate the inflow (see for instance the gravity off-take in figure 5.9). In such 
situations, branches, pieces of wood and bags of sand are sometimes used to regulate the 
flows. 
                                                 
58 For instance: turn the handle 5 times round to increase the discharge with 1 m3/s. 
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The major burden on the maintenance budget is cleaning the canals from settled silts 
(cf. Zavgordnyaya, 2006). Canals at the MCM level are scheduled to be dug out by excavator 
every year, but most of them are now cleaned every second year. Still, in general, they appear 
to be relatively clean from weeds and excessive siltation. The cleaning of the canals clearly is 
prioritised over the cleaning of the drains and collectors, which can be easily observed from 
the state of many drains and collectors (see figure 5.12).  
Yearly a maintenance plan is made for every district by the end of the summer 
season. This is then executed in the fall and early winter, when water demand is low and 
temperatures not yet below freezing. Money for the maintenance programme is allocated 
through the Water Department. Especially repairs at the large division points are prioritised, 
together with the reconstruction of collapsing canal banks. 
 
 
Figure 5.12 – The maintenance state of many drains and collectors is bad 
 
 
5.3.2. Measurements 
Throughout the district water flows are being measured at all division points as well as at all 
points where irrigation canals flow into or out off a WUA. For each of these places a small 
notebook is kept, which contains a description of the situation (often with technical 
drawings), and always a table and/or graph to convert staff gauge readings into discharges. 
These Q-h curves are produced on the basis of detailed discharge measurements, which are 
conducted by the use of a current meter. At district level there are only a few people who 
know how to do these measurements, but they seem to be conducted correctly and 
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A Q-h curve (or rating curve) shows the typical relation between the water level in a canal and the 
discharge flowing through that canal. Reliable Q-h curves can only be used when water flows freely 
through the canal; i.e. there are no obstructions or bends in the canal close by. Also the profile of the canal 
should be stable over time; i.e. no siltation or growing of weeds should take place.   
To construct a Q-h curve the profile of the canal is determined and the velocity of the water measured at 
different depths and different widths (see the typical cross section below). This is usually done by means of 
a current meter, a propeller that is placed in the water flow. With the velocity and profile the discharge can 
be calculated. This procedure has to be repeated at a number of moments with different discharges. Each 
time the determined relation between discharge and water level is set out in a graph. In the graph below 
each dot corresponds to such a procedure and the procedure has been repeated eight times. The curved 
line is fitted through the determined points. With a measured water level the discharge can now be read 
from the graph (see dotted lines), without every time having to repeat the complicated procedure with the 
current meter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discharge 
(m3/s) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Water level (m)     Typical cross section 
 
accurately59. At most places the measurement are conducted a few times per season, much 
less than the suggested (or sometimes even claimed) frequency of every 10 days during the 
growing season. With stable canal shapes, Q-h curves should hardly change. However, the 
measurements should regularly be repeated to keep the curve accurate. Three times per day 
(in the morning, at noon, and in the evening) the water level in the canals is measured by 
means of fixed staff gauges. With the Q-h curves these readings are converted to discharges. 
See figure 5.13 for an example Q-h curve as used in Khorezm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 5.1 – The Q-h curve; procedures and use 
                                                 
59 My numerous interviews and observations concerning the use of the current meter and construction of Q-h 
curves at Oblast level showed that the workers at the division points at this level were knowledgeable and 
capable. 
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Figure 5.13 – Q-h curve as made and used in Khorezm 
At the bottom of the booklet you can see the sealing with a thread, pasted paper and stamp. 
 
 
5.3.3. Communication and administration 
The measurement data is noted down in the small notebooks that exist for each 
measurement point, and which are kept at the four main division points in the district (see 
figure 5.8). It is clear that not all measurements are actually done, nor are they always done 
accurately. Yet there are no blanks in the booklet; i.e. people fill in numbers that they did not 
actually measure. It seems that frequently numbers are simply copies of the previous 
measurement or a number corresponding to what the discharge ought to be.  
The fluctuations in the discharges over the day are high; at night the discharge is 
typically higher than during the day, as then less water is taken out by pumping. The three 
times a day measurements do not completely cover these fluctuations. Due to this the 
estimates that field workers once in while fill in at the blanks are possibly more reliable then 
the actual staff gauge readings would have been. 
There are some checks in place to guarantee a basic quality and to keep an overview of 
flows within the district level. The field offices at the main division points are in regular 
radio contact with the head office in the district centre. Instructions are given concerning the 
scheduled discharges for each canal. Also the discharges in the main canals are then 
reported. Water that flows from one division point should reach the next division point. The 
comparison of these numbers provides a strong check on the accuracy of the measurements 
and forms an obstacle for taking water without authorisation. The room of manoeuvre of 
fieldworkers to divert water different from what they are told is only small, as explained by 
one of my informants. 
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[The informant] draws different canal stretches on a piece of paper and tells about the different 
discharges in them. KP: 300 m3/s is the total intake [from the river], 200 reaches Tashsaka Zaruzenya, 30 
is going into R8 canal and 28 reaches till here. If 30 m3/s is coming, they must have put 32 m3/s. We 
give our numbers to [the MCM], they give to Tezim, they to [BUIS], who talk to UPRADIK. The 
numbers have to match otherwise it will be noticed60.  
 
Next to the daily reporting of discharges by radio contact, every ten days the measurements 
are submitted in writing to the district office. Also the binding of the notebooks in which the 
measurements are administrated are sealed and stamped by the district office. This is done to 
prevent tampering with the books. Such a seal and stamp can be seen in figure 5.13. 
The water department releases water from the main infrastructure into the WUAs. 
At the same time the main canals also flow right through some WUAs, on to other WUAs. 
The water that leaves the canals within the boundaries of a WUA is accounted as water use 
by that WUA61. Much to the dissatisfaction of the WUAs this includes unauthorised water 
taking, but also seepage losses of these big canals. The latter is water which in practice 
cannot be put to use.  
As WUAs have administrative rather than hydrographic boundaries there can be 
numerous inflows and outflows. Also there are often many off-take points between the 
water department and a WUA. Many of the off-takes are operated by pumps that take water 
from the big canal and put it in slightly higher situated irrigation ditch (salma). Such off-takes 
are generally ‘measured’ by means of the electricity meter. At places with diesel pumps and 
broken electricity meters the water flows are estimated on basis of time administration and 
an estimated discharge from the pump. In any case these off-takes are monitored for their 
discharges, and the numbers are administrated in the same small notebooks as described 
before. Both the responsible district water manager and the concerned WUA chairman sign 
behind the measurements for each day. In this way the measurement sometimes become the 
subject of discussion and negotiation. A former WUA chairman for instance explained it to 
me as follows. 
 
GJV: How much has the reform to fermers and the WUA changed your work? [Former WUA 
chairman]: Before, other people told us what to do, now the WUA is independent and can decide 
itself, but the calculations have now become more difficult. For instance every day we had to sign for 
the water use with RayVodKhoz. If they wrote more than we had taken I didn’t sign, but in the kolkhoz 
time I just signed. 
 
He went on to explain that frequently it happened that the MCM office charged water to his 
WUA that was actually seepage water from a large canal flowing through the area of his 
WUA. 
Even if the measurements are technically not very accurate, by making the numbers subject 
to approval by the water receivers, it has become a functioning accountability system.  
In case of doubts more frequent measurements are being conducted, sometimes under 
pressure by the WUAs to which the water is accounted, or when higher authorities do not 
trust the numbers62. Such a situation was for instance described by a fieldworker of the 
MCM. 
 
                                                 
60 Field notes 27/07/2006 
61 Field notes 31/05/2006 
62 Field notes 27/07/2006 
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The hydrometers […] come to places every 10 days to check whether there is really flowing 4 m3/s. 
GJV: Do they really do that every 10 days? [MCM worker]: They should, but they don’t. Recently they 
measured again because the Kolkhoz Raís63 said that it was not 4 m3/s flowing. [The head of the MCM] 
said it was. In such a situation they measure it again. At that time there was indeed a little bit less than 4 
m3/s, but not much64.  
 
5.3.4. Functional management 
It is clear that neither the physical infrastructure, nor the measurement system is in a perfect 
state. Yet the water department is both technically and organisationally capable of dividing 
and measuring the water flows in such a way that they can be used for a functional 
accountability system between the department and the WUAs. 
Furthermore, from the descriptions above it is clear that both technically and 
managerially the irrigation system is designed for top down control. Water users can request 
water, yet will have to go through the water department in order to get it. The central office 
has to instruct the managers of the division points to release more water.  
 
 
5.4. Water requirement and availability 
 
To make an assessment of the scarcity or abundance of water in Khorezm in this section the 
balance between availability and requirement is examined. Both the requirements and the 
availability depend partly on natural circumstances and partly on human action. As a 
consequence they both fluctuate and balancing between the two is a dynamic process. 
 
5.4.1. Water requirements 
The low humidity in Khorezm combined with high temperatures in summer, causes very 
high evapotranspiration (see figure 5.14). In the peak period from June to August the 
reference evapotranspiration is around 7 mm/day. As rainfall is very low, especially in the 
summer period, all the water needed for crop growth needs to come from irrigation. Conrad 
(2006) shows that about half of the total water intake for Khorezm is concentrated in July 
and August. 
Table 5.1 shows the state norms that are used by the water department as the water 
requirement per crop. The allocation and scheduling procedures are based on these norms. 
From the table it is clear that the water requirement of paddy production is much higher 
than that of any of the other crops. The differences between water requirement for cotton 
and rice can almost completely be attributed to seepage losses in rice cultivation as the 
difference in actual ET was only 176 and 44 mm for 2004 and 2005 respectively (Conrad, 
2006: 5). 
The crop norm for household plots is high as it takes into account that most of this 
area is double cropped. However, real consumption is much higher as it is not considered 
that in summer about half of the area is cropped to paddy.  
Cotton is often thought to still be the main crop and the main water consumer of Khorezm. 
However, the area cropped to cotton is less then 40% of the total irrigated area65 and its 
                                                 
63 This must have been either the chairman of the WUA or the chairman of the MTP, as kolkhozy did not exist 
anymore at that time, and even other forms of LFEs no longer existed. 
64 Field notes 26/07/2006 
65 With 54% and 46%, respectively for 2004 and 2005, Conrad (2006) reports a higher share of cotton in the 
total agricultural area of Khorezm. For the R8 system, which is almost completely made up by Yangiarik 
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water requirement is only about 30% of total official agricultural water requirement. 
Household production, which is only practiced at about 20% of the area, uses more water 
than cotton, and is also officially allotted more water66 (see table 5.2). 
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Figure 5.14 – Climatic conditions in Khorezm 
Source: own calculations on data from three meteorological-stations in Khorezm, from 
ZEF/UNESCO project database. 
 
 
 
 
Crop/land use 
Crop water 
norm (m3ha-1)
Rice (paddy) 26206
Household plots gardens 9500
Vegetables and potatoes 8467
Alfalfa 8333
Cotton 5533
Maize 5233
Orchards 5133
Melons and gourds 3933
Wheat 3600
Table 5.1 – Crop water norms for the main crops of Khorezm 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and WUA workers 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
district he reports 49% in 2005. His numbers are based on remote sensing data. By (1) not recognizing 
household production as a separate land use, (2) not considering villages as agricultural area and (3) a bias 
towards large fields through pixel sizes of 1000x1000m, his numbers are considerably skewed towards large 
scale and state ordered production. 
66 This holds even true when calculated with the official water norm for household production, which in reality 
is on the low side. 
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Figure 5.15 – Crop water norms for the main crops of Khorezm 
Based on Table 5.1 
 
 
 Area (ha) % of 
irrigated 
area 
Crop water 
norm  
(m3ha-1) 
Water req. 
(103 m3) 
% of total 
official 
water req.67 
Total 
Irrigated area 
17734   119065  
Cotton 
production 
6517 36.8 5533 36064 30.3 
Household 
production 
3427 19.3 9500 39924 33.5 
Table 5.2 – Comparison of water requirements for cotton and household production in Yangiarik 
district (2005) 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture 
 
 
Water requirements do not only concern the total amount, but also the timing and the way 
of application. For this reason the water use practices of the main forms of production (see 
Chapter 4) are discussed here. A summary can be found in table 5.3. 
In Khorezm rice is grown in basins with standing water. This leads to a very high 
ground water table around the fields where it is cropped. The application of water does not 
need continuous supervision and it can therefore flow freely, which makes it easy to irrigate 
rice fields during the night. The inflow is simply opened at the end of the day and only in the 
morning the water is diverted again for other uses. 
Cotton is not a specifically high demander of water when compared to the other 
production processes here discussed. However, cotton has its specific requirements 
regarding the timing of irrigation. Cotton requires water from May till August, but especially 
in the period around July water application has to be accurately timed. Farmers even prefer 
to irrigate on the exact right day, i.e. the plant should start to experience water stress, but not 
to such an extent that it drops its flowers. The cotton is grown on ridges and the water is 
                                                 
67 It is important to realise that this calculation is based on the official requirements in which water use by 
paddy cultivation is not considered. In reality the total water consumption is higher; in 2005 by about 37% for 
Khorezm (Conrad, 2006) and thus the share of cotton in that is even lower. 
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supplied in the furrows in between. As the fields are generally not well levelled, it is difficult 
to apply the water evenly.  
Furthermore cotton generally requires a low water table and therefore good field 
drainage. However in the period of germination the ground water table is artificially kept 
high by filling the irrigation ditches with water and blocking the drains. Wheat is basically the 
only crop grown over winter and it has its peak water requirement in spring, different from 
the other crops and therefore not directly competing over water. This is the main reason that 
wheat remains somewhat out of the picture in this chapter. 
In household production a clear distinction between adjacent and distant plots is 
important. The adjacent plots, which are very heterogeneously cropped, are irrigated 
frequently throughout the growing season. Often only parts of the adjacent plot are irrigated, 
i.e. the crop that needs water is irrigated. The consequence is that dekhans irrigate their 
adjacent plots often more than once a week. The distant plots, being cropped to wheat over 
winter and to rice over summer, are irrigated in a similar fashion as described above for these 
two crops. 
 
Form of 
production 
State ordered  Commercial  Household  
Main crops Cotton, winter wheat Rice, vegetables, 
fodder 
Garden: fruits and 
vegetables 
Distant plot: winter 
wheat and rice 
Crop schedule Cotton: planting in 
March-April,  
main irrigation period 
in July-August  
harvesting in 
September-October 
Rice: planting in May 
or transplanting in 
June,  
Main irrigation period 
July-August 
harvesting in 
September 
Garden: various fruits 
and vegetables with a 
number of double 
cropping systems 
Distant plot: winter 
wheat (Oct-June) and 
rice (June-Oct) 
 
State water 
norm per 
hectare 
Cotton: 5533 m3/ha Rice: 26206 m3/ha Household production: 
9500 m3/ha 
Irrigation 
method 
Cotton: furrow 
irrigation 
Rice: basin irrigation Garden: mixed, 
depending on the crop 
Rice on distant plot: 
basin irrigation 
Irrigation 
timing 
Cotton: specific timing 
(interval); mostly 
during day time 
Rice: continuous; 
mostly during night 
time 
Garden: Specific timing 
per crop; several times 
per week 
Rice on distant plot: 
continuous; mostly 
during night time 
Ground water 
management 
Cotton: high 
groundwater during 
germination, lower 
during vegetation 
Rice: standing water 
in the field 
Garden: otherwise not 
specific 
Rice on distant plot: 
standing water in the 
field 
Table 5.3 – Summary of water use practices in the three forms of production 
See table 4.1 for an overview of other characteristics per form of production 
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5.4.2. Water availability 
Khorezm is in general not short on water. The qualification ‘in general’ refers to both space 
and time; if equally spread, throughout the whole province there should be enough water 
during most of the years. Conrad (2006) on the basis of own measurements of inflow into 
Khorezm concludes that during the vegetation period of 2005 the total intake was 5.38 km3, 
which corresponds with a water availability of 2278 mm/ha. 
Water availability is fluctuating between the years as result of the stochastic variability 
of rainfall and snowmelt. As a rule of thumb irrigation engineers often design schemes on an 
80% probability. This implies that on average in one out of five years there is less water than 
what is required within the irrigated area. The other four years there will be more water 
available than what is required. Thus when assessing the situation of shortage/abundance it 
should be understood in terms of probability. Moreover, in practice there is variation within 
the irrigated area; i.e. some areas and some people experience shortages more often and 
stronger than others. 
The 80% probability of river discharges is calculated from long time series of water 
flows, typically over a period of 50 years. As the discharges in the Amu Darya have 
considerably changed in this period due to increased water abstraction and increased storage 
capacity in reservoirs, long-term data is not directly usable (see figure 5.16). 
Mueller (2006) made a probability analysis of the officially reported intake of 
irrigation water into Khorezm. This shows that the 80% probability corresponds more or 
less with an intake of 5 km3 per year (see figure 5.17). This figure is not comparable with the 
reported 5.38 km3 reported by Conrad (2006), as Conrad’s number is limited to the 
vegetation period (excludes leaching). On the other hand Mueller’s numbers do not take 
account of the actual intake, which is presumably always higher and possibly even as high as 
37%, as reported by Conrad for 2005. Overall it can be concluded that 2005 was certainly 
not a water short year, but that it is neither an exceptionally water abundant year either. 
 
 
Figure 5.16 – Long-term Trends of River Runoff Variations at Tuyamuyun for 1932-1999  
Tuyamuyun is just upstream of Khorezm 
Source: UNDP (2007) 
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Figure 5.17 – Cumulative frequency of Amu Darya flow at Tuyamuyun and approximated 
probabilities, April to September, 1982 to 2001 
Source: Mueller (2006) 
 
As 2005 can be considered a normal year with regard to overall water availability, the 
observed practices in that agricultural season can be used to give an impression of normal 
water availability. The water abundance in such an normal year is illustrated with numbers 
and observations from the R8 system, which covers both an up-stream and a down-stream 
area of Khorezm province. There is no reason to believe that water use in the rest of 
province will be essentially different from that in this area68. Also from the work that I did at 
provincial level there were no indications that this part of the network is treated differently 
from the rest. I therefore extrapolated the observations from this one district (which covers 
about 7% of the total irrigated area in the province) and cautiously draw conclusions for the 
whole of Khorezm. 
The flow of water into the R8 system during July 2005 was around 50 m3/s at 
continuous flow, which corresponds to 24 mm/day69. Yet, the reference evapotranspiration 
(ETo) for this period is only 7.3 mm/day, and the absolute peak requirement is about 18 
mm/day (for rice). Thus, even when the whole R8 system would have been cropped with 
rice, if carefully applied, still there would have been more than enough water. In reality 70-
80% of the area is under other crops, which only require about a third of the requirements 
for rice. Thus there are high losses. These are not only deep percolation losses from canals 
and fields, but also plain wastage of water. Frequently it was observed that water went 
straight from the irrigation ditches into the drains. In various situations I observed (or 
                                                 
68 Conrad (2006) reports slightly higher than average water availability per ha for this area (24,898 m3/ha 
compared to 22,782 m3/ha), but he puts his findings regarding unequal distribution within Khorezm in 
perspective by pointing out that the boundaries of the systems are unclear and in reality they are at some places 
considerably different from the ones reported in the GIS database of the ZEF/UNESCO project. 
69 Or 2.8 l/s/ha; a rule of thumb for irrigation design is an overall intake of 1 l/s/ha, losses included. 
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people told me) that one of their tasks was to close the flows directly from the ditches into 
the drains. This concerns workers of the MCMs, of the WUAs and of the Water Inspection.  
In the operation of the irrigation and drainage system water managers in Khorezm 
follow the rule of thumb that it is completely acceptable that up to 50% of the irrigation 
inflow leaves the system again as outflow. This was for instance explained to me by a water 
manager at the Tezim. 
 
If less than 50% goes to the drains the water use efficiency is ok, if it increases above 50% it is not. Last 
week the inflow into Yangiarik was 39 m3/s and the outflow 16 m3/s; that’s acceptable70. 
 
And in an interview during the next year. 
 
GJV: Last year you mentioned that if 50% of the water flowing into an area is coming out of the drains, 
it is still alright, but if it comes above this number actions should be taken. Is that correct? 
[Respondent]: Yes, that’s correct. GJV: At what level do you know this proportion, and how often do 
you calculate this and who is responsible to do something about it? [Respondent]: Well we [of the 
Tezim] know how much water flows into an area, and the drainage department knows how much is 
flowing out. We do not sit together to calculate the numbers, but we both report to Urgench, where 
they compare the numbers. […] If over 50% is coming out, they will strengthen the control over this 
area. GJV: What does that mean, what concrete action can be taken? [Respondent]: they will check all 
the fermers in this area, whether they are not wasting the water. If they find that they do waste water they 
will make a report and the fermer has to pay a fine. GJV: Whose responsibility is it actually, that of the 
WUA or that of the Tezim? [Respondent]: The direct responsible is the ‘water control organisation’ in 
Urgench. They have an inspector for each district71. 
 
The 50%-rule that is mentioned by water managers in the field corresponds with the actual 
numbers reported by Conrad (2006) and Dzhabbarov (2005); see section 5.2.4. If effectively 
applied as a leaching fraction in combination with field drainage these could be reasonable 
values, but in the absence of subsurface drainage pipes there is no sense in applying such 
amounts of water as the excess water will only damage the crop. 
This was for instance illustrated by an inspector of the Department of Agriculture. 
 
We are sent to check whether the fields are watered according to the norm. Usually people irrigate too 
much. The plant will be with its stem in the water. When this happens the cotton will not grow well. 
GJV: Why do people put too much water? [Inspector]: Because the fields are not level; one side is high 
and the other low. When this happens the higher part grows well, because it is watered according to the 
norm, but the lower will not grow well, because the plants will be in the water. 
 
That is: he is more worried about over-irrigation due to the field not being level than about 
water shortage that could occur due to the same reason. 
The dramatically low water use efficiencies at this level can be easily increased by 
closing the connection points between canals and drains, as all the water flowing this way is 
by definition lost. This is also exactly what happens in case of imminent water shortage, as in 
this way quickly water can be made available. Also during normal situations these 
unnecessary outflows are a point of control: district water managers frequently go around in 
the WUAs to close unnecessary outflows and therewith increase the overall efficiencies. 
 
 
                                                 
70 Field notes 23/08/2005 
71 Field notes 11/03/06; the process water inspections and fining is explained later in this chapter. 
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5.5. Adapting to demands 
 
In section 5.2 and 5.3 it was shown that the technical and managerial aspects of the irrigation 
system have strong characteristics of upstream and top-down control. In section 5.4 it was 
shown that the different crop production systems put very different demands on water 
management. Not only in terms of quantity and timing, but also in managing groundwater 
and salinity. Besides that it was shown that Khorezm is relatively water abundant. This 
fourth section will show how this water abundance affects the actual water distribution 
process. Firstly, the formal allocation and scheduling process will be described. Then it is 
discussed how day-to-day water needs at field level influence the re-allocation and re-
scheduling process. 
 
5.5.1. The effect of abundance 
The high availability of water (as explained in section 5.4.2) creates a situation in which 
people can simply take water from a close-by canal any time they need water. Or when they 
cannot take it immediately, for instance because their neighbour is irrigating at that moment, 
at least they can take it very soon after that person. When there is little pressure on the water 
availability there is also little pressure to develop detailed rules and regulations to make sure 
no water goes lost. Being used to work in situations with more water scarcity I was often 
amazed by how easy people in Khorezm talked off sharing the water. 
Especially in 2005 farmers almost always expressed that if they needed water, they 
could simply take it. And if it was not there they would ask either their neighbour or the 
WUA worker and then get the water. Also the WUA workers explained that in principle they 
would get the water they asked for; if on a certain day the water in their WUA was not 
enough, they requested more water and usually such a request was granted. Later during the 
research it showed that it is not always as easy as that. Especially in 2006, when the water 
availability was lower and when I put more systematic attention to the tail end of the system 
it showed that there are big differences between users as well as between purposes of water 
use. 
 
5.5.2. Allocation & scheduling 
Water distribution can conceptually be understood as consisting of the three complementary 
processes of allocation, scheduling and delivery. Allocation is concerned with the 
distribution of rights and entitlements, scheduling is about the planning of how water is 
distributed and delivery concerns the practical distribution of water from source to user. 
These three processes often correspond with three steps consecutive in time. 
In Khorezm it is difficult to distinguish the allocation and scheduling processes from 
each other as they come together in what is called the determining of ‘the limit’. It is an 
irrigation schedule for six months that provides a list of discharges for each 10-day-period, 
for every canal and every WUA (see figure 5.18). This is based on the planned cropping 
pattern for that period. There is a schedule for the ‘leaching period’, which runs from 
October till March and one for the ‘vegetation period’, which runs from April till September. 
Crop planning takes place between the Department of Agriculture and the fermers. At the 
WUA level these areas are aggregated. The planned cropping areas are multiplied by crop 
water norms, which are determined constants for every 10-day-period of the year. At the end 
of February the WUAs have to submit their final plans for the vegetation period and at the 
end of August they have to submit the requests for the leaching period. The request are all 
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forwarded to the Department of Water in Tashkent. The water allocated to Uzbekistan by 
the ICWC is here divided among the provinces, districts and WUAs. Various people in the 
water hierarchy told me that these allocations are normally 80-100 percent of the requested 
amounts, depending on the prognoses of available water.  
Thus water allocation and scheduling is almost a direct expression of the cropping 
patterns that are largely determined by the Department of Agriculture at the district level, 
following the quotas for cotton and wheat that they received from Tashkent.  
 
 
Figure 5.18 – Picture of “the limit” 
The water allocation and scheduling on basis of centrally planned cropping patterns and state water 
norms; second column: names of WUAs, third column: names of supplying canals; columns 4 till 21: 
discharges in the canals during the indicated 10-day-period. 
 
 
5.5.3. No limit 
But ‘the limit’ is not the limit; water use can without any problem exceed the set limit. In the 
actual delivery process ‘the limit’ plays a very limited role, if any at all. Though the papers are 
distributed among district water managers at the main division points, the gates are set and 
water is deliveredaccording to the daily instructions from above rather than to the provided 
schedule. This is not strange at all, as the real demand of course differs from the calculated 
requirements on basis of climatic averages. The actual windiness, temperature and humidity 
determine the real water demand. The water hierarchy responds to these real demands. One 
way of doing this could be by re-calculating the crop water requirements. Instead the Water 
Department responds to the demands voiced from below. The heads of the MCMs 
coordinate the different demands between the WUAs and instruct their workers through the 
radio communication system (see section 5.3.3) to distribute the water accordingly. If a 
WUA asks for more water, the responsible MCM manager in principle tries to get more 
water to that WUA. 
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‘The limit’ is not only a schedule with discharge settings for each 10-day-period, but 
also becomes a lump volume allocation that can be used with some flexibility. During the 
advancement of the season the used volumes are added up and compared with the original 
‘the limit’. Both the MCMs and the WUAs are aware of this advancement, but it seems never 
a real argument to dramatically cut down on water supply or use; they all go over their limits. 
Foremost because the water needed for the commercial production of rice is not 
accommodated as such in the initial calculations process; the real need for that is about five 
times higher than what is initially allocated for that area. 
 
 
5.5.4. Differences between users and purposes of use 
These descriptions show that actual water distribution is informed from below. Primarily this 
demand information flows from the fermers and dehkans through the WUAs to the district 
level and higher. Especially when water availability tends to get lower, the process becomes 
more articulate. Then it also becomes clearer that for each of the three earlier described 
production processes the strategy for getting water is different. 
Even though the overall water consumption by household production is substantial, 
individual dekhans need only small amounts of water, as production takes place on small 
plots. People are mostly able to simply take this water, even when it is not abundantly 
available. Both peasants and farmers seem to be convinced that the basic production of 
peasants has priority over state and commercial production. Also various state officials 
mentioned that household production has this priority. If it would happen that for a long 
period there would be no water available people would start to complain through the 
ordinary community channels, i.e. to the village elders and the state-connected elites in their 
village. 
Only in an exceptional case it was found that distant household plots were being left 
unused for the (claimed) reason of poor access to water. In other situations, water needy 
dekhans used weapons of the weak and simply took the water they needed. Most rural 
households are dekhan households (90-95%), these are the poorest people and withholding 
water for their basic production would dramatically affect their livelihoods. 
This implies that if too little water is coming into the WUA, it is not the household 
production, but the other two production forms that experience this shortage. It has already 
been mentioned that the state is so much concerned with a good cotton yield that they 
strictly control the cultivation by farmers. This also concerns appropriate irrigation, both in 
terms of timing and quantity. There is a constant pressure on the primary producers (the 
fermers) and the supporting (state) agencies. Also the WUAs take well care of the cotton and 
they defend the state’s interests as they are made co-responsible for a good cotton yield. 
Both fermers and WUA staff testify that it is easier to get water for cotton than for other 
crops. Besides it was observed that WUA workers irrigate cotton fields for the farmer when 
ordered to do so by the district authorities (cf. Veldwisch, 2006). During daytime irrigation of 
rice fields is often not permitted and in crucial periods it was observed that WUA staff was 
instructed to only provide water to cotton.  
Even though in general WUA staff is willing to provide water for cotton when needed, 
it happened that cotton fields were occasionally without water even though in need. Fermers 
were quick to complain at district level; often first to the water management department, but 
if that didn’t help, directly to the district Hokimiyat. In a few cases it was observed that this 
led to interventions from above, but mostly the mere threat was enough to release the water 
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for necessary cotton irrigation. In the case described below it still took a lot of effort to get 
water for cotton. 
 
[Fermer]: I came to ask water from [the WUA Chairman]. I still haven’t irrigated my cotton even for the 
first time. Yesterday a group with all kind of experts came from the Hokimiyat to check the irrigation of 
cotton fields. They said that the fermer before me should release water to me, so that I can also irrigate. 
I went to him, but still he doesn’t release water. GJV: How many hectares do you have? [Fermer]: 1.5 ha. 
GJV: That’s very small for a cotton field isn’t it? [Fermer]: Last year I have planted mulberry trees and 
they are still very small. In between the trees I have to plant either cotton or wheat. I have chosen to 
plant cotton because it is better for the land; it is well fertilized and cultivated, which is also good for my 
mulberry trees. GJV: Do you take your water from a Salma? [Fermer]: Yes. GJV: How many other 
fermers are there on your Salma [irrigation ditch]? [Fermer]: Only one other, he planted 10 ha of rice. 
GJV: How many hectares does he have in total? [Fermer]: 25 ha of cotton and 10 ha of rice. He is taking 
all the water for his rice and not releasing to me. I am still waiting for the first time to irrigate. I went to 
the Hokim before to complain, but still the water didn’t come. Now I am here again to complain to [the 
WUA Chairman] and to ask him to bring water to my field. […][The WUA Chairman] greets us and 
leaves us sitting talking with the other men, while he takes [the fermer] a few meters apart. [My 
translator] picked up parts of the talk. Basically [the WUA Chairman] promised to get him water after 
we would have left.72 
 
It is clear that this is an ‘insignificant’ cotton producer. The 1.5 ha that he has are meant for 
mulberry leave production for feeding silk worms, only as long as the mulberry seedlings are 
small the fermer has to plant cotton (or wheat) in between. The other fermer with whom he 
shares the irrigation ditch is apparently a very rich and powerful person, indicated by his 
total land area, as well as the size of his paddy fields. Whether or not the smaller fermer in the 
end got his irrigation turn on that day I have not found out. 
Formally water for commercial rice production comes at the bottom of the list, only 
after the basic needs for the majority of the people and after the well protected state 
interests. Farmers who are trying to make their primary source of income flourish need to 
secure their water through other channels. People are very well aware that rice production is 
big money. Everybody wants to share in the profits, family and neighbours (e.g. as workers), 
the institutions controlling the cropping areas, but also the controlling water institutions. 
The fact that the extra water needed for rice production are not allocated in the original 
‘limit’, implies that this water has to be arranged in the second instance. The topic is 
surrounded by secrecy, but it is clear that people have to make use of their informal 
networks, their socio-political as well as their economic power to ensure that they get 
enough water for their rice fields. Often the big farmers are people with an extensive 
network, who also fulfil (or previously have fulfilled) roles in the state apparatus. The people 
that in case of need are approached for extra water are sometimes the same for cotton as for 
rice, but the nature of the relation is different. Small, weak farmers can ask the district 
governor to make sure their cotton field will get water without offering anything in return, as 
a good cotton yield is also to the benefit of the Hokim.  
Thus, also where is comes to water distribution, there are strong differences between 
the three forms of production. Cotton primarily depends on the state network through 
which it is easy to get water when needed. Water for commercially produced rice is 
mobilised through private relations and informal networks of the fermer, in which also money 
and transfer of other benefits play an important role. The peasants are by default only weak 
players in the struggle over water, yet they are with many and thrive on the generally 
                                                 
72 Field notes 18/7/2006 
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accepted norm that basic production has priority over commercial and state production. 
Besides they are with many and only divert small flows, which makes it difficult to control 
their water consumption. 
 
5.5.5. Keeping things in check 
At district level the main interests in controlling both state cotton and commercial rice 
production lay with the political elite. The governor is in the end held responsible for the 
cotton yield in his area and at the same time is able to profit from the rice production in his 
area. Both the state control and the informal, elite control are in his hands. The water 
department is bound hand and foot by the district authorities. In one of the districts where I 
worked the head of the water department made no secret of de facto being appointed in that 
position by the district governor and being primarily responsible to him73. 
 
The check system to limit overall water use consists of three elements: 
1. Controlling the cropping areas (of especially rice) 
2. Checking misuse and wastage and fining the offenders 
3. Afterwards check the used amounts with the allocated amounts and charge the 
overuse 
 
The demand on water can easily be limited by restricting the area that can be cropped to rice. 
By doing this the margin between allocated water and really available water stays the largest, 
which makes it easier to have enough water available to irrigate the cotton fields at the right 
time. At the same time limiting rice growing makes it easier to keep the ground water at an 
acceptable level throughout the area and as such prevent water logging and salinization of 
surrounding fields. The allowances for cropping rice are only given informally and strictly 
controlled by the (agricultural) district authorities. 
In each district there is a water inspector, who is employed by the Water Inspection 
Department at provincial level. They check day-to-day water use, but do not compare the 
actual use figures with the earlier allocated figures, as then they would quickly end up fining 
all the rice growers. Instead they focus on the avoiding of misuse/wastage of water, e.g. 
fields not being level and irrigation water unnecessarily flowing to the drain. The water 
inspectors state that as long as the water is used productively there is no problem and no 
need to write out fines. They explicitly keep out of crop planning, as this is deemed the area 
of the (agricultural) authorities at district level. The water that is used over ‘the limit’ needs 
to be paid for at the end of the season. However, actual water consumption by farmers is 
not measured. The costs are charged to the WUAs, which consecutively collect it from the 
farmers that have planted large areas of rice.  
Water flows are measured and administrated not only to determine the overall use, 
but also as a means of giving account. Water managers at various levels in the hierarchy are 
held responsible for supplying water to the level below them; i.e. district water managers to 
the WUAs and WUAs to the farmers. Especially when farmers could not fulfil their cotton 
quotas the water suppliers have to show that it is caused by insufficient water supply. The 
system developed at district level is highly detailed and fairly accurate for this task, but the 
WUAs generally struggle to get such an administrative system running. Therefore in case of 
accusations the WUA has a weak position. In some WUAs the staff is well aware of this and 
at those places administrative systems are being developed.  
                                                 
73 Quotes from field notes are left out for reasons of safety 
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5.6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter the Khorezmian water management system was discussed, both from an 
institutional, managerial and a technical perspective. Contrary to what was expected on basis 
of existing literature it was found that the irrigation infrastructure is functional and 
manageable. Moreover, in combination with the management procedures and practices water 
is measured, distributed and accounted effectively, i.e. the state is in control over water 
distribution. Deliveries from the main system to the WUAs is measured by the state and 
signed for by the WUA. The elaborate system of checks and (water) balances implies that 
water cannot easily ‘disappear’ from the system unaccounted. The water department is able 
to enforce control through a combination of technical and managerial mechanisms. 
Existing literature suggests that this control by the water department would be 
contested by the water users in their attempt to access water. There are three reasons why in 
Khorezm this technical and managerial control is not fiercely contested. 
In the first place the high availability of water makes it a less scarce resource and thus access 
to it is less contested. In this chapter it was established that 2005 was rather normal year in 
terms of water availability. During this growing season inflows of more than two times the 
crop water requirements were observed, as well as various signs of over-irrigation and excess 
irrigation water flowing straight into the drainage system. 
Secondly, contestation by water users is subdued by general socio-political control by 
the state. If WUAs and fermers would infringe on the distribution activities of the water 
department this could have serious consequences in other areas of life. The socio-political 
control by the state is also observable in the control over cropping patterns. This is 
concentrated in the department of agriculture and the Hokimiyat. Through this control the 
state manages the water demand. Especially the restriction of rice cultivation is a form of 
‘demand management’. With demand and supply broadly matched, water distribution to a 
large extent can follow the actual demand in the field.  
The third reason is the way by which acute need for access is mediated is through the 
large influence of sub-surface irrigation. Groundwater is actively used as a buffer that is filled 
with each leaching and irrigation event and contributes through the capillary rise to water 
consumption by the crop. Though the variance between fields is high, the capillary rise of 
shallow groundwater in many situation enlarges the margin in water application, both in time 
and in quantity. 
Sub-surface irrigation is of great influence because the very flat topography due to 
which natural drainage is minimal and groundwater levels can be easily kept high. The 
shallow ground water does also constitute the danger of killing crops when the ground water 
reaches the root zone (water logging). Moreover, the capillary contribution of saline ground 
water that evaporates at the soil surface can lead to severe salinization of the soil. Thus 
groundwater levels need to be accurately managed; they should be shallow enough to 
contribute to growth when necessary and deep enough to avoid dangerous levels of 
salinization. The drainage system is not functioning optimally. Drains are often too shallow 
and the capacity of the main collectors seems to be hampering a quick removal of water 
from sub-systems.  
Different crops have different requirements regarding groundwater management. 
This is especially observable between paddy and cotton cultivation. The standing water on 
rice field causes the groundwater levels in the surrounding fields to rise. Cotton is damaged 
by groundwater in its root zone. Growing paddy next to a cotton field can therefore be 
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damaging the cotton yield. This is one of the water related aspects of the interaction between 
two forms of production (the state-ordered production of cotton and the commercial 
production of rice). More directly the three forms of production interact with each other by 
competing over the available water. 
The three forms of production, as defined in Chapter 4, each have a distinct way of 
communicating their demands and securing their access to water. State-ordered cotton 
depends on the state network, to which fermers can easily appeal when their cotton is in need 
of water. Contrary to this, commercial rice production, which is primarily lucrative for 
fermers, and less so for the state, depends on the private/informal network of the fermer. The 
household production by dekhans is responsible for about one third of the total water use in 
Khorezm. Household production is general accepted as a higher priority than state-ordered 
cotton and commercially produced rice, both by the state and by fermers. The situation of 
relative water abundance makes it possible that water distribution largely follows the various 
demand signals without causing any substantial social tension. Fermers are very interested in 
increasing the area cropped to rice. For the state authorities this is also attractive as it brings 
in money for both to their district and to their own wallets (through informal payments). 
Yet, increasing the rice area puts extra pressure on the available water and as such threatens 
both the cotton production that needs to be delivered upwards and the basic needs of the 
rural masses. 
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6.1. Introduction and framework of analysis 
 
The dissolution process of collective farms into private, family-based enterprise (the fermer) 
through full-scale land reform was accelerated in 2004–2005, land and water management 
were structurally adjusted. In spite of the partial privatisation of agricultural production since 
independence the agricultural sector in Uzbekistan is still heavily regulated by the state. 
Water Users Associations (WUAs) were established that are given the responsibility to 
operate and maintain the irrigation and drainage infrastructure of the former collective farms 
(see Chapter 3).  
Formally the WUAs are non-governmental organizations, i.e. associations of fermers, 
but in practice they have remained under strict control of the government and play an 
important role in the control over agricultural production. Hence, water management at the 
WUA level has become one of the arenas where fermers meet the state.  
This chapter addresses two issues. The first is the introduction of the WUA as part 
of wider framework of neo-liberal and neo-institutional reforms. This is done by an 
assessment of project documents, policy documents from international organisations and 
existing academic literature on the early period of WUA establishment. The second issue is 
the practical functioning of the established WUAs as organisations functioning in between 
official state organisation on the one hand and newly privatised fermers on the other.  
 
Framework of analysis 
The policy of establishing WUAs is analysed as a dynamic process in which actors 
strategically interpret and adapt concepts and models to fit them to specific, contextualised 
objectives. Through analysis of policy documents and academic studies on WUA 
establishment it is analysed how the international heralded model is adapted to fit the 
objectives of the Uzbek state. In a next step the actual dynamics over water distribution at 
WUA level are studied. For this a conceptual model of access in the context of natural 
resources management is adopted, as developed by Ribot (1998) and Ribot and Peluso 
(2003) and discussed in section 1.3. Ribot and Peluso define access as “the ability to derive 
benefits from things” or resources (ibid.: 153).  They recognise a broad spectrum of access 
mechanism, which include the role of technology, capital, markets, labour (organisation), 
knowledge, authority, and social identity.  
The activities of the WUA are primarily analysed as access control, i.e. the WUA’s 
“ability to mediate others’ access” (ibid.:158). The fermers and dekhans (smallholders) employ a 
range of strategies for both gaining access to irrigation water and access maintenance. The specific 
strategies depend on both the social position of the farmer, the spatial and technological 
situation as well as the form of production (see section 4.3). Joint private action among water 
users, which appears to be slowly emerging, are analysed as a special access strategy. I argue 
that the state only permits these new forms of local institutions when they save money for 
the state and do not threaten its access control.  
From the analysis of the internal dynamics of the WUAs it becomes clear that 
neither the WUA, nor the joint private initiatives are the carriers of democratic change, as 
was expected by the international organisations pushing their formation as part and parcel of 
a broader water reform agenda. 
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6.2. Introduction of the WUA  
 
Both the history of WUA introduction in Uzbekistan and the current formal position of 
WUAs in water management are discussed in this section.  
 
6.2.1. Discussion of previous studies 
The first WUAs of the Republic of Uzbekistan were established in the year 2000, while the 
ideas for introduction at one of the leading research institutes on land and water (SANIIRI) 
emerged in the late 1990s (Wegerich, 2000:4). Zavgorodnyaya (2006:34) indicated that the 
ideas for WUA establishment came both from international donors as well as local 
administration, as is discussed in more detail below (section 6.2.2.).  
The experiments with the introduction of WUAs went hand-in-hand with the land 
reform experiments in which the Large Farm Enterprises (LFEs) were dismantled and 
divided among privatised fermers (Wegerich 2000:3; Zavgorodnyaya, 2006:80). These land 
reforms created chaos and uncontrolled water use at the level of the former collective farm 
(Abdullaev et al. 2006; Zavgorodnyaya, 2006:80). Khorezm Province has been a region of 
early experiments, with various phases of pilot testing. Between 2000 and 2002 four LFEs 
were dismantled and pilot WUAs established in their place. In mid-2003 all LFEs in 
Yangibazar district were dismantled and land redistributed among fermers74. WUAs were 
established along hydrographic boundaries. In the period from 2005 to 2006 all remaining 
LFEs throughout the country were dismantled and WUAs established in their place. The 
WUAs were again established with administrative boundaries, i.e. largely with same 
boundaries as the former LFEs. Figure 6.1 shows where and when the WUAs in Khorezm 
Province were established.  
Zavgorodnyaya (2006:14) notes that WUAs “were established as a ‘bridge’ between 
state irrigation management organisations and [privatised] water users”. The government 
presents WUAs as fermer-run organisations, though they are established by the state in a top-
down fashion (Zavgorodnyaya, 2006:35), and in practice the “WUA becomes a place in the 
strongly hierarchical structure that still is controlled by government” (ibid. p.79). 
Various issues of concern with respect to the introduction of WUAs as bodies of 
local water governance in Uzbekistan have been identified earlier. The most important are 
listed below. 
- WUAs experience problems in fee collection, which makes it difficult to cover the costs 
of services. People were used to receive water for free and beside that people sometimes 
refer to Islamic law that determines that water is a free good. As a result of the non-
payment by water users WUAs cannot pay their workers75, which makes it difficult to 
provide the required services. Fermers become even less inclined to pay the water service 
fees – a negative spiral (Zavgorodnyaya, 2006). 
- There are frequent discussions about the fairness of the height of water service fees, 
especially the fee differences between people that depend on pumped water and people 
taking gravity water (Wegerich, 2000; Zavgorodnyaya, 2006). 
- The participation of members in the management of WUAs is minimal. Often there are 
no WUA meetings being held and the state-established WUAs strongly built on personal 
leadership, rather than on transparent management with rules and regulations (Wegerich, 
                                                 
74 For an extensive discussion of this process see Trevisani (forthcoming). 
75 Some WUA staff had not received their salary for many months (Zavgorodnyaya, 2006:103) 
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2000; Zavgorodnyaya, 2006). The WUA chairman is appointed by the regional governor 
(Hokim) rather than elected by the members (Wegerich, 2000). 
- WUAs become part of the hierarchical government system of control over agricultural 
production, rather than being independent non-governmental organisations 
(Zavgorodnyaya, 2006:79). As long as the state order system regarding cropping areas 
and production quotas remains, free decision making in the WUAs will remain 
problematic (Wegerich, 2000; Zavgorodnyaya, 2006). 
- Property rights (regarding land) are insecure, which makes it more difficult and less 
interesting for fermers to actively engage in management of the WUA (Wegerich, 2000). 
 
The existing literature on WUAs in Uzbekistan mainly tries to define characteristics for 
success. Those studies analyse the gap between an (often implicit) ideal model and the reality 
they see on the ground. The objectives and models of change underlying the WUA 
establishment policies are often not critically examined. Though these models often remain 
implicit they can be reconstructed from the various project documents. This is done below. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 – WUA establishment in Khorezm Province (0 = no data) 
Source: own presentation on basis of data of the ZEF/UNESCO Khorezm project 
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6.2.2. The policy process 
The international literature on WUAs can be understood to consist of four groups; (1) the 
ecological basis of collective action, (2) the characteristics for success literature, (3) the new 
institutional economics literature, and (4) the control and empowerment perspective (Narain, 
2004). The literature cited in 6.2.1. fits under the second category, i.e. it primarily analyses 
the characteristics for success, while being slightly influenced by the literature in the other 
categories. Most of what is written about Uzbek WUAs aims at their establishment and 
“success” without properly defining what a successful WUA would be. Meanwhile the 
authors advocate change, without explicating what this change would entail. The implicit 
models of change can however be reconstructed from this literature when read attentively. 
This is done in this section. 
In the same article Narain (2004) voiced the critique that policy is often perceived as 
a simple prescription rather than as complicated process which it in practice often is. This 
critique connects to a larger body of literature on the analysis of policy processes. The 
introduction of WUAs as a model for local water governance has been pushed by 
international organisations as a ‘one type fits all’ solution. In reality in the Uzbek case only 
some aspects of the model are taken aboard, while on many other aspects the model is 
adapted to fit the wider Uzbek governance structure. The recent work by Yalcin and 
Mollinga (2007a and 2007b) is a welcome addition to the literature on the Uzbek policy 
process. Their analyses provide valuable insights on how the Uzbek government uses 
international terminology to present the Uzbek reforms as a slowly joining of the neo-liberal 
ranks, while in reality these policy models are thoroughly adjusted to fit them to the 
objectives of the Uzbek government. 
The introduction of WUAs is directly connected to the experiences with water 
management at the former LFE level after dismantling the first collective farms and 
restructuring them into hundreds of fermer enterprises. The water department was 
responsible for water delivery up to the border of the former LFE. This left a gap from the 
border of the former LFE down to fermers. Not surprisingly, fermers were not able to manage 
the water between themselves. Yalcin and Mollinga (2007b) report that it ‘increased frictions 
and conflicts over water distribution between individual farmers’. At first the water 
department was expected to fill the gap and start delivering water up to the fermer enterprises.  
Yalcin and Mollinga (ibid.) describe that in 1998 some people within the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Water Resources visited countries with local water management by WUAs. 
Only in 2000, working through informal connections, pilots could start under responsibility 
of the provincial Hokim of Khorezm, who was convinced that an alternative organisation for 
water management would be needed at the LFE level when the land would be distributed 
among fermers.  
On basis of positive experience with these first WUAs in Khorezm, with especially 
good performance in the drought years 2000 and 2001, in 2002 the government decided to 
also start experiments in other areas of the country (ibid.). Full scale reforms happened in 
2004–2006, in which the remaining LFEs were dismantled into thousands of fermer 
enterprises. 
A number of international organisations (donors, NGOs, research institutes) have 
offered support and pushed for Uzbekistan’s adoption of the ‘WUA-policy-model’. Their 
ideas about WUAs have very much been influenced by ‘a neo-liberal and neo-institutionally 
informed global water discourse’ (Bolding, 2004: 13; Mollinga and Bolding, 2004). The 
topics addressed by these international organisations as well as what they wrote about the 
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Uzbek process reveals to a great extent the underlying models of development they had in 
mind. 
Quotations from some of these policy support documents can be found in Box 6.1. 
These organisations expected that the WUA-model of governance would have the following 
main results: the democratisation of water management at the local level (collective action, 
self-governance), the improvement of water use efficiencies, cost recovery of operation and 
maintenance and a more equitable water distribution between water users. 
The (academic) research that was conducted since the early years of WUA 
establishment, to a large extent, have followed the issues of expectation. For instance, the 
work by Wegerich (2000) typically addresses the issues of free WUA formation by farmers, 
the willingness to pay water charges, and empowerment of farmers. In his conclusion 
Wegerich notes that ‘old institutions have taken control [and] it seems that this process is not 
helpful in terms of democratic development of the WUAs’. Still he expresses the hope that 
‘WUAs could become a participatory bottom-up movement’. The expectations are 
somewhat hidden between the lines, but clearly reflect the international model discussed 
above.  
The study by Zavgorodnyaya (2006) clearly aims to identify the obstacles to be 
overcome in order to reach the mentioned objectives. It is observed that the Uzbek way of 
implementing WUAs de facto deviates from the international model, but this is rather seen as 
a failure to implement it in the right way. This becomes clearest in Zavgorodnyaya’s 
comparison of WUAs that are ‘supported’ by international organisations and WUAs that are 
‘unsupported’.  
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Box 6.1 – Quotations from documents by international organisations showing elements of their 
underlying models of reform 
The International Water Management Institute: “However, by transferring water management at on-farm 
level to the WUAs, [Central Asian] states [..] are demonstrating their commitment to the worldwide-
recognized standards. There are already good examples of sharing water management responsibilities, improved self-
management, economical independence and incentive for collective action in the existing WUAs in Central Asia” 
 (Abdullaev et.al., 2006:14; italics added) 
 
Memorandum of understanding on a rehabilitation project funded by the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB): “The Project will support the strengthening of the water resources management through 
installation of a modern control and communication system, capacity building and improved Operation 
and Maintenance procedures, the establishment of Water Users Association’s (WUA) and development of 
an integrated Water Resources Management Model. The improved water resources management 
component would optimize the utilization of the available water resources in the Surkhandarya Basin and will result 
in reductions in water abstractions from the Amu Darya River. The overall efficiency of the system because 
of these measures will be increased by at least 5%, resulting in water savings of about 60 million m3 
annually”.  (ADB, 2003a:3–4; italics added)  
 
The ADB in a study on irrigation in Central Asia: “Despite the obvious need for rehabilitation, 
governments will waste any efforts directed at it, unless they complement it with institutional strengthening 
and (especially where state orders for output remain intact) agricultural policy reform. Farmers must earn 
enough to be able to finance operation and maintenance of irrigation and drainage structures. They also 
need to have a stake in decisions that relate to water distribution and infrastructure maintenance. This calls 
for the establishment of participatory forms of organization for maintenance, such as Water User Associations 
(WUAs)”  (ADB, 2003b:29; italics added). 
 
The Handbook on how to establish a WUA in Uzbekistan, published by IWMI and the SIC-ICWC: “A 
Water Users Association (WUA) is a non-profit organization that is initiated, and managed by the group of water users 
along one or more hydrological sub-systems […] regardless of the type of farms involved” (IWMI and SIC-
ICWC, 2003:2; italics added) 
 
Some benefits of WUAs mentioned in the same handbook: 
• “Equitable water distribution among farmers [...] 
• More reliable water supply 
• Water supply becomes more responsive to crop needs 
• Quick dispute resolution at the local level 
• Well-maintained canals […] 
• Less water theft/ stealing”  (IWMI and SIC-ICWC, 2003:3) 
 
Some obligations of a WUA mentioned in the same handbook: 
• Ensure full involvement of all WUA members in setting up and managing a WUA 
• Make fair and democratic decisions within WUA 
• Ensure just and equitable water distribution among all WUA members 
(IWMI and SIC-ICWC, 2003:13) 
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Rather than focussing on how the Uzbek ‘errors’ could be overcome to fit the international 
heralded WUA model, this research focuses on identifying the mechanisms and drivers 
behind the inventions of new models of local water management. This helps to create the 
understanding that the Uzbek government has an idea of the WUA that seriously differs 
from the international ideal model. By using the same terminology as the international 
celebrants of the WUA-model, the Uzbek government to a large extent has been able to 
convince international organisations that it is pursuing neo-liberal reforms through WUA 
establishment. Instead the international community should realise that there is not just ‘the 
WUA’, but a multitude of interpretations and attribution of meaning. The Uzbek 
government has been very apt in fitting the idea of the WUA to their own objectives of 
control over agricultural production. Section 6.2.3 is an attempt to give such an analysis. 
 
6.2.3. The formal position and internal organisation 
The WUAs in Uzbekistan have been based on (provisional) decrees by the Cabinet of 
Ministers. Decree no.8 of 5 January 2002 specified  
 
‘(i) the procedure for establishment of WUAs on the territory of agricultural 
enterprises which are being reorganized; (ii) the management structure of the WUA; 
(iii) the standard agreement about water users integration and establishment of WUAs; 
(iv) the standard charter of the WUA; and (v) the standard agreement between the 
WUA and farmers for provision of chargeable water delivery services and works’ 
(UNDP, 2007: 66).  
 
Among other things it defines that the WUA operates on a budget based on user fees, that 
the general assembly is the central body for decision making and that the chairman is elected 
by this body. For the organisational structure see also figure 6.2 hereunder.  
The decree was in the first place about the break up of the unprofitable shirkats, 
rather then specifying the structures on which the WUAs should be established. Still it 
provided a (provisional) legal basis for the establishment of WUAs in the country (Yalcin 
and Mollinga 2007b: 11). In practice WUAs were established by decree of the Hokims, with 
reference to the decree on national level. Still formal law on WUAs is lacking (cf. 
Zavgordnyaya, 2006:82), but currently under development by a commission of parliament 
together with governmental agencies and stakeholders (UNDP, 2007: 75). 
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Figure 6.2 – The organisational structure of a WUA in Uzbekistan 
Source: Re-drawn from Yalcin and Mollinga (2007b:15), based on information obtained from the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources in Tashkent, July 2005 
 
 
6.3. The WUA, the state and access control  
 
From earlier studies and the understanding of the Uzbek WUA-policies as a top-down, state-
induced establishment process it is clear that the WUAs are not free associations of water 
users (fermers) who organise water distribution among themselves. Possibly one could label 
the WUA as a ‘semi-state organisation’ or as a ‘state-controlled organisation’. This section 
sets out to characterise the WUA in relation to the state. To this end, first the de facto relation 
between the WUA and various state actors is discussed. Secondly the WUA’s different roles 
and activities within its own area are analysed. The latter shows the different strategies to 
control the access to water. 
 
6.3.1. The WUA and the state  
State control over WUA establishment and its functioning is not just a deviation of how it is 
intended to be; this is even part of the formal policy. Yalcin and Mollinga (2007b:23) refer to 
a decree by the cabinet of ministers of 2003 that states that  
 
the water departments and on-farm hydro and reclamation organizations of the 
Ministry at the region and districts have the following functions: a) to make proposals 
on the WUA development and provide assistance in implementation of the 
development programs, b) to arrange the activities on the WUA establishment and 
operation and c) to monitor the WUA performance. 
WUA
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
WUA COUNCIL (Executive 
Board) 
(Its head and 4 members) 
AUDITING COMMISSION
(Its head and 2 members) 
 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
COMMISSION 
(Its head and 2 members) 
 
WUA Manager  
 
Technical Staff
- Hydro-technicians (Mirabs); 
- Operator for structures; 
- Pump Operators; 
- Electricians 
- Operator of Heavy Equipment 
- Mechanics 
Accounting Office 
- Accountant; 
- Assistant Accountant 
 
Support Staff
- Security Guard 
- Cleaner; 
- Seasonal workers; 
- Others 
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This study shows that the state’s strategy is a combination of (1) active interfering in (or 
overruling off) internal WUA political processes, (2) setting strict boundary conditions on 
inputs, outputs and what the WUA is allowed to handle on its own and (3) the handing over 
of difficult tasks and responsibilities that are costly to the WUA (yet even then they remain 
under monitoring by the state). In the following sections various instances of these three 
wider strategies are described. 
 
District level water management meetings 
The main points of contact between the state and the WUA are the meetings at the former 
offices of RayVodKhoz and those at the Hokimiyat. The head of the Main Canal 
Management (MCM) weekly calls a meeting with all the WUA chairmen in his area. In these 
meetings the chairmen report on their activities of the last week and get instructions for the 
next week (see the quotations below). Also these meetings are an important means for 
information dissemination by the state; firstly regarding water issues, but also regarding 
broader agricultural issues. During the fieldwork period I was allowed to sit in on a few of 
these meetings and could observe closely the dynamics and sort of information exchanged76. 
In one of these meetings some WUA chairmen were reprimanded that they had not 
yet made contracts with all fermer in their area.  
 
[The head of the MCM]: When there are 187 fermers why did you only make a contract with 106?! You 
will probably come up with the one or the other foolish reason. I gave you 3 days to make it the full 
hundred percent, but you did a bad job!  
Reply [by the addressed chairman]: I tried to make it the 100%, but many fermers do not have their 
administration in order, they are new fermers, and many of them don’t even have their stamps yet. [The 
head of the MCM]:  That’s nonsense, if there are 187 fermers there are not 80 without stamps!77 
 
The next weekly meeting started with remarks that show how water provision still follows 
central planning on crop production and continued with instructions following on to the 
ones mentioned before. 
 
[The head of the MCM]: Till Monday we will finish the 4th time irrigation of wheat and then finish the 
5th irrigation by [the] 30th [of May]. […] Have you finished registration? Have you made all the 
contracts now? I remind you: if fermers will not produce enough cotton and wheat it will be your fault 
because these fermers will say that they didn’t get water and you will not be able to show that you did.78 
 
Also WUA chairmen were addressed regarding specific failures in providing water to certain 
fermers. 
 
                                                 
76 I am aware that the meetings were also affected by my attendance; not everything was said while I was there. 
At one meeting I was explicitly asked to leave the room before the meeting ended. Apparently there was 
something to be discussed that was not meant for me to know. Also I only attended meetings in one Main 
Canal Management area, but I know from interviews that very similar meetings were being held in the other 
areas where I worked. 
77 Field notes 13/05/2006 
78 Field notes 20/05/2006 
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[The head of the MCM]: One of the sheets79 in [a particular WUA] is broken, why didn’t you fix it?! 
People have come to me to complain because the sheet is broken, why didn’t you do anything with it?! 
Now this might go to the Hokim himself when he has his office hours on the 15th of May. Also one 
man from [another WUA] did not get water, why didn’t you give him?80 
 
In another meeting it also showed how much the water department is still involved in central 
crop planning and in managing what is happening within the WUAs. 
 
[The head of the MCM]: The first problem is wheat. We should finish the last irrigation of wheat fields 
in 2 days from now. Do you have wheat that is not soft? {I understood that he meant the soil under the 
wheat, i.e. the soil is recently irrigated and thus moist}.  
After this [he] checked with each WUA chairman how is the state of their wheat fields, whether they 
have already finished. Some of the responses:  
- [chairman 1]: no problem,  
- [chairman 2]: we will finish in 2–3 days,  
- [chairman 3]: we have problems irrigating all wheat fields. [Response by the head of the 
MCM]: Why don’t you turn on both pumps instead of one? [chairman 3]: Yesterday there was 
not enough water in the canal for two pumps,  
- [chairman 4 (of a tail-end WUA)]: We need more water. {[The head of the MCM] tells [a 
person] to help [chairman 4] with that}. [chairman 4]: Can we get an extra sheet? [The head of 
the MCM]: No, there is a big chance that the extra sheet will be stolen or been cut into smaller 
pieces for something.81 
 
These quotations illustrate that the work by the WUAs is being checked and controlled by 
the water department at MCM level. Moreover in a number of ways the WUA is treated as a 
state-extension into the domain of the former LFE, especially where it comes to agricultural 
planning and production. Indirectly these quotations also show that this control does not 
take place only through these meetings, but also by field visits, checking the administration 
of WUAs and by directly receiving complaints of fermers. 
 
Meetings and activities of the Hokimiyat 
Similar co-ordination meetings were held at the Hokimiyat, the district governor’s office and 
the centre of agricultural planning and control. In the period of main agricultural production 
such meetings were held (almost) every day. My information on these meetings comes from 
interviews with people who attended them, as I was not allowed to join such meetings.  
Representatives of many agricultural organizations attended these meetings. The 
exact invitation list depends on the crop phases; experts and managers for the most 
important aspects of that period are invited to attend. Almost during the whole period the 
WUA chairmen were present at these meetings82. The sort of information and instructions 
are similar to those in the MCM meetings, but then relating to all aspects relevant for 
agricultural production, with special attention for cotton and wheat. Also the influence of 
the Hokims is not limited to these meetings. Frequently they visit agricultural areas and then 
give instructions on what action to take. This sometimes also includes the management of 
                                                 
79 This refers to a metal sheet that is used at water division points to block off the flow to one canal so that all 
the water will flow to the other canal(s). 
80 Field notes 13/05/2006 
81 Field notes 27/5/2006 
82 Even more frequently then the heads of the MTPs. This was somewhat to my surprise as the heads of the 
MTPs are often the former head of the LFEs and it was frequently suggested that these people still play an 
important role in co-ordinating agricultural production in their areas. 
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water at field level. The direct effect is very fragmented and the fields and farmers are 
selected arbitrary. The indirect effect is much more important, as such instructions also have 
the effect that people will be aware of what is important for the state (and/or the Hokim).  
The chairmen of the WUAs are supposed to be elected by the general assembly, i.e. by 
all the fermers in the WUA. In reality they are ‘appointed’ by the District Hokim. Or at least 
they are by local officials ‘in advance prepared candidates’ (Zavgorodnyaya, 2006: 42). This 
was confirmed in a number of interviews with fermers and WUA staff. In general this was 
perceived as the normal situation, not a deviation of how it should be. In an interview with a 
fermer it was for instance explained to me as follows. 
 
[Fermer]: The Hokim came here and had a meeting […] GJV: With whom was the meeting, just with a 
few people or with all fermers? [Fermer]: With all fermers, but I didn’t go because I had a lot of work. My 
brother went and informed me afterwards. GJV: What about WUA meetings, do they also happen 
regularly? [Fermer]: No, maybe when the Hokim comes, but otherwise not. The workers of the WUA 
come to our land and to our houses, but we do not have meetings with all fermers. GJV: But I 
understood that you elect the WUA chairman, do you have a meeting for that? [Fermer]: Yes, but we 
have no problems now, so we do not want to change the chairman. GJV: But in case you would, who 
would be calling the meeting in which a new person would be elected? [Fermer]: Fermers would be going 
to the MTP chairman or to the Hokim and complain and they could then change the WUA chairman. 
GJV: So, it doesn’t really go through elections? [Fermer]: No, it is through complaining to their higher 
bosses and they can then change83. 
 
Also it happened that the District Hokim was travelling through the area and ordered specific 
cotton fields to be irrigated. For instance, I encountered a case where WUA staff was 
irrigating a cotton field even in the absence of the fermer, just because they had been 
instructed to do so by the Hokim84. 
Also the District Hokim has access to the budgets and bank accounts of the WUA. 
The fee payments by fermers are mostly through the state controlled settlement account 
system, which is accessible by the District Hokim. Zavgordnyaya (2006: 90) reports on the 
influence of Hokims on these accounts. In addition I encountered a case in which the District 
Hokim used money from the WUA accounts in his district to (temporarily) finance a project 
that had nothing to do with water management. 
 
GJV: How does it work with meetings, do you have such meetings with the WUA workers and/or with 
all fermers? [Respondent]: Yes, we meet every morning at 8 o’clock with all WUA workers. Also the 
fermers that have problems will then come to the office. GJV: Did you also have a meeting this morning? 
[Respondent]: No, because this morning [the WUA chairman] and the others left early for the meeting 
at the Hokimiyat to buy seedlings according to the decree by the Hokim. [Translator]: what kind of 
seedlings? [Respondent]: All kinds of trees, mostly fruits, but also poplar. GJV: Is this the task of the 
WUA? [Respondent]: Well no, but maybe the Hokim thought that now the WUA is the organisation 
closest to the fermers, which also has money in its account. Therefore it is possible to do it in this way. 
GJV: Would it not have been more logical to do it through the MTP? [Respondent]: The MTP has a 
[large] debt, because last year they could not fulfil the cotton plan on their own land. They got a credit, 
but couldn’t pay back the loan. If now the fermers would pay for their seedlings through the MTP, all the 
money would go into the debt and not go to the Hokimiyat. You see, we are not free to do with our 
money what we want; the [WUA] budget is just taken for these seedlings85. 
 
                                                 
83 Field notes 25/05/2006 
84 This case is also described in Veldwisch (2006) 
85 Field notes 28/03/2006 
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The WUA as defender of local interest 
Even though on basis of the above there is little basis to argue that the WUA is an (interest) 
organization of water users, in their relation with (higher level) state organisation the WUA 
chairmen also protect the interests of the water users in their areas. 
Frequently WUA chairmen came to ask for more water at the MCM office. Especially the 
chairmen from tail-end WUAs were active in maintaining a good relation with the head of 
the MCM. When there were difficulties within the WUA to supply all the fields with 
sufficient water, the WUA chairmen sometimes tried to get the head of the MCM to these 
areas to see it with their own eyes86. Moreover these tail-end WUAs frequently sent one of 
their workers along with an MCM employee to check the district canals upstream of their 
own WUA and the outflows to upstream WUAs, as for instance explained to me by one of 
the MCM employees. 
 
GJV: How often do you go up and down the canal? [MCM worker]: Three times per day; at 6 in the 
morning, at 2 in the afternoon and in the evening at 6. Then I take the gauge readings and I calculate 
the average amounts of water use. […] One of the WUA workers of [the tail-end] WUA comes with me 
every day to check how much water is flowing87. 
 
Also the WUA chairmen actively lobbied to get allocated a large part of the money available 
for major maintenance as well as for the excavator to come to their WUA to clean out the 
canals and drains. 
 
6.3.2. Activities of the WUAs within their own areas 
 
Style of management and transparency 
In the four case study WUAs management styles were observed that were similar to the ones 
noted by Zavgorodnyaya (2006); the personal style of the chairmen played a very important 
role, general assemblies were not held, and decisions were made in a personalised top-down 
manner. However, it was also observed that some WUAs had implemented measures that 
improved the transparency of the organisation. In a few WUA offices list were put up the 
walls with all fermers in the WUA according to the areas managed by water guard (see Figure 
6.4). Also the total cropped area, the cropping patterns, and the allocated water of each fermer 
were put up. In one WUA office they also put up a work plan with the (operation and 
maintenance) activities of the WUA complemented with the name of the person responsible 
for completing the task. In that same WUA office there were job descriptions for the various 
positions within the WUA (see Figure 6.4). 
 
                                                 
86 E.g. in field notes 25/05/2006 
87 Field notes 26/07/2006 
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Figure 6.4 – Job descriptions with responsibilities (left) and a list of fermers in one water management 
area (right) 
 
 
In one WUA the chairman showed a clear philosophy of the need to build-up trust with the 
fermers in order to be able to manage a WUA effectively, especially with regard to fee 
collection. 
 
[WUA chairman]: The [water guards] should do a good job, then fermers will pay the WUA and we can 
pay the [water guards]. And if you will pay them in time they will do a good job. The most important is 
that they establish good relations with both the chairman and the fermers. It is all about building trust. 
[…] It is not difficult. If you have the wish to work well, everyone can organise this. The first thing is 
that you should not lie to fermers. If you tell them that you will supply their land with water the next 
morning you should actually do so and not think that you can also do it one day later. If you don’t lie to 
fermers, they will also not lie to you. If they start to trust you, they will pay. If 2 or 3 times you do 
something wrong, you lose the trust of the fermers and it will be very difficult to make them pay. (…) In 
the very difficult cases I go to those fermers myself or I send the lawyer to go and explain. In some cases 
I also go to the fields myself to see whether people get the water that we are promising them. For 
instance yesterday [your translator] saw this. I could easily have sent one of my workers, but instead I 
went myself88. 
 
This quote touches upon the idea that there would a circular causal connection between the 
service level provided by the WUA and the fee collection rate89. The circle would read as 
follows. When WUA staff does a bad job at distributing water and maintaining the 
                                                 
88 Field notes 25/05/2006 
89 Based on Zavgorodnyaya (2006) and discussions with Jan Sendzimir. 
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infrastructure, farmers are not inclined to pay their WUA fees. As a result the WUA has 
difficulties in paying its staff and with badly paid staff it is difficult to provide adequate 
services. The initial situation is not very helpful to break the cycle; farmers are not used to 
pay for water and WUAs are not used to maintain infrastructure and distribute water. This 
idea does not take into account the influence of political pressure (to pay), creative 
motivation (to do a good job or to pay) and of the possibility to do things jointly. Neither 
farmers nor WUA staff are (only) rational economic human beings. The three mentioned 
aspects all influence the dynamics at play within the WUA. 
 
Little access control 
Though the larger part of my fieldwork took place along the canals (or at the fields, which is 
practically the same) it was rather seldom that I met workers of the WUA in the field. If I 
met WUA workers along the canals it was most often at (or near to) the places from where 
the WUA takes its water from the main system. The activity was then mostly to arrange 
enough water to flow to the WUA rather then the distribution within the WUA. 
Farmers frequently mentioned the absence of WUA staff in the field. The quotation 
below is from an interview with a fermer, just after a worker of another fermer had left us to 
arrange more water to come to their end of the canal.  
 
GJV: How will he [arrange more water]? [Fermer]: He will negotiate with the other fermers who are 
irrigating now. […] GJV: And what about the worker of the WUA, is he not the one to decide about 
where the water is flowing and at what discharges? Is he not going to talk to this person, instead of to 
other fermers? [Fermer]: No he will talk to the fermers. GJV: And where is the WUA worker now? 
[Fermer]: Do you really think he is coming here? They never do. We arrange the water distribution 
among ourselves90. 
 
My observations suggest that the WUA is generally not physically controlling the water flows 
in its area. This is further supported by the stories about access strategies by fermer, discussed 
in the next section. 
During some periods WUA staff was observed to frantically go around and arrange 
water distribution to go the way they wanted it to go. In one case the WUA chairman was 
waiting a full afternoon next to a minor division point to make sure that water would be 
flowing in the branches that he intended. There was a lot of tension between the farmers 
around that place and it seemed that only with the physical presence of the chairman the 
water was flowing in the planned direction91. 
There were huge differences between the studied WUAs, often without apparent 
reasons. This is partly due to the highly personalised management styles that result in big 
differences and partly due to the newness of the sort of the institution that makes that 
procedures have not yet crystallised in their final form. The direction in which these will 
develop is difficult to assess. 
 
 
                                                 
90 Field notes 06/07/06 
91 Field notes 28/07/06 
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6.4. Fermer strategies for gaining & maintaining access 
 
The gaps in the WUAs control system provide a lot of room for fermers to secure their access 
to water. The various farmer strategies for accessing water are analysed here. It was found 
that three things are of strong influence.  
 
(1) The farmer’s socio-political position (use of (political) ties, status and money). 
(2) The spatial and technological situation of the field (water in the tail-end area is 
arranged differently from water in the head end area; farmers have different 
strategies for pumped water than for gravity water). 
(3) The form of production practiced at the field (one and the same farmer arranges the 
water for his cotton production differently from water for his rice). 
 
Hereunder they are analysed as separate mechanisms on basis of cases. In reality, however, 
each field that needs to be irrigated can be characterised on each aspect. The identified 
mechanisms do not tell us how a specific fermer will act in a specific situation; different 
characteristics influence the fermer’s strategy, but this relation is not linear. 
 
6.4.1. Socio-political position 
In this sub-section I describe four cases of how farmers adopted strategies in accordance 
with their specific socio-political position in order to gain and/or maintain access to 
irrigation water.  
 
Case 1 
One fermer in the far tail-end area of a WUA where I worked was the only person in that part 
of the WUA who was able to access water in periods of shortage. He was a friend of the 
WUA chairman and besides being a fermer he was also the manager of the nearby petrol 
station He used his resources (a car) and his strong political position to gain access to water. 
The following fragment describes the moment that we met the first time and in which the 
fermer spontaneously explained his strategies to gain access to water. Early in the morning I 
was waiting in front of the WUA office. 
 
[The WUA chairman] arrived in a sand-coloured Russian jeep. Another man was driving. […] GJV: 
Who are you, I don’t think I have met you before, have I? [Fermer]: No, I haven’t met you before either. 
I am fermer with land on the other side of the collector. There is no water there. GJV: Is that your car? 
[Fermer]: Yes, since yesterday I have been driving around with [the WUA chairman] to close down 
pumps and other outflows in order to get water to my fields. GJV: And are you also the one who is 
paying for the petrol? [Fermer]: It drives on diesel, but yes, I pay for it. GJV: Why does the WUA not do 
this work themselves? [Fermer]: They don’t have the power to do this. {Implicitly saying that he does 
have the power to do it}. But anyway, when I come with [the WUA chairman] they turn off the pumps, 
but as we leave they turn it on again. Only when people would get fined a few times for misusing water 
they will start to listen92. 
 
A week later we sat down to have lunch and after the situation got somewhat informal we 
came to talk again about the water availability in the tail-end, where he has his land. 
 
                                                 
92 Field notes 18/7/2006; I am aware that my questions were directive, but I am confident that this fermer 
understood what I asked when he agreed to my suggestion. The remark on the borrowing of tractors from 
other fermers, in the next quotation, also confirmed this analysis. 
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[Fermer]: I was the first person to take land in this kolkhoz. Then this land was fine, but now I am in big 
trouble [because it is difficult to get water to this place] GJV: You can get water; [the WUA chairman] is 
your friend, you can go around with him in your car, and you control diesel distribution. [Fermer]: Yes! 
GJV: But for smaller fermers around you it is much more difficult… [Fermer]: Yes indeed. I also easily 
borrow tractors from fermers. [If] I ask they don’t deny me93. 
 
Later the WUA chairman told me that this fermer is from an influential family, with a number 
of uncles at important positions in the state hierarchy. He used his position, ties and money 
to arrange the water he needed. 
 
Case 2 
One fermer-household that I worked with had 23 ha of land in the head-end area of a WUA. 
The enterprise was practically run by two sons, but officially it was on the name of their 
father, who had an important position at a state organisation in the district capital. They had 
about 10 ha of paddy land. This was possible because the soil in that area was saline and 
nothing else would grow there. 
 
[Son]: there is nothing else that grows here so we can only plant rice. The Hokim in a meeting once said 
that all the land has to be used so if we want to use it we have to plant rice.94 
 
Also it was of influence that this land could be reached by gravity flow, so that even though 
the paddy needs a lot of water, the costs would be low.  
 
[Son]: Our fields are relatively low and therefore we can take water by ayak suv [i.e. by gravity flow]. In 
that case you can plant rice, if you need to use a pump it becomes too expensive to plant rice. 
 
The two mentioned aspects relate to the spatial and technological situation. There is 
however good reason to also use this example to illustrate the role of socio-political position. 
In the land redistribution process many people opted for the pieces of land with a good soil 
quality. This fermer explicitly chose for land with a bad quality and access to gravity water, as 
he was aware of the possibilities this would create for paddy cultivation, which would 
become highly profitable. 
 
[Son]: We took the bad land, but it has turned out that actually on the bad quality lands you can make 
the best profit. I and my brother were also telling my father to take the good land, but he wanted to 
take the worse land that takes water by [gravity flow]. […] My father has very good connections and 
knew what [land/crops] would be doing [economically] well. 
 
Not only did this fermer have a socio-political position that gave him access to the right 
sources of information, as well as the right connections to be able to arrange the allowances 
to grow (such a large area of) rice. 
 
                                                 
93 Field notes 25/7/2006 
94 Field notes 30/5/2006 
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Case 3 
A medium-sized fermer (15 ha of which 6 planted to cotton) has his land in the tail-end area 
of a WUA. This is an area that frequently experiences water shortages. Both fermers and 
dekhans have problems getting their fields irrigated in time. Some distant household plots in 
this area are not even cultivated because of this reason. Also this medium sized fermer 
experiences these problems. His strategy to gain access to water is to coalesce with the 
strongest actor in this area, a fermer with over 100 ha of land, of which a large part is planted 
to rice. The large fermer has a very important state job at district level and his wife is the farm 
manager, the person who manages the work on the day-to-day basis. The medium-sized 
fermer acts as one of the clients of this patron.  
 
[We encountered the medium-sized fermer] at the side of the street. {The car of the medium-sized fermer 
was parked at the beginning of the dirt road at which the wife of the large fermer was levelling the land 
by tractor] and on top of the medium-sized fermer’s car there was a 30–40 litre drum that was used for 
petrol or diesel}. 
[…] GJV: We were at your house early this morning, but your wife told that you had already left. 
[medium-sized fermer]: Yes, I left early this morning. GJV: She said that you went to get diesel. [medium-
sized fermer]: Yes. GJV: What are you doing here, do you have your fields here? [medium-sized fermer]: 
No, I am helping [the wife of the large fermer]. Yesterday she helped me95, so today I help her.  
 
The ‘help of yesterday’ probably referred to providing machinery for digging an on-field 
drain, while it seems that the ‘help of today’ refers to providing a drum of diesel. The 
medium-sized fermer was also allowed to make use of the pumps of the large fermer, 
something that other people in that area were not allowed.  
The relation between the medium-sized and large fermer is very unequal in terms of 
power and status. There are services provided back and forth, but they are of unequal nature.  
Regarding the water access strategies of the large fermer: he simply takes water when he 
needs it, even if this is to the loss of many others in that area, as reported by a number of 
people from that area. Even the wife of the large fermer said this herself. The next fragment is 
from an interview at their place, following an appointment that we had made a week before. 
Upon arrival they had changed their mind and with vague excuses tried to no longer 
participate in the research. The following quote reports on my last attempt to get a 
conversation going. 
 
[My translator]: An interview just means that we talk about water distribution. [Wife]: I am too busy to 
talk. Also you shouldn’t be talking with me but with the WUA, the mirab. {Ending her speech like the 
interview was over} GJV: I also talk with the WUA, [and other water organisations], but I also talk with 
fermers and dekhans. For me it is interesting to know how fermers organise that they get water with 
organisations like the WUA. [Wife]: We don’t have anything to do with those organisations, we just take 
the water from the canal when we need it. {Again ending her speech like the interview was over}.96 
 
 
                                                 
95 This possibly referred to the borrowing of small excavator for the construction of an in-field drain. 
96 Field notes 8/6/2006 
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Knowledge, favours and threats  
Socio-political positions of farmers are of influence in water distribution in a variety of ways. 
Through their connections farmers with strong socio-political positions have access to 
knowledge that is not available to others (case 2), they are able to mobilise favours for their 
allies (case 2 and 3) and to withhold these favours from others, or threaten them in other 
ways (case 3). When people are not able to mobilise water through their connections they 
depend more on other strategies, for instance through intelligently making use of their 
spatial and technological position. 
 
 
6.4.2. The spatial and technological situation 
Water distribution is besides a socio-political issues also an organisational issue; i.e. water has 
to be practically distributed in space and time. Therefore farmer strategies to access are also 
influenced by their spatial characteristics; for instance by their position in the WUA, the 
number of farmers along their canal, the irrigation and drainage infrastructure, the sizes of 
fields and the soil type.  
 
Case 1 
In one of the case study WUAs I frequently met with particular medium-sized fermer. Socio-
politically he was not particularly strong, but he was highly skilled and entrepreneurial. As a 
result he was able to achieve good yields. His fields were supposed to receive water by 
gravity directly from a canal flowing along his fields, i.e. without passing though a shared 
irrigation ditch. However, the water level in this canal is often too low to make the water 
flow onto the fields. In this case he was supposed to use pumped water supplied from 
another direction. This would lead to additional costs. Instead this fermer bought a metal 
sheet to partly block the water flow in the canal flowing along his fields. As a result the water 
level n the canal was raised and the fields could be supplied by gravity water. The fermer could 
do this because of a culvert just downstream of his fields where he could easily fit the metal 
sheet. Moreover his fields were in an area somewhat isolated from the rest of the WUA so 
that it would not be noticed97.  
 
Case 2 
One of the fermers with whom I frequently met had his land in the tail end of a WUA, where 
it was difficult to get water. In real difficult situations he rented a private diesel pump and 
made the water flow from a distant feeder canal, not even meant to supply his area. The 
place at which he had his fields this was basically the only solution to get water. The water in 
the main canal from where he would normally take his water would not be high enough to 
flow into the irrigation ditch. Moreover, if it would flow into it, first two large areas with 
distant household plots would use the water. By the time they finished, the water level in the 
main canal would often already be low again. By using another supply ditch the fermer was 
able to by-pass the two large areas with distant household plots. 
This case illustrates what I have seen and heard at many other places; people who 
can afford to rent a diesel pump will do so in case of extreme drought. Also there is need for 
some political power, as it is not accepted of all that they place a private diesel pump in an 
upstream canal.  
                                                 
97 Eventually it did get noticed by a governmental organisation and the fermer was told that the sheet was illegal 
and had to remove it and pay a fine. 
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6.4.3. Final remarks 
It may be clear that the strategies for getting water of fermers and dekhans are also different for 
each of the three production forms, as described in Chapter 5. State-ordered cotton depends 
on the state network, to which fermers can easy appeal when their cotton is in need of water. 
Contrary to this, commercial rice production, which is primarily lucrative for fermers, and less 
so for the state, depends on the private/informal network of the fermer. The household 
production by dekhans is general accepted as having priority over state-ordered cotton and 
commercially produced rice, both by the state and by fermers. 
In this section it was shown that in addition to the attempts of the WUA to control 
access to water, water distribution is also shaped by farmers’ strategies. Depending on the 
situation fermers and dekhans have different possibilities for gaining and maintaining access to 
water. The actual strategies that farmers deploy are of course always of an integrated socio-
technical nature, i.e. actions in the material/technical dimension also have socio-political 
meaning and actions that initially act upon the socio-political dimension eventually are 
expressed in material terms. In some situations there is an apparent full control by the WUA, 
in other situations there seems to be hardly any control by the WUA. In the latter case the 
resulting situation is one of apparent anarchy in which water is contested between its users 
without any institutional regulations. 
 
 
6.5. Joint private initiatives 
 
In situations where the WUA does not effectively exert access control farmers sometimes 
develop sets of rules and enforcement systems. In some situations they organise 
maintenance, and jointly hire pump operators. Some of these co-operations have histories 
that date back to at least a decade, especially when it concerns groups of dekhans that share a 
former collective field as distant plots. In this section various examples are presented in 
which there is some form of joint management of water or water infrastructure directly 
between farmers, i.e. outside the WUA structure, but within the area of a WUA.  
Acute maintenance requirements are often the immediate cause for such joint 
initiative. In one of the case study WUAs maintenance is explicitly left to fermers themselves 
and the expenses for maintenance are even no longer part of in the WUA budget. WUAs 
sometimes transfer their pumps to the accounts of fermers or rent them out in order to ease 
the work load of the WUA.  
 
Case 1 
In one of the WUAs where I worked there was an area of about 20 ha with mainly orchards 
for fruit production. The land is distributed among about 10-15 small fermers. Many of them 
only recently (in 2006) became fermers, but they had been cropping these plots before in a 
similar sort of arrangement with the collective farm. During those times they paid a rental 
fee (arienda) to the collective farm and were relatively free in their production. The farmers in 
this area jointly bought a pump, which they also maintained and operated themselves. In 
response to a changed cropping pattern upstream, which lowered the water availability for 
their area, they decided to buy a pump. Through this pump they were able to access water 
from a canal that has a water level too low to access without a pump. Each by themselves 
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they were not able to provide for the pump and its maintenance, but together they could 
easily carry the costs. 
 
GJV: Where do you take your water from? [Fermer]: Water comes from the pump. We also pay for the 
pump and for water. GJV: Which pump is this, where is it? [Fermer]: It is just behind the field here, close 
to the [canal]. It takes water from the [canal] and puts it in the [irrigation ditch]. GJV: Who is the pump 
operator? [Fermer] (laughs a bit): He is also a tractor driver [and] lives behind here in the village. GJV: 
How big is the area that takes water from this pump? [Fermer]: It is about 20 ha {pointing out at the area 
around us}. The owners of the land put money together and put the pump there. GJV: When was this 
done? [Fermer]: It’s more than three years. It was already there when I got my land. GJV: But in that 
time there were no private owners of the land, but only collective land, not so? [Fermer]: Then we rented 
{arienda} the land, now it is given to fermers, it is very similar. […]  
[Fermer]: We go turn by turn, we make a queue. The pump gives a lot of water so 5–6 people irrigate at 
the same time. The turn for water then comes every 3–4 days. Because we have a pump it is good, there 
is enough water. GJV: Can you also take water by gravity to your field? [Fermer]: It is possible, but 
difficult as people upstream have planted rice. [...]. [Fermer]: Before water was coming from that side, but 
since they started planting rice upstream the water is not coming to here anymore. Then another canal 
was dug and now water comes from that side {the other direction and indeed another main canal 
system}.  
{Observations about the pump: The pump is an electric pump, but seems smaller than the 500 l/s 
pumps. Possibly it is around 200 l/s. At the electricity pole there is box with a red and a black button}. 
GJV: Are those buttons to turn the pump on and off? [Fermer]: Yes. GJV: Can anybody just turn it on 
and off? [Fermer]: Yes, but often there is simply no electricity. If there is electricity the pump is 
working.98 
 
Case 2 
At various places I found that the pumps that were officially under the operation and 
maintenance of the WUA, were actually maintained by the group of fermers dependent on 
that pump. In some cases the operator was even paid directly by the fermers. The following 
fragment describes such a situation. 
 
At the pump close to the main road, on the northern side of the canal, about 10 men are 
standing/sitting around the pump. We stopped there for about 10-15 minutes and talked for a while 
with those men. Especially one man was talking with me. He told me he works for the MTP, organising 
spare parts. They were doing maintenance/repairs on the pump. The people around are people who 
depend on this pump, as well as [the pump operator]. The money needed for operation and 
maintenance of this pump is being paid by the people who depend on this pump. The income is 
360,000 soum per 10 ha (total about 70 ha) and is paid directly to [the pump operator], who keeps the 
accounts. Also his oylik [monthly wage] is paid from this money. GJV: But isn’t this supposed to go 
through the WUA? They: Yes, but they don’t do it, so we do it ourselves. GJV: And before, in the 
shirkat time, did the workers of the fields then also take care of it themselves? They: Before the kolkhoz 
used to take care of this, we didn’t have to contribute ourselves99. 
 
The next week I asked the WUA chairman about this and he confirmed that in his WUA all 
the pumps either were or soon would be transferred to the direct management of the fermers 
dependent on the pump. 
 
Case 3 
In a tail-end area of the case study WUAs there were many distant household plots. These 
dekhans worked together in constructing obstructions in the canal with the objective of 
                                                 
98 Field notes 10/6/2006 
99 Field notes 12/07/2006 
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raising the water level and thus increase the outflow into their irrigation ditch. They would 
also jointly defend their constructions from demolition by downstream water users. 
 
[Dekhan]: This is high land. If there is a lot of water it is possible to grow rice here, but if there is little 
water not. GJV: What can you do to get water if there is only little? [Dekhan]: I can for instance irrigate 
at night. Also we block the yap by using a sheet and the water level will become higher and flow unto 
our fields. We agree with the people who are even further downstream along the canal. We do this 
when they don’t need the water. GJV: Did you organise yourself as a group here and do you 
communicate with the group further downstream? [Dekhan]: Well, if people downstream have irrigated 
for 3-4 days, 4 or 5 of us come together and block the water and will irrigate our tamorkas100. 
 
Another dekhan in that area explained that these obstructions need to be guarded. 
 
In the area on the other side of the road we stopped at various smaller off-takes. At one place sand bags 
have been dropped in the canal, apparently to higher the water level in front of it. There is a man sitting 
next to it. GJV: Are you taking water now? He: yes, I’m irrigating my wheat field. […]. GJV: Why do 
you put these sand bags, is the land to high for the water to flow unto it? He: No, the land is not high; 
just there is very little water here. GJV: Yeah, you are completely at the end of the WUA isn’t it? He: 
yes, before it reaches our field many people have taken water. GJV: The sand bags here do they stay in 
permanently or do you take them out when you are finished irrigating? He: The person who is irrigating 
his field should keep watch at this place, because the people from downstream always come to take 
away the sand bags101. 
 
Frequently these joint actions seemed to entail not more than two to three neighbours 
organising one incidental intervention. The people working together to construct or 
demolish an obstruction did not do this on a regular basis or in exactly the same group 
setting. 
 
Case 4 
During night-time observations in the tail-end area of another case study WUA I 
encountered a group of dekhans that at night went around arranging water to come to their 
area of distant household plots.  
 
They explained that they were organising water for their tamorka’s. During the daytime it is impossible 
to get water for the tamorka’s. ‘The fermers take all of the water’. During the nigh we go along the main 
canal and check whether all the off-takes are well closed and the check structures open. Now still a lot 
of pumps are still working, but later they will shut down and then we will finally get some more water. 
Our field of tamorka’s is very large [actually said 20 ha, but I find it hard to believe this]. Every night 8 
of us irrigate, we have schedule for that. During that night those people have to organise their own 
water. We will stay the whole night in the field and if necessary we will go up and down the canal once 
in a while to check102. 
 
This case is similar to that described in case 3. However, it seems that in this situation the 
cooperation is slightly more institutionalised. There is a sort of a rotational system between 
the various tamorka plots within one field. Going around on bicycles at night requires more 
organisation and coordination than making and incidental obstruction in a canal. This 
reflects the difficult situation of these dekhans in the tail-end area of a tail-end WUA. 
Various tamorka plots in the same area were not cropped at all. During daytime these 
                                                 
100 Field notes 09/06/2006 
101 Field notes 05/06/2006 
102 Field notes 20/07/2006 
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dekhans were not able to get water at all and at night they had to go around in groups in 
order to arrange water to come to their plots. 
 
Final remarks 
People in post-communist settings are often said to have an aversion to collective initiatives 
and the formation of cooperatives. In this section it was shown that joint actions have 
developed and are developing in water management in Khorezm. However they hardly ever 
have a permanent character and they are rather responses to incidents. They mostly arise 
around acute maintenance problems, notably the breakdown of pumps. The direct interest 
for all the dependents and the clear demarcations of this group make it relatively easy to 
organise action. 
 
 
6.6. Conclusion and discussion 
 
The Uzbek WUAs in 2005–2006 were still very much state controlled organisations that 
serve an important role in the control over (state) agricultural production by privatised 
fermers. The WUAs are controlled through direct government interventions in specific issues, 
and by being highly contained by the boundary conditions under which the WUA is allowed 
to work. Both the local government (Hokimyat) and the local branch offices of the Water 
Department are involved in this. The WUA is an organisation fixed between state and fermer 
interests. 
Within the boundaries of the WUA there is a socio-political dynamic over water that 
can be characterised as the WUA employees aiming to control the access to water and 
farmers aiming at gaining access and access maintenance. The balance between the two 
differs per WUA and even per area in a WUA. 
There is a large variety of farmer strategies to gain access to water. They can be 
understood as being influenced by three important situational features; the socio-political 
position of the farmer, the spatial and technological situation and the production form. 
At the dissolution of the LFEs most of the controls in the agricultural production system 
have moved to the district level; i.e. they are arranged directly between fermer enterprises and 
the responsible district-level organisations. Different from this model, the organisation of 
water has remained at the level of the former LFE. This is related to the nature of the 
resources and the transport network; i.e. water is voluminous and fluid, while its distribution 
depends on an open canal network that is complicated and expensive in its operation and 
maintenance. The control over this resource requires close attendance at field-level. 
Apparently the state has realised at an early moment that water distribution is (to become) a 
social-political process between primary users. In response to (and anticipation of) these 
developments, WUAs were created as state controlled institutions. The WUAs have 
essentially different roles than the former LFEs; i.e. they are not production units 
themselves, but merely supply and control organisations for the agricultural enterprises (the 
fermers). 
Currently there is a feeble balance between re-regulated state control and emerging 
forces of privatisation, which create individualised risks and benefits. The situation observed 
in 2005–2006 is not static. One of the central questions for the future is whether the state 
will eventually leave water distribution in the domain of the WUA to local actors or whether 
it will increase its control. The experiments with water pricing in 2006 indicated that the state 
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might be seeking to increase its control on water flows through a detailed and structured 
system of measurements and decision-making (see Chapter 7). The observed trends over the 
past years of reform consists of the privatisation of risks and benefits and the handing over 
of administrative and financial burdens to fermers, while the state firmly keeps its hands on 
the overall agricultural production system. If this trend continues the costs for maintenance 
and operation will eventually be left to the fermers. Also it would be a surprise if the state 
would let the collective action patterns develop into a serious alternative for arranging water 
distribution among farmers.  
  
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
 
 
Irrigation Technology in Transition 
 
Chapter 7 – Irrigation Technology in Transition 
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7.1.  Introduction 
 
People and water are linked to each other both through institutions and technologies. The 
previous chapter dealt with changing institutions, this chapter deals with the issue of 
technological change in the context of the irrigation and drainage network of Khorezm. This 
is the last chapter with empirical material; it is only followed by the conclusions. It is not 
intended to convey the message that the technological story is of lesser importance and 
hence put at the end of the book. Rather the technological process is understood as 
inherently reflecting the wider socio-political processes of change. As the general process of 
agrarian transition is quite different from similar studies on irrigation technology, it was 
deemed necessary to first discuss this before analysing its relation to the change of irrigation 
technology.  
This chapter starts with a discussion of the conceptual framework used for the 
analysis in this chapter (section 7.2). Among other things it discusses how technology is the 
result of social processes. This is especially the case if we look at water technology, which is 
generally about controlling a limited (and/or contested) resource. Therefore both the 
technology and the institutional framework often show the results of contestation between 
users. Also the irrigation technology in Khorezm is an example of how technology is shaped 
and re-shaped by social and political processes. In this case it was a centralised communist 
command economy aiming at the maximisation and the forced transfer of surplus of cotton 
yields that defined the technological form. Section 7.3 is an analysis of development and use 
of irrigation technology in Khorezm during the early years of independence, i.e. the period 
before complete de-collectivisation. 
Though remnants of the state socialist production system are to some extent still in 
place, other essential elements have been subject to change. It can be expected that in the 
context of privatisation of risks and benefits in agricultural production, also the demands on 
irrigation technology will change. Section 7.4 looks into the question to what extent the 
water technology of the irrigation and drainage network of Khorezm is changing as a result 
of these changing demands and production relations. 
 
 
7.2. Conceptual framework 
 
This section builds upon the wider discussion about technology and society as presented in 
the conceptual framework (Chapter 1). The practical ensemble of knowledge, skills and 
objects by means of which people pursue particular goals in society is considered 
technology. This definition leads to a focus on people and their objectives in society, which 
are based on different understandings of situations. People have different problem 
definitions and consciously use knowledge, skills and objects to address their ‘problems’.  
The technological process is understood as a socio-technical process, which implies 
that it has at the same time a social as well as a technical dimension. The proponents of such 
an understanding have criticised technocrats, technological determinists and propagators of 
the transfer of technology paradigm, pointing out that they have failed to understand the 
intrinsic socio-political nature of science and technology. In the same way social scientists 
almost always overlook the material aspects of what are seen as socio-political processes.103 
                                                 
103 See also Mollinga (2006) 
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Yet, The exertion of power, the building of control, and the reproduction of social relations 
are all inextricably connected with technological objects. 
The social and the material need to be studied as elements of one and the same 
process. Both the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) school and the Actor 
Network Theory (ANT) school have recognised this and propagated ways to study these 
integrated processes. Later in this section the core concepts of these schools are discussed 
and applied to the study of irrigation systems. 
This chapter does not deal with technology in general, but rather with irrigation 
technology, or even more specific: it deals with large-scale open canal irrigation. In the 
irrigation process water is distributed according specific crop demands with regard to time, 
space, quantity and quality (the physical dimension). At the same time water is understood as 
essentially a limited resource and as such as a resource that is contested between users and 
uses (Vincent, 2001). Moreover an irrigation system is a network technology104, i.e. irrigation 
systems are transport networks that connect places to each other. Places, fields, are inhabited 
and used by people, who for their water delivery depend on what happens elsewhere in the 
network. This type of technology is radically different from more individual oriented 
technologies like e.g. ground water pumps, tractors, and farm implements. In an irrigation 
system ‘the particular layout of the canal system is important, as it structures the ways in 
which different groups of water users relate to each other, both in spatial and temporal 
sense’ (Oorthuizen, 2003). 
Technologies have different forms of appearance. The three main categories are (after 
Mollinga, 1998):  
 
1. Material artefacts and technological landscapes (like dams, canals, division structures, 
polders and cultivated desert areas) 
2. Human labour power (in skills like field level water application, technical drawing 
and management skills) 
3. Texts (like in irrigation textbooks and manuals) 
 
In this chapter the main focus is on the first category, i.e. the hardware of the irrigation and 
drainage network. Man-made landscapes are explicitly included in this category. The concept 
of a technological landscape fits better to a network technology than the idea of single 
artefacts. It is the wider environment, the landscape that has been shaped by the 
cultivation/civilisation/reclamation process. The technology of large scale irrigation systems 
is to a large extent formed by the layout of the canal network. 
Technologies not only have different forms of appearance, but in these appearances 
they have different dimensions of meaning in a socio-technical framework. Around the 
concept ‘water control’ Mollinga (1998) and Bolding et al. (1995) have developed a three-
dimensional understanding of water distribution processes. These dimensions are the 
following three: 
 
1. The technical/material dimension 
2. The managerial/operational/organisational dimension 
3. The socio-political dimension 
 
                                                 
104 This idea/term is taken from Mollinga (2007). 
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As a result of the very broad definition of technology, the achievement of water control for 
agricultural production is understood as a technological endeavour; it is the pursuance of a 
particular goal using knowledge, skills, and objects. This implies that the three dimensions of 
water control are also three dimensions of (irrigation) technology. Some processes have a 
pure technical cause, yet almost all these processes and events have effects in the managerial 
dimension and carry a meaning in the socio-political dimension. The events and processes 
around water control are never restricted to just one dimension; they happen in a three 
dimensional world. Natural scientists should realise that natural, material processes carry a 
socio-political meaning that is different for different stakeholders. This has almost become a 
mantra for people in the field of philosophy of science and technology, yet it is still a 
relevant point to make in the field of water resources studies. 
Irrigation systems are composite technologies with multiple linkages to the social 
world (Bolding, 2004). Moreover they are multi-interpretable by different stakeholders. 
Theory tells us that stable technological networks are formed by strong linkages between 
human and non-human elements; i.e. usually the management of irrigation artefacts is 
embedded in the livelihoods of people through elaborate systems of rules and regulations. 
The rules and regulations are a means to deal with conflicting interests over a limited 
resource. Contestation over water is partly expressed as the contestation over technology, 
but also contestation over the system of rules and regulations. Moreover, especially in state 
managed irrigation systems, these (local) property regimes are limited the control strategies 
of the irrigation department. 
The conceptual framework elaborated will be used to look at the socio-technical 
nature of the processes of transition. The knowledge that the social and material are closely 
interrelated leads to pressing questions, especially in the context of the economic and 
political transition since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the next section first the Soviet 
technological legacy is analysed. 
 
 
7.3. Post-independence collective agriculture105 
 
The situation described in this section refers to the situation as it existed from independence 
till the most recent phase of reforms (1991 till 2005). In this period there was central 
planning from Tashkent, the organisation of production was still primarily through Large 
Farm Enterprises (LFEs)106, the household plots had been doubled compared to the Soviet 
period and the first private farmers (fermers) were established within LFEs, however without 
seriously affecting the agrarian structure107. During the fieldwork in 2005 some of the LFEs 
were not yet dismantled. Interviews and observations made in that period show how the 
water distribution process worked. With the abandonment of the LFEs and the 
establishment of fermers and WUAs instead (completed in 2006) also the water distribution 
process has changed substantially. The hardware of the irrigation and drainage network 
however was shaped in the USSR period and the layout had changed only little since then. 
The signs of contestation over water as a limited resource were not directly apparent 
and therefore also the irrigation technology was not contested in its essence. This was partly 
                                                 
105 Some of the material presented in this section has earlier been published in Veldwisch (2007). 
106 These were mainly Shirkats – from the Uzbek ‘shirkat ho’jaliki’, which literally means ‘collective enterprise’. 
It is a legal enterprise status that after independence basically supplanted the Kolkhozy and Sovchozy. 
107 This period of transition is discussed in Chapter 3. 
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due to the high availability of water108 and partly due to the nature of the state control system 
over water and agriculture. Also the exact technological design was somewhat irrelevant 
because of the strong institutional control on agricultural production by the state. These 
characteristics made the situation different from most other cases around the world. In line 
with this also the organisation of irrigation was rather different from what could be 
considered ‘normal’. And, perhaps not surprisingly, also the physical infrastructure was 
different from studied systems around the world. This section sets out to explain the relation 
between the typical technological layout of the irrigation and drainage network of Khorezm 
in relation to its situation of relative water abundance and its development history in the 
context of a state socialist system with a plan economy.  
Both at field level and at brigade level the technology was highly flexible and 
susceptible to frequent changes; irrigation ditches could change their flow direction, earthen 
connections were constructed and closed again on daily basis, temporary weirs were 
constructed, and water was delivered on basis of subjective estimates. Overlaying such a 
flexible physical dimension was a very stable socio-political dimension that demanded and 
enforced compliance. Control over the agricultural system did not in the first place take 
shape through strict control over the hardware of the irrigation network. Land control and 
concomitant control over crop quotas and permissions, combined with strict controls over 
output markets put a firm basis for control over the physical side of the production process. 
This was strengthened by a socio-political system of field-checks, rewards on loyalty and 
punishments on disloyalty.   
Technological objects and systems are often means of exerting control in the 
absence of the controller – a traffic light is the simplest example. Socio-political control can 
thus be substituted by technological objects. This is often one of the functions of water 
division structures that represent rules, rights and regulations cast in concrete. In early post-
Independence Khorezm this was not the case; the exertion of socio-political control over 
water flows was not substituted by the specific designs of division structures. 
 
7.3.1. Networks of ditches 
The irrigation ditches that connect the main canals to the fields formed networks rather than 
linear connections. Most fields could be reached via different paths through the network (see 
figure 7.1). As the slope of the landscape, as well as the slope in these ditches was very small, 
the water can run in both directions, depending on which connections were opened and 
closed. 
                                                 
108 See Chapter 5, in which the availability of water is discussed. 
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Figure 7.1 – A network of ditches in a brigade with 14 fields in Karmish WUA  
The (handwritten) black numbers  (1/14) refer to fields, as listed in table 7.1. The blue arrows 
represent the main canal system. The red and green balls signify off-takes from the main canals. The 
green balls (marked a/e) are gravity off-takes, the red ones (marked 1 and 2) are pumped off-takes. 
The red arrows stand for ditches flowing with pumped water and the green ones ditches with gravity 
water. The purple lines with arrows on both sides are ditches that flow in both directions, sometimes 
with pumped water, sometimes with gravity water and sometimes with a mix of the two. 
 
 
Field Owner/user Use/crop Area (ha) 
1 Shirkat Cotton 13 
2 Fermer Maize + rice + cotton 12 
3 Tamorka Double cropped with wheat and rice 12 
4 Shirkat First wheat, then rice for pudrats 8 
5 Shirkat Cotton 8½   
6 Shirkat Fallow 10 
7 Shirkat Cotton 8½ 
8 Fermer  2 ha rice, 3 ha cotton, 1 ha wheat 6 
9 Fermer  Cattle feed 3 
10 3 Fermers Mulberry for silk 1 
11 Housing + gardens Various unknown 
12 Shirkat Cotton 3 
13 Shirkat share cropping Rice 4½ 
14 Shirkat + tamorka Various 9 
Table 7.1 – The fields of a brigade in Khorezm Shirkat (later Karmish WUA), their ownership, land use 
and size during the summer of 2005 
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In some areas, the gravity flows and the pumped flows were disconnected from each other, 
thus creating two ditch-networks that overlapped each other. The water level in the pumped 
ditch network was independent of the water level in the main canal system, while the water 
level in the gravity-fed ditch network was largely determined by the water level in the main 
canals. The latter depended on the discharges in the main canals and was sometimes 
influenced by making obstructions in the main canal. The height difference between the two 
networks was typically about 20–100 cm. Some of the high fields could never be irrigated 
with gravity water, as the water level would never be high enough to flow onto these fields. 
Many fields could be irrigated by gravity water when the water availability (and water level) in 
the main canals was high, but could not be irrigated in this way when the water levels were 
low. Pumped water was kept separate from gravity water in order to maintain the gained 
height. This created situations as depicted in figure 7.2, where irrigation ditches cross each 
other. Van den Dries (2002), for cases in Portugal also describes crossing irrigation ditches 
for keeping apart different streams of water. In those cases they signal differences in 
ownership of developed sources of water. The crossing ditches observed in Khorezm have 
nothing to do with ownership or water rights, but are (historic) expressions of practical 
solutions to problems with water levels and field levels under collective management. 
 
 
Figure 7.2 – Crossing ditches; one with pumped water and one with gravity water 
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7.3.2. Irrigation scheduling 
Many fields could be reached by both networks. The decisions about which fields were to be 
irrigated from which ditch and in which order the fields were to be irrigated were made by 
the brigadir, who was responsible for the agricultural production in one brigade109. The 
ground for decision-making was essentially production maximisation within the brigade. The 
implication of this was that mainly practical considerations informed the decisions. For 
instance there were small differences in height between the fields and the highest fields could 
often only be reached by pumped water. Therefore these fields were irrigated with pumped 
water and the lower fields by gravity water.  
Not all fields were irrigated simultaneously; the irrigation turn rotated within the 
brigade. There were no fixed irrigation schedules, but there was an order in which the fields 
would normally be irrigated. Again this was connected to the topography of the area; 
irrigation started at the highest fields and ended with the lowest. This order was maintained 
with the idea to create a downward flow that would wash out the salts with the drainage 
water.  
All fields within the brigade were used for state production and were managed by the 
brigadir. The brigadir decided which field got water from where and at what moment – water 
distribution at the brigade level followed the optimisation of production at that level. There 
was a single water user and the scale of management was different. As a result, water 
distribution between fields was primarily a practical issue and not subject to contestation 
between different users.  
Also when fermers started to have 10-20% of the land within the LFEs the brigadir still 
was the primary water manager, the one who decided on the rotational schedule within the 
brigade. The actual tillers of the fields, the pudrats, were told when to irrigate their field. The 
following fragment from my field notes is exemplary for how brigadirs experienced their role 
in water distribution. 
 
GJV: Do you decide or do the pudrats decide when to irrigate? [Brigadir]: I decide. GJV: is there 
anybody you ask for advice? [Brigadir]: no, [I decide] just by myself, maybe with some other brigadirs I 
consult (field notes 12/08/2005). 
 
Since independence (privatised) fermers have been allotted lands within the area of the LFEs. 
Their fields were enclaves in the middle of collective farms. These fermers were dependent on 
the irrigation schedule as operated by the collective farm. They had to agree with the brigadir 
on when they could irrigate their fields.  
 
I asked [the brigadir] how fermers get their water. [The brigadir] explained: fermers have to request water 
from me and then I tell the pump operator to turn on the pump. Fermers have to pay for the electricity 
to the Shirkat. However, most fermers get the water straight from the canal and are not dependent on 
the pump (field notes 27/06/2005). 
 
                                                 
109 The brigade, as used here, is a spatial unit that typically covers about 100– 150 ha of cultivable land divided 
over 10– 20 fields. However, it used to refer (and still does to some extent) to a labour and production 
organisation. Members of a collective farm were part of a ‘work brigade,’ which, headed by a brigadir, had the 
responsibility for a cropping area. 
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7.3.3. Flexible connections 
The two ditch networks were (or could be) connected at a number of places. These were 
often just temporary earthen connections in which a few shovels of earth and mud were 
taken away or put back. Water from the pumped network could thus be let into the gravity 
network, which was done if the gravity network did not supply enough water. Also the 
connections from the ditches to the fields were typically of the earthen type, i.e. they 
appeared and disappeared by moving a few shovels of soil. Also reversing the flow direction 
in irrigation ditches is an example of the flexibility and pragmatic management of water that 
existed at the level of the brigade.  
Figure 7.3 shows a place where such a connection is made. The ditch marked with the 
dotted line is an ongoing, gravity fed irrigation ditch. The connection that is close to the 
place from where the picture was taken, flows through a pipe underneath the road and can 
supply water from a ditch with pumped water. This connection was only incidentally used. 
The outflow on the other side of the ditch connected to a drain. It was used as an emergency 
outlet for in case to much water would be coming this way. Furthermore the water in that 
drain was further downstream sometimes utilised for irrigating a paddy field. 
The following quotation from my field notes illustrates how flexible both farmers and water 
managers dealt with the construction of irrigation ditches and off-takes to fields. Together 
with two fellow researchers we arrived at a cotton field that was in the process of being 
irrigated. Besides the fermer there were workers of the WUA and a worker of the MCM 
present at the field. 
 
The fermer came with us to show the intake of water. He dug a small ditch right through a road. 
[Fellow researcher]: Do you always take your water like this? Fermer: Normally I take from the ditch 
that flows here along the field, but it has not been properly maintained before it was handed over to 
me and I haven’t had the time yet to clean it. This is the best entry point to irrigate this field, as it is 
the highest point; from here it flows to the rest of the field110. 
 
                                                 
110 Field notes 24/07/2006 
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Figure 7.3 – Flexible connection in the ditch network 
 
 
7.3.4. Measurements 
Within the LFEs, water distribution was not accounted, i.e. the water delivery to fields was 
not measured. Therefore water measuring structures were never constructed for use at LFE, 
brigade or field level. Knowledge on where water was needed at what moment was not put 
down in schedules, but rather vested in persons through practical experience. The detailed 
system of state norms for water application to different crops, which was used for allocating 
water to the different LFEs, is not used within the LFEs. A Mirab confirmed this in the 
following way: 
 
The crop norms are only used for outside, that is: getting the right amount of water to the Shirkat. 
Within the Shirkat they don’t play a role. Within the Shirkat people simply request water and then get 
it111. 
 
The last remark conveys both the message that water distribution in the LFE was quite 
unproblematic and that water distribution followed requests rather than a pre-determined 
schedule. Water demand (and application) at field level followed crop-physiological 
characteristics and rules of thumb. In cotton the colour and shape of the leaves, as well as 
the distance between the side branches was used as an indication for the soil humidity and 
irrigation requirement. During an irrigation turn the water was not measured. Rather rules of 
                                                 
111 Field notes 9/6/2005 
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thumb were indicative for the amount to be applied, e.g. ‘the water needs to reach the end of 
the furrow before closing the flow’, or ‘the furrow needs to be filled completely, but the 
water should not touch the stem of the cotton plants’. 
Only at the point of hand-over from main system level (District Canals) to the LFEs 
water measuring devices were constructed. Water was measured at these outlets and was 
used for determining whether LFEs had remained within their assigned limits. LFEs were 
fined on the basis of this information. However, neither these fines (at the end of the 
season) nor the water delivery during the season fully depended on the measurements. Water 
distribution and the fining procedure were also very much connected to relations between 
the Raís (head of the collective farm) and the Department of Agriculture.  
 
7.3.5. Concluding remarks 
The pattern of water distribution as set out by the state was not seriously contested by its 
users, as contesting water distribution (technology) implied that one also contested the state. 
That is: the water distribution was firmly linked to an extremely stable governance system 
and as such forms a robust chain. Irrigation technology was employed for mainly technical 
and managerial control. 
 The relative abundant availability of water and the nature of state-controlled 
collective farming meant that competition between brigades was minimal. By supplying 
enormous amounts of water the task of distribution was eased. This solution, however, led 
to other problems; in the first place to quickly rising ground water levels (water logging) and 
salinization of the soil. The construction of a large drainage system and the operation and 
maintenance thereof were needed to address these problems. Secondly, the over-supply of 
water in Khorezm aggravated problems further downstream along the Amu Darya. The Aral 
Sea was in the first place sacrificed for the production of cotton, but its quick drop was also 
caused by over-irrigation at a large scale. Thus the costs of distributing water were 
externalised. 
The stability of the Khorezmian system did not so much built on institutionalised 
arrangements between users and irrigation objects. Neither was the physical system cast into 
concrete. Rather the political control system provided top-down stability under which strict 
control over the water distribution system was not necessary to bring about compliance. 
People were kept obedient citizens in other ways. Together with relative water abundance 
this kept the social forces minimal and the technological system stable without using it to 
enforce control. 
 
 
7.4. Moving towards privatisation 
 
Also in 2007 the irrigation and drainage technology of Khorezm still reflects the logic of the 
Soviet state and its organisation of agriculture. As the physical technological layout is quite 
inert it did not (immediately) adapt to the new situation of de-collectivised agriculture. Being 
developed to match a situation of strong state control and collective agriculture now, in 
order to remain stable, the inherited technological set-up seems to require the continuation 
of a strong state and weak private interests of users. 
It is important to assess how changes in the organisation of agricultural production 
and state control, as described in the preceding chapters, will affect the (operation of the) 
irrigation technology. The introduction of market principles and land distribution along 
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household lines has strongly increased the forces of private benefits. This brings in new 
forces into the process of the shaping of technology. The political control seems to remain 
tight as ever, also in agricultural planning. Still, the individualisation of production increases 
the forces of competition through introducing personal risks and benefits. Does the 
technological system then still fulfil the demands of actors that are able to mobilise their 
influence, are users going to open the black box, and does this indeed imply that they contest 
the state in its control? How do people deal with that sensitive issue? 
With the wide-scale implementation of the new framework, in which fermers have 
become the main agricultural enterprises and WUAs the water supplying organisations, new 
forces are introduced that influence the shaping the irrigation technology. This process is 
described and analysed in the first sub-section (7.4.1). In response the state also takes 
measures that affect the irrigation technology. This is the subject of the second sub-section 
(7.4.2). 
During the fieldwork period the studied processes were still in a very early phase. 
They were purely studied in a qualitative manner. The result is an understanding of some of 
the mechanisms at work, i.e. they are processes that are possible in this new situation. It has 
not been possible to quantify these processes. However, the studied situations give a good 
indication of the direction of development and how this is dealt with by both fermers and the 
state. 
 
7.4.1. Re-appropriation of irrigation technology by fermers  
Above it has been discussed that at the level of the former brigade two overlapping ditch-
networks exist. What used to be pragmatic management between pumped water and gravity 
water is re-interpreted in the current situation. Fermers themselves have to pay for the 
electricity used in pumping the water from the main canal into the ditch. The running costs 
for gravity ditches are much lower, but their water provision is less secure in case of 
droughts; due to low water levels in the main canals the water does not always run by itself. 
In that case pumps can still lift the water into the ditch. Fermers prefer to have access to both 
sources; they want to use gravity water when possible, but want access to pumped water to 
guarantee access in times of low water levels in the canals (see Box 7.1). 
 
 
Box 7.1 – The costs of pumping 
 
The relation between gravity and lift irrigation is not new; also in the collective farming era 
this situation existed. The difference is that fermers personally carry the risks and benefits of 
agricultural production. Therefore the push for both risk aversion and profit maximisation is 
[Son of fermer]: Our fields are relatively low and therefore we can take water by ayak suv [gravity]. In that 
case you can plant rice, if you need to use a pump it becomes too expensive to plant rice. For 24 hrs of 
pumping you pay 70-80,000 soum [this is between 1.6 and 2.3 soum/m3]. Those people have enough 
water for cotton and wheat, but not enough to plant rice. (…) Also in summer the electricity gets shut 
down to prevent people from using the pumps. GJV: Who shuts of the electricity? [Son of fermer]: There 
are these water organisations. If there is water needed in the last kolkhozes the head of the water 
organisation calls to the head of the electricity organisation and he then shuts down the electricity for 
maybe 5 hours. GJV: Do they shut down electricity for those pumps or for the whole Rayon? [Son of 
fermer]: Not for the whole Rayon, just for the areas upstream. From this point upstream there are 20 
pumps in the canal, so if they don’t work the water will come to the downstream end. In the upstream 
they cannot take water during those periods so they sometimes just don’t have water. 
(Field notes 30/05/2006)
CHAPTER 7 – IRRIGATION TECHNOLOGY IN TRANSITION 
 
 
179
much greater than under collective production112. In various situations fermers were observed 
to invest in new infrastructure to guarantee cheap and reliable access to irrigation water. This 
included both the construction of new (gravity-fed) ditches as well as the purchase of private 
pumps.  
Most of the government and WUA owned pumps are now electric pumps, which 
compared to diesel pumps, are cheaper to run, easier in maintenance and relatively easy to 
meter. However, when fermers buy pumps they generally choose diesel pumps, as they do not 
depend on the availability of electricity and are easier to move around. WUAs and state 
managers try to limit water consumption in certain areas by switching off the electricity for 
whole branches of districts. The use of diesel pumps circumvents this central control 
strategy. Moreover these diesel pumps can be placed anywhere. This also provides the 
opportunity to rent out the pumps to other people (see Box 7.2). 
 
 
Box 7.2 – Quote from an interview with a fermer on the use of mobile pumps 
 
Other investments that are done by fermers include the maintenance of drains and canals that 
officially have to be maintained by the WUAs. In an interview a fermer explained that he 
invested 400,000 soum (about 400US$) in the cleaning of the drains around his cotton fields, 
as he was confident the salinization caused by not cleaning the drains would reduce his 
cotton yield with a value possibly ten times as high. At first he wanted the WUA to take care 
of this maintenance, but upon finding their excavator broken and their budgets empty he 
decided to provide the money for hiring an excavator himself113. 
This case illustrates that the privatisation of risks and benefits has created shorter 
feed-back loops from opportunities at field level. Fermers signal opportunities for 
investments if they see risks and/or benefits that could affect their yield. At first they will try 
to get the government to invest, but if the government fails to do so, the concern is high 
                                                 
112 Risk aversion and profit maximisation are often considered contradictory strategies. Here it is just stressed 
that they are both responses to the privatisation of risks and benefits. Usually at first the increased private risk 
is dealt with and only later the opportunities of the increased benefits are explored. 
113 Field notes 7/4/2006 
GJV: Does this [wheat] field get water from the same place as your tamorka field? [Fermer]: Yes, but it is 
very difficult to get water here. This big field is full with tamorka plots that need water and on the 
opposite side of the road there is another 6 ha field of tamorka’s. Therefore it is difficult to get the water 
here. (…) [Fermer]: This is [almost 2 ha] of wheat. Right in front of the house I have [just over 3] ha of 
cotton […]. [Fermer]: This year I irrigated this wheat field only once and it cost me 60,000 soum. GJV: 
Why, to whom did you pay this? [Fermer]: To the tractor driver, for pumping. GJV: With a mobile pump? 
[Fermer]: Yes. GJV: At what canal do you put it then? [Fermer]: […]. GJV: But that is very far from here. 
[Fermer]: Yes, 1.5 km. GJV: And you make the water go through all the [irrigation ditches] between there 
and here? [Fermer]: Yes. GJV: And nobody takes this water on the way to here? [Fermer]: No, I make sure 
they don’t take. GJV: And do you also pay to the WUA for water? [Fermer]: Yes, 49,000 for the whole area. 
GJV: And you have to pay this even though the WUA cannot supply you with water? [Fermer]: Yes. […] 
[Fermer]: We get diesel from the state to do the works on our fields, but it is not enough. There are 4 main 
periods of activities, but after the second one our diesel is finished. We certainly don’t have enough diesel 
for pumping all the water to our fields, but sometimes we also use the mobile pump to irrigate the cotton 
field. It costs 4,000 soum/hr plus the diesel. Luckily the cotton doesn’t need a lot of water. But because 
the pumping is so expensive we cannot afford to grow rice just by pumped water. Rice needs water every 
third day. GJV: Is it not more profitable to buy your own pump? [Fermer]: Yes, but at the moment I don’t 
have the money for it. Once my farm starts making more profit I will certainly buy my own pump. 
(Field notes 16/06/2006)
CHAPTER 7 – IRRIGATION TECHNOLOGY IN TRANSITION 
 
180 
enough, and the fermer has money to invest, eventually fermers invest themselves. It is clear 
that the mechanism is there, though it is not known on what scale it is currently affecting 
maintenance practices in Khorezm. It can be assumed that such investments are also 
connected to the socio-political situation of the fermer and his assessment to the chances that 
he will personally reap the benefits of the investment. 
There is also the mechanism that rich/important people are expected to take 
responsibility for public interest, to show off their richness and use it for the benefit of the 
community. In this example the action could simultaneously fulfil this role, but the fermer 
explicitly presented the investment as economic rationale for personal benefit. 
Individual investments in land/water management are also made where it concerns 
the cropping of cotton and rice next to each other. The crops are only allowed to be grown 
next to each other if there is a drain in between, as otherwise the high groundwater table 
under the rice field might negatively affect the cotton yield. Especially middle sized fermers, 
who often only have one or two fields, dig in-field drains to split-off part of a large field as 
separate water management units to be used for rice cultivation.  
The investments in land and water by individual fermers in the first place aim at direct 
economic benefit for the fermer. These investments are responses to inefficiencies that 
existed under the state/collective production system. Only with the privatisation of risks and 
benefits through the establishment of fermer enterprises these incentives have started to gain 
weight. It is striking that they are all short-term investments. Longer term investments into 
land development and soil fertility are limited, possibly insecure land tenure arrangements 
are of influence on this. An exception is the investment in private pumps, which in general 
only pays off after a few years. The important difference is that these investments remain 
mobile; i.e. they are not inextricably connected to a field and therefore are less susceptible to 
(state) capture. 
Furthermore the development of gravity off-takes and the purchase of diesel pumps 
represent attempts to circumvent state control over water through its control over electricity. 
Therefore it can also be understood as contestation of state control. Still the state is firmly in 
control over the socio-political domain. However, as individual control in the technological/ 
material dimension is slowly increasing some people start to challenge the overall state 
control.  
In a number of cases around the world it has been shown that both labour and 
capital investments form the basis for water rights114. Thus it could be hypothesised that 
investments in the maintenance and/or development of water infrastructure will influence 
the water rights system. In the Khorezmian case fermers who invest in maintenance of a canal, 
irrigation ditch, or pump, would claim to have the first right to water. Thus far such patterns 
were, however, not yet observed. It should be realised that the Uzbek society is not so much 
regulated by rights and the rule of law, but rather follows clientelistic patterns. However, the 
rich, well-connected fermers are the ones currently investing, and thus patterns of investment 
will to a great extent overlap the patterns of the socio-political network.  
 
                                                 
114 This is referred to as hydraulic property. Gerbrandy and Hoogendam (1996), in an article about hydraulic 
property in two irrigation systems in Bolivia, analyse that the essential element of hydraulic property “is the 
relations among people that arise from people’s relations to these objects. The investment process entails not 
only creating people-object relations but also creating relations between the actors/investors. Hence, during the 
investment process, the relative position of individuals with respect to property objects and the use of these 
objects are defined, and thereby the position of each investor relative to the others are defined. These relations 
are called property relations.” 
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7.4.2. State implementation of a new control framework 
Due to the agrarian reforms a situation has arisen where the rationale of the existing 
irrigation technology (strong state control, collective agriculture) and the rationale of 
agricultural production (privatisation) are no longer well matched. The Uzbek government is 
seeking ways to deal with this. A path of development seriously explored is the introduction 
of ‘water pricing’. This would be a package in which water delivery up to field level will be 
measured, combined with adapted institutional arrangements for water allocation and 
(volumetric) pricing as a means of cost recovery. In this chapter it is discussed as a 
technological change, as there would be huge implications for the division and measurement 
of water. The introduction would radically affect the infrastructure. Besides there are of 
course also institutional implications integrated with this. 
The agrarian reform processes that have been implemented before are consistently 
framed in neo-liberal terminology and policy models. For the land reform process and the 
establishment of Water Users Associations it has been shown before that the Uzbek practice 
differs significantly from how these policy models internationally are understood115. In line 
with the neo-liberal policy direction the Uzbek government in 2006 started talking about 
introducing (volumetric) water pricing. In every province two WUAs were appointed as pilot 
cases. In the two pilots of Khorezm province the policy change largely remained rhetoric. 
The state realises that if volumetric pricing is to be introduced on individual basis water 
delivery measurements must be done at each field, or at least at each ‘block’ of fields. State 
water managers envisage that ‘hydroposts’ (water measurement devices) will be installed in 
the form of parabolic-shaped canal stretches that function as flumes. With a correctly 
functioning flume only measurement of the water level just upstream of the structure is 
necessary to accurately determine the discharge (see box 7.3 and figure 7.4).  
At a few places such hydroposts are already installed. The construction is co-
ordinated and supervised by the Tezim. The costs were estimated by various WUA and Tezim 
workers to be 80– 100 US$, and are to be covered by the fermers. The responsible people in 
the Tezims have very limited knowledge on how these structures technically work. Within the 
WUAs this knowledge is even far more limited. As a result the hydroposts are frequently 
constructed in such a way that they do not cause a hydraulic jump to occur. The result is that 
a single water height measurement upstream of the structure does not longer suffice – either 
the velocity of the water or the water height downstream of the structure need to be 
measured as well.  
 
                                                 
115 For the process of land reforms see Trevisani (forthcoming), for the process of WUA establishment see 
Chapter 6 and Yalcin and Mollinga (2007b). 
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Box 7.3 – The functioning of a flume 
 
A flume is a stretch of canal that is constructed in such a way that the velocity of the 
water flow increases. The velocity should reach a speed that is higher than the speed by 
which waves are transported through water; i.e. it passes through the state of ‘critical 
flow’ to ‘super critical flow’. In a cross-cut this would be visible as a decrease in water 
level, while the total discharge remains the same. After the flume the velocity of the 
water is reduced again resulting in a water jump, which is visible as highly turbulent 
water. 
As long as there is super-critical flow in the flume, recognisable by the water jump 
afterwards, the discharge through the flume is only a function of the water level in front 
of it. The function can be plotted in a graph (Q-h curve or rating curve) or put in a table. 
Once a Q-h curve is available the discharge can be found by reading it from the curve at 
the water level that is read from the staff gauge. 
 
In the sketch below the following things are indicated:  
a) the place for measuring the water level, for instance by use of a  staff gauge;  
b) increasing velocity and decreasing water level,  
c) critical flow occurs somewhere in this stretch, and  
d) an hydraulic jump. 
 
 
 
 a b c d 
flow 
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Figure 7.5 – Two hydroposts in Khorezm  
The picture on the right shows one that functions as a real flume, with a staff gauge (‘a’), a decreasing 
water level (at ‘b’), critical flow (in stretch ‘c’), and an hydraulic jump (at point ‘d’). The picture on the 
left shows one of the concrete canal stretches that has been installed to measure water delivery to 
individual fermers.  
 
 
In one interview it was suggested to use the floating method to determine the velocity. 
Practically this mean dropping a floating object in the canal and clocking the time needed to 
travel a known distance. In this case the known distance would be the length of the concrete 
canal stretch. Then the stretch would not be used as a flume, but merely as controlled canal 
stretch (see Box 7.5). Technically this could solve the problem, but the problems are larger, 
as volumetric water pricing also requires much greater managerial attendance. 
 
 
Box 7.5 – The floating method 
 
To determine the water use by a fermer, both the application time and the average discharge 
need to determined. This requires frequent observations by a fieldworker – both to 
determine the start- and end-time as well as the fluctuating discharge. Typically this work will 
have to be done by the water guards of the WUAs. In the previous chapter it has already 
In a controlled, or relatively stable, canal stretch the discharge (Q) is a function of the water level (h) and 
the velocity of the water (V). Q = C * V * h, in which C is a correction factor. 
In the floating method the velocity is determined by letting an object float in the water over a measured 
distance (e.g. 10 m). The time it takes to cover this is distance is clocked by using a stopwatch. The 
average velocity is calculated (distance/time). By using a correction factor to compensate for the velocity 
not being equal throughout the profile and multiplying it with the h and the average width, the discharge is 
calculated. 
CHAPTER 7 – IRRIGATION TECHNOLOGY IN TRANSITION 
 
184 
been discussed that many water guards are not actively controlling water division in their 
areas. The requirement to quantify all the discharges and keep detailed water accounts would 
mean a tremendous increase in work load for the water guards, especially if this would have 
to be done through the labour intensive floating method. 
Water pricing can be implemented in a variety of ways and with a variety of 
objectives116. Thus far, the Uzbek government has been stressing the option of volumetric 
water pricing, with the main objective to improve efficiencies. Water pricing that is done in 
this way is a technology that presupposes a very different managerial and socio-economic 
system than the current Uzbek system. As argued in Chapter 5, the drives behind water 
distribution process are diverse and closely linked to the three modes of production. 
Moreover, water is not distributed without respect of person; rather the contrary: some 
people get water much easier than others. The distribution system is obscure and 
personalised. Water distribution is connected to established political stakes and benefits. 
Rules apply differently for different people and different production processes. It is not 
likely that the volumetric pricing of water can become a transparent guiding principle in the 
division of water117. 
It is well possible that the Uzbek government will change its mind to an area based 
system of water charging with cost recovery as the main aim. This would mean a simple 
elaboration of the system by which WUAs are already expected to cover their costs. Still it is 
possible that the volumetric water pricing will be pushed through. The requirement of water 
guards continuously going round and accurately keeping a water administration would 
certainly increase the hold on water flows within the WUAs. Even if discharges are not 
quantified through measurements, but through estimates by the water guards the system 
could lead to a significant increase of efficiencies; if not as a response to the water price, 
then at least through reduction of careless wastage by an increased attendance. 
 
 
7.5. Conclusion and outlook 
 
In this chapter Khorezmian irrigation and drainage technology was looked at; both its 
development history and its current use. First the system was analysed in the context of its 
development history. The irrigation technology of the old (Soviet) agricultural production 
system is geared at large-scale, collective agriculture with strong, uncontested central 
management. In the early post-Independence period this changed only little. For users it 
would have been very easy to manipulate the irrigation hardware for personal benefit, but 
users did not pursue this because of other (socio-political) reasons. Water control mainly 
took place through socio-political control of the command economic system (see figure 
7.5a). The technology development process is an essentially different from what has been 
described for other systems around the world, yet it clearly reflects the socio-political context 
in which it was developed. 
As a second step it was analysed how the demands on the technology have changed 
under the agrarian change process that has taken place since the collapse of the Soviet-
                                                 
116 See for instance DFID (2004). 
117 This fundamental discussion leaves the question aside whether charging the real costs of water would 
influence the distribution of water. There are various studies that show that the marginal costs of an extra cubic 
meter of water are less than the marginal benefit of that cubic meter (Molle and Berkoff, 2007). Through a 
modelling exercise, Bobojanov (forthcoming) shows that also for Khorezm this holds true. 
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Union. The recent reforms that aim at privatisation of risk and benefits of agricultural 
production have led to the strengthening of mechanism of optimisation at farm enterprise 
(household) level. This includes the drive among farmers to secure their access to water (see 
figure 7.5b). Both the Soviet-time hardware and the Soviet-time mechanisms of indirect 
socio-political control through the command economy have largely remained in place, 
though the latter have been re-regulated. In their attempt to secure access to water, local 
actors (especially fermers) have started to redefine/redesign socio-technical relations. As a 
result practices are emerging that could counter the (economic) inefficiencies of the system. 
This is for instance apparent in the investments being done by farmers on the maintenance 
of drains and optimising the use of water supplied by gravity and the use of pumps. The 
current situation is a fragile balance between forces of remaining state control and privatized 
forces seeking individual benefit through securing access. 
Thirdly it was analysed how the government responds to the arisen situation of 
misfit between irrigation technology and the agricultural production system. It is unclear in 
what direction the government’s response will develop, as within the government there are 
both forces pushing further reform and forces that want to strengthen state control. The 
experiments with water pricing taking place, and its foreseen country-wide introduction in 
2008 or 2009, indicate that there is a good chance government will further increase its 
control within the WUA. The technology and procedures needed for introducing volumetric 
water pricing imply a system of very firm checks and controls. In combinations with 
possibilities to go around very strict rules highly depending on the person this means that for 
the poor there will be new restrictions, while the rich and well-connected will probably find 
ways to get around them. 
The years 2005 and 2006 have been relatively water abundant years. If a drought year 
would come it can be expected that it leads to acute problems, exposing the misfit between 
irrigation technology and a privatized agricultural sector as well as the non- or under-
developed institutions regarding water distribution at the WUA level. Such an event could be 
dramatic, but might be necessary to create clarity among fermers and the government 
regarding the impact the privatization of agriculture will eventually have on the organization 
of water distribution processes. 
If within the WUAs local processes of governance are to be given a chance to 
develop, they would be served better by a technological change that would give them insight 
in allocation, scheduling and delivery of water rather than the volumetric water pricing 
system that is currently pilot-tested. Possibilities for this are proportional division methods 
and time-based allocations118. Such a technological change should not just be a change in 
hardware, but even more a local process of making rules and deciding on procedures. Just 
providing insight on where the water actually flows does certainly not guarantee that 
excluded people get empowered, but it would provide a basis for opposing unequal 
distributions. 
                                                 
118 The International Water Management Institute has summarised its experiences with such approaches in 
Abdullaev et al. (1999 and 2004) 
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Figure 7.6 – Comparison of the state regulations and influencing of irrigation technology by its users  
Schematic ‘a’ represents the situations from the Soviet period till the latest round of land reforms in 
2005. Schematic ‘b’ represents the situation as encountered during the field research in 2005-2006. 
The thick arrows symbolise the flow of resources and benefits, while the (red) dotted lines symbolise 
socio-political mechanisms of influencing the distribution of these resources and benefits. The 
thickness of the arrows symbolises the relative volume of importance of the flow or mechanism. The 
‘plusses’ and ‘minuses’ in schematic ‘b’ indicate an increased or reduced importance of the 
mechanism as compared to the situation in schematic ‘a’. 
 
 
 
a 
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8.1. Introduction 
 
This study is about the organisation of agricultural production and the distribution of water 
for agriculture in the post-soviet context of a slowly reforming authoritarian regime. The 
current situation is characterised by reforms that echo the sound of privatisation and neo-
liberal reform, while in practice central planning and state control have shown to be 
persistent, though not unchanging. Reforms in land and water management are presented by 
the state as de-regulation, but in practice it is rather a re-regulation. By moving from 
collective farming to household-based fermer enterprises, the role for the individual in 
agricultural production has become larger. Households have become subject to increased 
risks and benefits associated with more individualised agricultural production. Meanwhile the 
state has re-arranged its control over agricultural production by strictly controlling cropping 
patterns, by ordering fermers to produce cotton and wheat to be sold for a fixed price to the 
state and by actively monitoring and interfering with agricultural management at field level. 
The question addressed in this study is how these reforms that comprise both 
continuity and change, affect the distribution of water. In order to give a satisfactory answer 
to that question first the content of the reforms was studied as well as their effects on the 
wider regulatory system of agricultural production. Furthermore, water distribution 
processes are shaped by the availability of water, by water requirements at field level and by 
the spatial and technological characteristics of the irrigation and drainage network. These 
aspects form an integral part of this study. 
 
 
8.2. Transition and socio-economic differentiation 
 
The transformation of agricultural production systems in Uzbekistan is a step-by-step 
process, which is closely orchestrated by the state in order not to let the developments get 
out of control. In order to assess the influence of these reforms on water distribution 
processes we first need to understand what these reforms entailed, what they aimed for and 
what in general terms their effects have been. It seems attractive to interpret the 
developments in Uzbekistan on a linear scale from a communist plan economy to a liberal 
market economy. There is international (economic and political) pressure on Uzbekistan to 
develop in the direction of a market economy and liberal democracy. The de-collectivisation 
through land reform, the reduced regulation of state planning in agricultural production, the 
liberalisation of some markets and the establishment of Water Users Associations (WUAs) 
could then suggest that Uzbekistan is moving along that line in the direction of a liberal 
market economy. Certainly Uzbekistan has left behind its communist ideology and economic 
system and it has adopted some aspects of what can be called a liberal market economy. It 
seems, however, that the government of Uzbekistan has a different development model in 
mind. This development model borrows both from state planning and market economy 
models, in such a way that state control is maintained and at the same time productivity and 
efficiency are increased. It shows that moving away from a state-socialist economy and 
governance system is not by definition a transformation into a market economy and a liberal 
democracy. The transformations have been gradual and continuous. Fifteen years after 
independence Uzbekistan has its own system of governance and its own economic system. 
There are various similarities with how things were organised in the Soviet period, yet these 
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elements are embedded in new relations. Uzbekistan is walking its own path of development. 
Its current system cannot simply be defined in relation to the Soviet and capitalist systems.  
Though it is difficult to discover the aims and intentions of the state and the groupings 
within it, the effects of the chosen path are becoming clear. The creation of two types of 
farming enterprises (fermers and dekhans) gives away that the agrarian reforms aimed at the 
establishment of large scale agriculture operated by a minority. The de-collectivisation 
created agricultural producers at the scale of the household that were subject to individual 
risks and benefits. These risks and benefits worked as incentives for increasing productivity 
and efficiency. The de-collectivisation process also had the effect that only 5-10%119 of the 
rural households (the fermers) got control over 70-80% of the arable land. The majority of 
households (the dekhans, about 90-95% of all rural households) only got small plots on which 
they produce primarily for home consumption. Production on this land does not constitute a 
suitable business model that a rural household on which a rural household can base a 
sustainable livelihood. The reforms implemented imply that the majority of rural people (the 
dekhans) cannot make a living purely on their own land. They either have to find employment 
with fermers or outside of agriculture. Many dekhans work on the fields of fermers. The relations 
between fermers and dekhans are developing in the direction of strong patron-client networks 
that built upon mutual dependencies. The terms of trade within such relations are ill defined, 
which is often to the detriment of the weaker party. The dissolution of the Large Farm 
Enterprises (LFEs) and the establishment of other forms of enterprises has created two 
distinct categories of rural households; those who control areas of land that could make for a 
viable enterprise and those who only have small plots that can barely provide enough to feed 
a household. Beside this economic differentiation also a socio-political differentiation is 
taken shape. In various settings fermers meet with each other and with state authorities. These 
meetings are important arenas for sharing information and building networks. It can be 
expected that this strengthens the development of a joint norms and value system that 
contributes to fermers becoming a social class. Dekhans are excluded from these arenas and 
networks. The way in which land has been distributed among the rural population (a small 
group of households manages the major part of the land) in combination with the 
centralised control over agricultural production (creating arenas for social interaction 
between fermers and between them and the state), has created fertile ground for growing 
socio-economic differentiation and the formation of class. This emerging process of socio-
economic differentiation poses serious questions regarding the government’s strategies 
regarding poverty and development.  
 
 
8.3. The subsumption and dissociation of new agricultural enterprises 
 
In the process of balancing control over agricultural production and loosening the leash 
some households and farming enterprises remain firmly subsumed in the wider system of 
production regulation, while others have dissociated from the system and increased their 
control over their own production and economic activities. Dekhan households that do not 
work for fermers are relatively furthest dissociated from the system, while medium sized 
cotton and wheat producing fermers strongly face the process of subsumption of both 
external and internal relations of production by the state bureaucratic regulation system. The 
very small (economically insignificant) and the very large (socio-politically powerful) have 
                                                 
119 The exact numbers in the 4 case study WUAs varied between 6 and11% 
COTTON, RICE AND WATER 
 
190 
moved somewhat outside this control system. When subsumption would be projected in a 
diagram against farm size it would result in an inverse U-shaped graph. This has parallels 
with what Rasanayagam (2002:55) in more general terms observed about enterprises in 
Uzbekistan: “there are no medium sized businesses in Uzbekistan, only large and small 
ones”. In this context it is important to notice that actually most of the fermer enterprises 
are ‘medium sized’ enterprises. The state has intentionally created them with this size, and 
has so far kept them under strict control.  
The current mechanisms of control are different from those under state socialism and 
collective farming. People who are now fermers were mostly middle cadre agricultural 
workers. Their freedom of doing business was zero, as no enterprises existed at that level. 
The creation of individual farms has put the individual entrepreneur (in this case the fermer) 
at the centre of the (agricultural) enterprise and consequently experiences more of the risk 
and benefits associated with their acts. But the fermer’s freedom of operation is limited by a 
wide range of control mechanisms, both in the political-administrative and economic spheres 
and through technological arrangements and restrictions. The fermer enterprise is at the 
centre of a web and surrounded by a range of links to the technological-administrative task 
environment (TATE). In the Uzbek case the TATE is to a large extend still the state – in a 
variety of manifestations (bank, agricultural service providers, processing industry, etc.). It 
seems that the state wants to remain firmly in control (of agricultural production) and yet 
overcome the inefficiencies associated with the state-socialist mode of operation in collective 
agriculture.  
 
 
8.4. Water distribution and three forms of agricultural production 
 
In this study agricultural production in Khorezm, Uzbekistan was found to consist of three 
coexisting forms of production. They are the state-ordered form of production (of cotton 
and wheat), the commercial form of production (of mainly rice and fodder) and the 
household form of production (of a variety of food products for home consumption). Each 
form of production has its specific organisation of inputs, labour, state control, distribution 
of benefits, and marketing. In the state-ordered form of production the fulfilling of quotas is 
the central objective. Production takes place on fermer land, but the role of the state in 
control over agricultural production is very strong. The commercial form of production is 
the main cash earner and source of investment capital for fermers. The areas used for rice 
cultivation are however strictly controlled by the state and allowances to grow are used as 
rewards. Through controlling this production process the state controls emerging 
agricultural entrepreneurship. And finally the household form of production fulfils the main 
role as provider of basic livelihoods and food security. It is in the state’s interest to provide 
enough room for this as to control the social stability of the country, which indirectly 
influences the political stability.  
One of the main findings of this study is that the three forms of agricultural production each 
have their own ‘logic’ as regards water management. This means that in each of these three 
forms of production water is acquired and managed in a different way. In case water is short 
each of the three forms of production has its own typical way of securing its access to water; 
state-ordered cotton fermers call on the state organisations, commercial rice fermers depend on 
their personal connections, and household production water users rely on local exchange 
mechanisms. The household production water users are politically ‘untouchable’ in a way as 
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household production provides for the basic livelihood security of the majority of the rural 
population.  
The wider structures of regulation in agricultural production thus highly influence the social 
dynamics of the distribution of water at all levels, from field level up to system level. It is 
striking that the form of production for which the water is used has such a strong effect. 
This is because the forms of production are tied to specific socio-political structures and 
institutions. In case of state-ordered cotton these are strictly organised and expressed in 
formal rules and regulations. In the other two forms of production this is arranged more 
informally. These forms of production are highly influential through the (formal and 
informal) aligning with socio-political structures. 
 
 
8.5. Governance structures and water abundance 
 
Various governmental organisations are involved in agricultural water management of the 
irrigation and drainage network of Khorezm. The division of responsibilities is often unclear 
or in practice not adhered to. Their social interactions are not primarily defined by the 
official relations between the organisations, but often reflect historic patterns of governance. 
Especially the administrative branch (the Hokimiyat) in practice plays a much more important 
role then officially assigned. Their interference in the procedures of allocation, scheduling 
and delivery of water is politically driven and an articulation of the centralised governance 
model. This can be seen as a legacy of the Soviet period, which in contemporary Uzbekistan 
it is still firmly present. 
The deterioration and possible collapse of maintenance and water distribution systems that is 
often described in existing literature about irrigation in Uzbekistan and Central Asia (see 
section 5.3), was not found to have dramatic proportions in Khorezm. Both the state of the 
infrastructure and the procedures to allocate, schedule and deliver water are sufficient for 
effective water management. Initial water allocations are made on basis of the official 
(centrally controlled) crop planning patterns in combination with crop water requirement 
calculations on the basis of average climate data. The allocated schedule is called ‘the limit’, 
but in practice it is not the maximum amount of water to be delivered. Water delivery from 
system level to the WUAs is measured and accounted, and at the end of the year over-use 
has to be paid for by the WUA. In day-to-day management ‘the limit’ only plays a minimal 
role. In practice discharges are adapted on the basis of feed-back information from the field; 
when WUAs request more water they usually get it. Delivery then follows competing 
requests for water, which are based on observations in the fields.  
The relatively abundant availability of water in Khorezm (as shown in Chapter 5) eases the 
task of the government agencies to supply sufficient water to everybody. Water is here not 
so much a “limited resource” as it is often seen in the analysis of irrigated agriculture. This 
situation of limited social dynamic between irrigators is reinforced by both the historic 
trajectory of collective agriculture and the continuation of a political regime of a restrictive 
state with “obedient” citizens. 
Not only are the dynamics between water users less clearly articulated, they also take 
different shapes. Instead of tail-enders suffering continuous water shortages, as it is seen 
elsewhere, in the tail-end areas of the Khorezmian irrigation network water excess and 
associated problems of water logging and salinization frequently occur next to periodic water 
shortages. A second difference in the form of dynamics between water users is the use of 
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technology. The history of collective agriculture under strict state control has left an 
irrigation network that is not cast into concrete, but enables flexible use and adaptation. The 
stability of the system was guaranteed by political force rather than sturdy technology. Partly 
this political force still consolidates water distribution, especially on the levels above the 
WUA. With the dissolving of the collective farms this control is partly falling away within 
the WUAs.  
 
 
8.6. WUAs between farmers and the state 
 
The newly established Water Users Associations (WUAs) are the arenas in which fermers 
enterprises and dekhans households have to share their irrigation water. WUAs have been 
established in place of the former collective farms with reference to the internationally 
heralded policy framework of self-management by farmers. The Uzbek government, 
international organisations and academics have all presented these new institutions as a 
solution for increasing water use efficiencies and improved participation of farmers in 
decision making. The WUA is presented as the bearer of democratic principles. In practice 
the Uzbek WUAs are state-managed organisations, or at least they are strictly controlled by 
the state. Among other things the WUAs fulfil important roles in the implementation of 
(state) control over water distribution and agricultural production. With the WUA the Uzbek 
state has not brought in a Trojan horse that once implemented rolled out its scheme of 
democratic transformation, as was maybe thought by the international water management 
community. In practice the Trojan horse turned-out to be an empty shell. Rather the Uzbek 
state has intelligently reinterpreted the WUA model to suit its own objectives of control over 
agricultural production. By using the same (or similar) terminology and formal structures as 
used internationally for WUAs the Uzbek government has been able to throw dust in the 
eyes of the international water management community. 
WUAs are not only local bodies controlled by the state, they are also semi-autonomous 
bodies that aim to get enough water to the WUA and effectively distribute it among the 
farmers in their area. In this social arena WUAs aim at access control, while fermers (and to a 
lesser extent also dekhans) deploy strategies to gain access to water. Their strategies depend 
on (1) the form of production, (2) the socio-political status and ties of the farmer and (3) the 
spatial and technological situation of the field. Due to the relative abundance of water also 
these patterns are not strongly articulated, though more so in water short periods. Mostly 
these are individual strategies, but in some cases people engage in forms of joint action. This 
organisation is usually incidental and formed around concrete maintenance or distribution 
problems. Moreover, it is characterised by low levels of formalisation. This happens in 
situations where the WUA is absent, for instance when it restricts itself to controlling those 
aspects most relevant to cotton production. Even though these patterns of joint action are 
only incidental they are somewhat remarkable for two reasons. In the first place, in post-
soviet societies ‘collective activities’ in general are not heralded by the people. And secondly, 
the Uzbek state generally does not allow for forms of self-organisation to develop as they 
might pose a threat to the political stability in the country. When these, currently incidental, 
patterns of joint management would solidify into stable systems of rules and regulations they 
could develop into alternatives to the WUA system. In light of the government’s current 
policy not to let such spontaneous bottom-up organisations develop, it remains to be seen 
whether this will actually happen. 
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8.7. Technological change in a transition context 
 
The spatial layout of the irrigation and drainage network of Khorezm and the deployed 
technology have been strongly shaped by the socio-political context in which Khorezmian 
irrigated agriculture was developed and expanded. The specific socio-political context was 
that of agricultural production and irrigation during the period of the USSR, which was 
characterised by collective production, aiming at maximum output through cotton mono-
culture while centrally and bureaucratically managed. These aims and this mode of operation 
are reflected in the technologies and layout still present. In the words Bruno Latour: 
“technology is society made durable” (Latour, 1991). Technological objects are made to 
perform roles, i.e. social tasks are delegated to artefacts. These roles are partially fixed in an 
artefact, which implies that merely changing institutions and management relations is 
sometimes not enough – also the technology might need revision in a changed socio-political 
context. In the early years after independence the aims and forms of organisation in 
agriculture in Uzbekistan did not change a lot.  The 2005-2006 phase of reforms introduced 
more far reaching changes. Individual risk and benefits on a wide scale made their entry, 
while also the size of agricultural enterprises changed substantially. This changed the 
demands on water management technologies. 
The irrigation technologies that resulted from the period of the USSR are not so easy to 
characterise. The irrigation systems are large-scale canal systems and dimensioned for cotton 
monoculture. The main canals were strongly over-dimensioned with the perspective to 
further increase the irrigated area. But the characteristic that is most influential with regard to 
water control is the fact that the exact technological layout was somewhat irrelevant. 
Irrigation technology was functionally used to divide water, but the function of control in 
the socio-political sense was not delegated onto artefacts. The strict state control over 
cropping patterns and agricultural practices at field level, combined with authoritarian 
control of society and minimal personal interests in increased water use, and an abundance 
of water, created a situation in which there was no need for irrigation technology that 
restricted water use. Water division structures in Khorezm are not expressions of contested 
allocation and distribution of water in the way this has been analysed elsewhere, expressing 
complex social relations between water users and managers (see for instance Ubels, 1989; 
Kloezen and Mollinga, 1992; Bolding et al., 1995; Mollinga and Bolding, 1996; Mollinga, 
1998; Veldwisch, 2006). The irrigation technology and spatial layout are, however, still 
strongly related to the socio-political characteristics of the soviet and post-soviet collective 
production systems. The way the system has been designed and constructed expresses the 
existence of unquestioned centralised managerial control and singularity of purpose, allowing 
a fully pragmatic and instrumental approach to layout and hydraulic design. The irrigation 
and drainage system as found in Khorezm could only have been developed there and then. 
In the 2005-2006 reforms individual water users were created and the interest in profitable 
yields increased. As a consequence the interest in reliable access to water also increased. 
Social dynamics over water distribution between these users arose. As part of their strategies 
to secure access to water farmers have started to manipulate and adapt the irrigation and 
drainage technology. In the relative absence of the state in maintenance and improvements 
at the level of the WUA and below, farmers themselves invest in technological changes. 
Claims on access to water are connected to these investments, similar to the creation of 
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hydraulic property, which is the establishment of water user rights through investments by 
water users. 
In the dynamics over water distribution at the WUA level the role of technology is gaining in 
importance, not only in the dynamics between farmers, but also in that between the state on 
the one hand and farmers on the other. If the state wants to stay in control over water 
distribution, even if it is through WUAs, it will have to come with new control strategies. 
The experiments with volumetric water pricing can be seen as response to the arising 
situation in which water is becoming the subject of contestation. Volumetric water pricing 
requires detailed water measurements at field level, which itself requires, among other things, 
the installation of measurement structures, specified measurement procedures  and a close 
observation and control of flows. 
 
 
8.8. Implications for research and policy 
 
The findings of this study were summarized above. Besides giving answers to research 
questions, the study also results in a number of new questions and the refining of earlier 
defined research questions. These questions do not only emerge from the empirical findings, 
but are also driven by particular aims. Both for formulating the relevant areas for further 
research and for formulating recommendations for policy change it is necessary to first 
define the objectives. With regard to Uzbekistani (agricultural)development it is my view that 
besides aiming to increase efficiency of resource use, to increase agricultural production and 
to reduce environmental damage, the aim should also be to reduce poverty, to increase 
equity in access to resources and to improve transparency of governance. The following 
recommendations should be seen in light of these aims.  
As someone concerned with developmental issues, working through an institute for 
‘development research’ in a ‘pilot project in development research’ I take the stance that 
development has to do with the (re)distribution of benefits and with emancipation of those 
who are denied equal access to benefits. I realise that these objectives are not necessarily 
shared by the ZEF/UNESCO project, let alone by the Uzbek state.  
When development intervention are understood to include the redistribution of power and 
benefits, both as means and outcome, the research conducted within the project does not 
always contribute to development, sometimes rather to the contrary. For instance delivering 
improved advice on fertilizer application in (state-ordered) cotton production primarily 
benefits a small (already advantaged) proportion of the rural population and the (state 
owned/controlled) cotton processing industries. Also the development of tools with which 
crop production and water distribution can (almost real-time) be monitored at regional scale 
on basis of remote sensing data could lead to reinforced state control rather than that it leads 
to redistribution of control and benefits to people so far excluded. Thus, research has socio-
political implications that affect development, even if it is technical research that is 
understood as belonging to the domain of the natural sciences. When not being clear on 
what we understand by development, our research may have unintended effects on the 
distribution of resources and power.  
The recommendations for future research and policy change given below are (inherently) 
politically loaded. It is realized that the Uzbek state is not a homogeneous body and that in 
the ministries both conservative and reformist forces are present. This latter group of people 
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may have similar visions for the development of Uzbekistan and may find inspiration in the 
recommendations given below. 
A recurrent theme in the recommendations is the importance of household production in 
Uzbek agriculture, which has remained severely under-exposed in the academic literature, 
state policies as well as in development oriented (international) projects. In line with the 
stance taken as described above I give ample attention for the socio-economic 
differentiation caused by, among other things, the land reforms by which many fermers have 
started to accumulate wealth and status on basis of the primary access to land and resources, 
while others were excluded. 
 
8.8.1. Future research  
 
- This study shows that in 2005-2006 WUAs in Khorezm were a combination of state-run 
organisations and farmer-run organisations. State organisations justified their strong 
involvement with reference to the WUAs being new organisations and thus requiring 
external support. The fact that this support was often more of a forced nature than a 
response to requests by WUAs leads one to suspect that state involvement could remain 
strong. It is, however, clear that the WUA, as a governance model of local water 
management, will practically develop and thus change in various aspects over the coming 
years. The WUA as an object for monitoring change is a strategic choice for studying 
changing agrarian relations, as the WUA is one of main points of contact between fermers 
and the state. 
- Chapter 6 shows that farmers may organise themselves where the WUA does not 
adequately fulfil its tasks of maintenance and operation. The cases encountered during 
this study were incidental, triggered by the break-down of pumps or other essential 
infrastructure on which a limited group of farmers depended. Where (small) groups of 
farmers jointly invest in maintenance and/or jointly hire a pump operator it could be 
expected that rule and decision making processes will emerge. These could develop into 
collective action regimes. Studying these emerging patterns at such an early stage of 
development in a post-soviet context where ‘spontaneous’ collective action is rather 
exceptional (cf. Mearns, 1996), will probably result in valuable insight on how such 
initiatives develop. Moreover, it would be strategic to study these processes as they might 
present an alternative for the lack of increase in user participation and control so far 
through the top-down establishment of  WUAs. 
- The main processes of water distribution were identified and described in this study, 
both at district and WUA level. Now that the basic processes are identified it is possible 
to quantify them in order to show their relative importance. For instance the amount of 
water used in household production could be quantified, as well as its productivity, and 
compared with the other forms of production. A former brigade could be studied in 
detail by systematically following (and measuring) all water deliveries to fields while 
simultaneously the socio-political processes are monitored. Such an integrated approach 
will deepen the knowledge of the processes identified in this study and connect them to 
problems identified (and sometimes quantified) by studies in the natural science domain. 
Examples of the latter are water logging, over-irrigation, salinization, strategies for using 
the contribution by ground water, and difficulties in timely water delivery. The 
simultaneous study of farmer strategies and bio-physical processes in their fields will help 
to evaluate the (un)intended effects of these farmer strategies. This could lead to 
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identification of approaches that could be effective in changing farming practices 
because they take into account both the intentions and the effects of farmer strategies. 
At the same time it will result in deepened knowledge about the bio-physical processes 
of field level water application, in a way that represents actual practices. 
- Research that would go even a step further would constitute participative development 
of water distribution systems (both technical and administrational). IWMI and the ICWC 
have used such an approach in the Ferghana Valley. Working together with WUA staff 
in the processes of allocation, scheduling and delivery of water is at the core of such a 
study. Developing simple ‘models’ to monitor the three processes, for instance by 
automated Excel sheets, will help the WUA to keep better track of what happens in its 
own area. The objectives of the model to be developed need to be formulated by the 
WUA, facilitated by a researcher (or small group of researchers) that will be able to build 
such a model. This first step is an important research tool as it helps to identify the 
objectives of WUA staff. If they believe that the model can result what they want to 
know, they will probably be highly interested to develop it and fill it will relevant data. 
The data collected by the WUA staff is valuable for quantifying certain processes. These 
could for instance be frequencies of irrigation, actual rotational schedules, differences in 
water application within the area of the WUA and actual cropping patterns. 
- Finally increased attention for household production by the dekhan households would 
have the potential of delivering knowledge that is beneficial for the majority of the rural 
poor. In spite of its importance in agricultural production, dekhan agriculture has too 
long been neglected. In order to be able to come up with relevant policies and 
agricultural extension that is aimed at the dekhan, more research needs to be done on the 
current agricultural practices and the contribution of agricultural production to 
livelihoods. The further study of dekhan livelihood strategies in general will result in 
knowledge on how the process of socio-economic differentiation develops under 
influence of the ongoing reforms. Preferably this process of differentiation should be 
studied in connection to autonomy versus control by the wider structures that regulate 
agricultural production, i.e. the processes of subsumption and dissociation. 
 
 
8.8.2. Policy  
The recommendations given here are both aimed at reformist forces in the Uzbek 
government and at international organisations aiming to influence the Uzbekistani policy 
reforms. 
 
- During the period of field research experiments with volumetric water pricing were 
initiated by the Uzbek state. Though measurements and pricing did not happen in 
practice, there was a lot of talk about its introduction. One of the main expectations 
from this change of procedure and technology was that it might lead to water saving on 
basis of an economic rationale. Both the technical and the procedural implications for 
introducing volumetric water pricing are huge and costly. In the existing plans fermers will 
have to bear the cost for construction of water measuring structures at each field. 
Moreover, the framework cannot be effectively enforced unless management and/or 
technology are radically changed. A water pricing framework which is easier to introduce 
is pricing on basis of crop and area. This is already widely practiced in many WUAs for 
covering the internal costs of operation, with a dual tariff system for rice on the one 
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hand and all other crops on the other. WUAs could be charged volumetrically (i.e. on 
basis of their real use), while costs are incurred on farmers on basis of their cropping 
areas. This way of water pricing could be an effective tool for cost recovery as it links 
very well to the existing practices of control in which cropped areas are closely 
administrated, while water delivery to individual fields is not measured, but controlled by 
putting fines on wasteful practices.  
- Water distribution at the WUA level has so far remained quite opaque. This is partly due 
to the water distribution technologies that make it difficult to visualise, let alone 
quantified, how water flows are divided. Organisational practices and procedures do not 
make rotational schedules any more transparent. This obscures the understanding by 
farmers of how much water is available and how they could access it. If procedures and 
technologies would be more transparent, it would be easier to identify inequalities, 
misuse and opportunities. This could be improved by stimulating both institutional 
measures as well as technical measures that make it easier to see where the water is 
flowing to. Making (rotational) irrigation schedules publicly available and providing easily 
understandable water measurement structures at some strategic places in the WUA are 
examples of such interventions. 
- One of the ways of addressing the increasing socio-economic differentiation along the 
lines of division between fermers and dekhans would be to increase the support for 
household production. This study shows that in the studied areas 89-94% of the rural 
households in the first place depend on their household plot. About 20% of the arable 
land is used for household production and roughly one third of water use comes to its 
account. Despite of this it has lacked government support and has largely been outside 
the scope of research and international development projects. Agricultural extension 
services for household production are lacking. Agricultural input supplies have so far 
been purely directed at large scale agriculture.  Moreover, there is ample room to 
improve post-harvest processing and market development for household production. 
 
 
8.9. Cotton, rice and water… 
 
This study shows that in Uzbekistan water distribution can not be understood separate from 
central state control over agricultural production. Through a set of ongoing agrarian reforms 
the Uzbek social landscape is changing. The complete switch from large farm enterprise to 
fermer enterprises, which was country-wide implemented in 2005-2006, is a jolt in an 
otherwise gradual process. In the period of study the privatisation of agricultural production 
advanced, but state regulation did not diminish. The interface between privatised commercial 
agriculture and state agriculture is clearest observable in the numerous contrasting aspects of 
cotton and rice production. Fermer enterprises in Khorezm are often engaged in both, 
agricultural state organisations as well. Rather than between fermers and the state, the 
watershed quite literally lies between cotton and rice. In the study of water distribution 
processes the precarious relation that exists between cotton and rice production became 
apparent. This is not only because of conflicting water management requirements, but just as 
well because the distribution of water between cotton and rice stands for the sharing of 
benefits between privatised commercial and state production. 
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Annex 
 
Khorezm Sociological Survey – April 2006 Name of Surveyor: ______________ 
 
Rayon: __________ Shirkat/WUA: __________ Kishloq: ___________ Ethnicity: __________ 
 
Question № Question YES NO 
№ People in Household  Enough vegetables (or need to buy)?    
- 1st Generation (pension)  Enough wheat (or need to buy)?    
- 2nd Generation (oldest worker)  Enough rice (or need to buy)?    
- 3rd Generation  Sells goods direct to bazaar?   
- 4th Generation     Which goods?   
- Other:  Sells goods to trader who then sells?   
     Which goods?   
№ Available workers in House  Barters goods for other goods?   
- male     What for what? (gives ¦ receives)   
- female  Has a car?   
  Has a tractor?   
№ Household members in:  Has a donkey cart?   
- paid employment off-farm  Has a bicycle?   
- only works on the land  Animals M F 
- own family business  Cow   
- works outside Uzbekistan  Sheep   
- works outside of Khorezm  Chicken   
- mix of above  Donkey   
- 14-16yr or student  Horse   
Land holding ha/m2    
A. Household plot (excl. house)     
B. Tamorka(s) away from house      
C. Ijara / fermer leasehold     
D. Ishchi (worker of fermer)     
E. Sharecropping (1ha cotton/wheat)     
 
Crops grown (ha/m2) A B C D E 
Cotton      
Wheat      
Rice      
Potatoes      
Vegetables (incl. melon, onion etc.)      
Corn/maize      
Fruit trees      
Mulberry trees      
Other:      
      
      
 
Comments: 
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Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
 
 
1. Einleitung 
 
Diese Studie handelt von der Organisation landwirtschaftlichen Produktion und der 
Wasserverteilung für landwirtschaftliche Zwecke in ein sich langsam veränderndes autoritäres 
Regime in einem post-Sowjetischen Kontext. Die gegenwärtige Situation wird gekennzeichnet 
von Reformen die den Klang der Privatisierung und der neoliberalen Reform räsonieren, 
während Zentralplanung und staatliche Kontrolle sich in der Praxis als hartnäckig gezeigt haben, 
sich aber gleichzeitig auch ändern. Reformen im Land- und Wassermanagement werden vom 
Staat dargestellt als eine Deregulation, in Wirklichkeit aber handelt es sich eher um eine 
Reregulation. Durch die Umstellung von kollektiver Landwirtschaft auf fermer-Unternemen, mit 
dem Individuellen Haushalt als Basis, hat sich die Rolle des Individuum innerhalb der 
landwirtschaftlicher Produktion vergrößert. Haushalte werden bloßgestellt an den vergrößerten 
Risiken und Vorteile die zusammenhängen mit einer mehr individuell organisierten 
Agrarproduktion. Mittlerweile hat der Staat seine Kontrolle über landwirtschaftliche Produktion 
neu Arrangiert durch eine strenge Kontrolle über Gewächsplanung, durch fermers aufzutragen 
Baumwolle und Weizen anzubauen die zu einem festen Preis an den Staat verkauft werden, und 
durch die aktive Überwachung und Einmischung in die landwirtschaftliche Betriebsführung auf 
den Feldern.  
Die Frage die in dieser Studie zur Diskussion steht ist wie diese Reformen, die sowohl 
Kontinuität als auch Veränderung beinhalten, die Wasserverteilung beeinflusst. Um eine 
befriedigende Antwort auf diese Frage geben zu können wird zuerst der Inhalt der Reformen 
studiert als auch deren Effekte auf das weitere regulierende System der landwirtschaftlichen 
Produktion. Auch werden Aspekte der Wasserverfügbarkeit, der Wassernbenötigung in den 
Feldern so wie die räumlichen und technologisch spezifischen Merkmale des Bewasserungs- und 
Drainagenetzes studiert, da diese alle Wasserverteilungsprozesse beeinflussen.  
 
 
2.   Der Rahmen dieser Studie 
 
Diese Untersuchung wurde innerhalb des gemeinschaftlichen Projektes des Zentrum für 
Entwicklungsforschung (ZEF) und der United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO) ausgeführt, getitelt “Economic and ecological restructuring of land and water use 
in Khorezm”. Das Projekt wurde in 2001 gestartet und richtet sich auf die vergrößerung der 
Effektivität von menschlichen und natürlichen Hilfsquellen in der Region Khorezm (Vlek et al., 
2001). Gemäß den Zielsetzungen der ZEF ist die Arbeidsmethode des Projektes explizit 
multidisciplinar.  Die unterliegende Studie ist das wichtigste Output einer der Modulen innerhalb 
dieses Projektes. Dieser Modul wurde als Doktorarbeit eingerichtet innerhalb des ZEFs 
Department of Political and Cultural Change. Als solches baut es weiter auf frühere Modulen der 
Sozialwissenschaften (Wall, 2006; Zavgordnyaya, 2006; Trevisani, bevorstehend). Auch werden 
Querverbindungen hergestellt zu Untersuchungen auf dem Gebiet des Wassermanagements in 
der Naturwissenschaft (z.B. Akramkhanov, 2005; Ibrakhimov, 2005; Forkutsa, 2006; Conrad, 
2006) und zum wirtschaftlichen Teil des Projektes (Mueller, 2006; Bobojanov, bevorstehend).  
Die Untersuchungen enthielten 12 Monate Felduntersuchung in fünf Terminen, in der Periode 
zwischen Februar 2005 und Oktober 2006. Der Standort der Felduntersuchungen war das 
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Bewasserungs- und Drainagenetz der Provinz Khorezm (Oblast/Viloyat) in Usbekistan (Figur 
1.1). In dieser Region wurden vier Water User Associations (WUA’s) als Kasusobjekte gewählt 
(Figur 1.2). Die konkreten Methoden für die Feldforschungen waren (1) direkte Observation von 
Objekten, Ereignissen, Prozeduren und sozialen Interaktionen; (2) semi- und unstrukturierte 
Interviews mit Slüsselinformanten; und (3) eine Haushaltsumfrage.  
 
 
3.  Struktur des Buches 
 
Der konzeptuelle Rahmen für diese Doktorarbeid wird im 1. Kapitel ausarbeitet und enthält drei 
Teile.  
(1)  Der Usbekische Staat im Übergang, eine weitläufige Diskussion über die Bedeutung des 
Begriffes Übergang, das Wesen des Staatssozialismus und welche Wege Staten folgen die sich 
davon fortbewegen. Diese Transition ist sowohl politischer, als auch Wirtschaftlicher Art.  
(2) Die zweite Diskussion handelt von der Organisation der Landwirtschaft (und 
Bewasserung). Zwei Theorien werden präsentiert; die labour process approach und die Theorie des 
Technological-Administrative Task Environment. Diese beiden werden angewendet bei Landwirtschaft 
im Übergang.  
(3)  Der sozialtechnischen Charakter der Bewasserung und der Technik wird besprochen 
mittels einer Diskussion zur Technologiedebatte, einer ausführlichen Beschreibung eines 
interdisciplinären Rahmen für eine Analyse des Bewasserungsmanagements, und einer 
Diskussion über die Theory of access.  
 
Das 2. Kapitel beschreibt wie die Untersuchungsmethode den Arbeidsumständen in einem post-
Sowjetischem autoritären Land angepasst wurden. Methodologie kann konzeptuell verstanden 
werden als bestehend aus drei Ebenen; (1) das wissentschaftliche Model, das die 
erkenntnistheoretischen und ontologischen Erkenntnisse darstellt; (2) die Untersuchungsmethode 
oder –strategie und (3) Untersuchungstechniken (Buraway 1998:6; Alasuutari, 1995; Bryman, 
2004). Jede Ebene der Methodologie wird beeinflusst durch den Kontext in dem sie angewendet 
wird. Der Charakter des Usbekischen Regimes und Verwaltung haben einen starken Einfluß auf 
die Untersuchungsmethode und deren Ergebnisse. Im Usbekischen Kontext sind offizielle 
Daten, Kenntnisse und Meinungen oft vage. Um die Anonimität der Informanten zu schützen 
war es oft nicht möglich Befindungen bei anderen Gesprächspartners zu überprüfen.  
Das 3. und 4. Kapitel erläutern den breiteren landwirtschaftlichen Kontext. Diese 
Kapitel beschreiben die Beziehungen zwischen Bauern, dem Staat und landwirtschaftliche 
Planung. Diese Beschreibung ist unentbehrlich wenn es darum geht die Dynamik der 
Wasserverteilung zu verstehen die in den weiteren Kapiteln diskutiert wird. Im 3. Kapitel wird 
die elementäre Struktur der Usbekischen landwirtschaftlichen Gesellschaft beschrieben. Staatliche 
Aktoren, privatisierte Bauern (fermers) und Kleinbauern (dekhans) haben alle ihre eigene Rolle und 
es gibt zwischen ihnen spezifische Austauschbeziehungen. Sozialwirtschaftliche Differenzierung 
im ländlichen bereich findet in einem raschen Tempo statt.  
Im 4. Kapitel wird an Hand des labour process approach gezeigt welche drei Weisen der 
landwirtschaftliche Produktion das Khorezmenisch System kennt; (1) die staatliche Beauftragung 
der Produktion, (2) die kommerzielle Weise der Produktion und (3) die haushaltliche Weise der 
Produktion. Diese Produktionsprozesse werden unterschieden auf Grund ihres In- und Outputs, 
ihren Tauschverhältnissen, als auch ihrer technischen Forderungen. Die Entwicklung einer 
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kommerziellen privatisierter Reisproduktion ist eine gewaltige Veränderung und möglich ein 
Mittelpunkt einer politischer Wendung.   
Im 5. Kapitel wird gezeigt wie die Kontrolle über die Landwirtschaft seine besondere 
Form annimmt im Bereich der Wasserverteilung auf regionalem Niveau. Das 
Gouvernementsambt (Hokimiyat) erhält ein sehr zentralgeleitetes Staatsmanagementsystem in 
Stand. Der Staat bewahrt  Gehorsamkeit und das Einhalten Produktionsquoten mittels ein 
System das mit der einen Hand Druck ausübt auf Bauern und sie mit der Anderen belohnt. Die 
Unterschiede im Wassergebrauch zwischen Baumwoll- und Reisproduktion spielt eine wichtige 
Rolle in dieser Dynamik.  
Nach einer Auseinandersetzung der Geschichte der Einführung der Water Users 
Associations (WUAs) in Usbekistan, besieht das 6. Kapitel die wirkliche Wasserverteilungsdynamik 
innerhalb der WUAs. Kleinbauer (dekhans) und neue Landwirte (fermers) ringen um den Zugang 
zu einer begrenzten Hilfsquelle. Während an einigen Stellen die neugestalteten WUAs strenge 
Zugangskontrolle üben, bilden sich an anderen Stellen Formen kollektiever Handlung. Diese 
haben immer einen informellen Charakter und formen sich anläßlich der Arbeit um den 
Unterhalt und den Gebrauch der Pumpen.  
Das 7. Kapitel zeigt daß die landwirtschaftlichen Änderungen die momentan statt finden 
einen anderen Anspruch haben auf Bewasserungstechnik, sowohl auf der Micro- als auf der 
Systemebene. Die Entwicklungsgeschichte der Bewasserung und der Drainage in Khorezm zeigt 
wie das System geformt worden ist von (historischen) sozialpolitischen Beziehungen. Es zeigt 
welche wesentlichen Änderungen in der Struktur der Usbekischen Landwirtschaft ihren Einfluss 
haben auf das Bewasserungs- und Drainagenetz.  
Die Schlussfolgerungen der Studie werden in Kapitel 8 präsentiert. Hier stehen die wichtigsten 
Befindungen, eine Diskussion der Folgen für die Theoretischen Debatten die im 1. Kapitel 
präsentiert worden und eine Liste von Empfehlungen für sowohl Verwaltung als zukünftigen 
Forschungen.  
 
 
3.  Zusammenfassung der Befindungen  
 
3.1.  Übergang, Ordnung und Aufteilung neuer landwirtschaftlicher Betriebe 
Die Veränderung der landwirtschaftlichen Produktionssysteme in Usbekistan ist ein schrittweise 
Prozess, der haarscharf vom Staat arrangiert wird damit die Entwicklungen nicht steuerlos statt 
finden. Um den Einfluss dieser Reformen auf die Wasserverteilung messen zu können, müssen 
wir zuerst verstehen was diese Reformen auf sich haben , welchen Zweck und welche generellen 
Effekte sie (gehabt) haben. Es scheint attraktiv die Ereignisse in Usbekistan zu interpretieren an 
Hand eines Spektrums das reicht von kommunistischen Planwirtschaft einerseits bis zu liberalen 
Marktwirtschaft andererseits. Die Dekollektivierung durch Landreformen, die verringerte 
staatliche Regulierung der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion, die Freigabe einiger Märkte und die 
Errichtung von Water Users Associations (WUAs) würde dann den Eindruck geben dass Usbekistan 
sich bewegt in Richtung liberale Marktwirtschaft. International wird (wirtschaftlicher und 
politischer) Druck auf Usbekistan ausgeübt um sich in Richtung einer solchen Wirtschaft zu 
entwickeln, insgesamt einer liberalen Demokratie. Bestimmt hat Usbekistan seine 
kommunistische Ideologie hinter sich gelassen und auch einige Aspekte einer so genannten 
Marktwirtschaft übernommen, allerdings hat es den Anschein das Usbekistan ein anderes 
Entwicklungsmodel in Gedanken hat. Dieses Entwicklungsmodel entleiht Elemente der 
staatlichen Planwirtschaft als auch der Marktwirtschaft, in einer solchen Weise das staatliche 
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Kontrolle erhalten wird und Effektivität und Produktivität gleichzeitig erhöht werden. Es zeigt 
das Abstand zur staatlichsozialistischer Wirtschaft und Verwaltung nicht unbedingt eine 
Transformation in Richtung einer freien Demokratie und einer liberalen Marktwirtschaft mit sich 
bringt. Die Transformationen fanden stufenweise und unaufhörlich statt. Fünfzehn Jahre nach 
der Unabhängigkeit hat Usbekistan seine eigene Verwaltungsform und sein eigenes 
wirtschaftliches System. Es gibt verschiedene Übereinstimmungen mit der Organisationsweise 
zur Zeit der Sowjetunion, aber diese Elemente sind eingebettet in neue Beziehungen. Usbekistan 
bewandelt seinen eigenen Pfad der Entwicklung. Sein heutiges System kann nicht einfach nur 
definiert werden in Beziehung zum Sowjetischen oder dem kapitalistischen System.  
Obwohl es schwierig ist die Ziele und die Absichtes des Staates und Gruppen im Staat 
ausfindig zu machen, sind die Effekte des gewählten Pfades deutlich sichtbar. Die Schaffung von 
zwei globalen Typen von landwirtschaftlichen Unternehmen (fermers und dekhans) zeigt das die 
agrarischen Reformen sich richten auf eine großflächige Landwirtschaft die von einer Minderheit 
bebaut wird. Die Dekollektivierung schaffte landwirtschaftliche Produzenten auf dem 
Haushaltsniveau. Diese werden bloßgestellt an individuellen Risiken und Vorteile die wiederum 
dafür sorgten das Produktivität und Effektivität gesteigert wurden. Dem Prozess der 
Dekollektivierung folgte auch das nur 5-10%120 der ländlichen Haushalte (die fermers) 70-80% der 
Ackerböden in Hände bekam. Die Mehrzahl der Haushalte (die dekhans, ungefähr 90-95% aller 
ländlichen Haushalte) bekam nur ein kleines Grundstück wo hauptsächlich Produkte für den 
eigenen Verbrauch angebaut werden.   
Produktion auf diesen Flächen ist kein wirtschaftliches Model wovon ein ländlicher 
Haushalt leben kann. Die Reformen die durchgeführt worden sind haben zur Folge dass die 
Mehrzahl der ländlichen Bevölkerung nicht leben kann von ihrem Land allein. Sie muss entweder 
bei den fermers, oder außerhalb der Landwirtschaft Arbeit finden. Viele dekhans arbeiten auf den 
Feldern von fermers. Die Beziehungen zwischen fermers und dekhans entwickeln sich in Richtung 
einer starken patron-client-Beziehung, die gebaut ist auf gegenseitige Abhängigkeit. Das 
Tauschverhältnis innerhalb solcher Beziehungen ist oft schlecht definiert, was die schwächere 
Partei oft benachteiligt. Die Teilung der Large Farm Enterprises (LFEs) und die Gründung 
andersartige Betriebe haben zwei unterschiedliche Sorten von ländlichen Haushalten geschaffen; 
jene die Grundstücke kontrollieren und die einen lebenskräftigen Betrieb halten könnten und 
jene die nur kleine Parzellen haben worauf sie kaum genug für die eigenen Bedürfnisse anbauen 
können. Diese sozialwirtschaftliche Differenzen werfen Fragen auf in Beziehung zu Armut und 
Entwicklungsstrategien.  
Im Prozeß wobei Kontrolle über landwirtschaftliche Produktion in Balance ist mit dem 
teilweise loslassen, bleiben manche Haushalte und landwirtschaftliche Betriebe eng eingeordnet 
im größeren System der Produktionsregulation, während andere sich losgemacht haben vom 
System und in zunehmendem Maß die Kontrolle haben über ihre eigene Produktion und ihre 
wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten. Dekhan-Haushalte die nicht für fermers arbeiten sind relativ am 
weitesten entfernt vom System, während mittelgroße fermers die Baumwolle und Weizen anbauen, 
die Prozesse der Einordnung der internen und externen Produktionsbeziehungen der 
bürokratischen staatlichen Regelungen am härtesten spüren. Die sehr Kleinen (wirtschaftlich 
uninteressanten) und die sehr Großen (sozialwirtschaftlich mächtig) haben sich etwas außerhalb 
dieses Kontrollsystems platziert.  
Wenn staatliche Kontrolle im einem Diagram projektiert würde, würde das eine umgekehrte U-
förmige Linie ergeben. Dies hat Parallele mit dem was Rasanayagam (2002:55) im Algemeinen 
feststellt in Bezug auf die Usbekischen Unternehmen: “Es gibt keine mittelgroße Betriebe in 
                                                 
120 Die exakten Zahlen in den vier Kases betrugen zwsichen 6% und 11%.  
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Usbekistan, nur große und kleine”. Dennoch sind die meisten heutigen fermer-Betriebe von 
mittlerer Größe. Sie wurden ursprünglich von Staat gegründet, und das hält sie unter strenger 
staatlicher Kontrolle.  
Außer der Schaffung zweier Kategorien landwirtschaftlicher Betriebe haben die 
Reformen auch die Water Users Association (WUA) als neues Verwaltungsinstrument auf dem 
Niveau des ehemalige kollektiven Bauernhöfe geschaffen. Diese Institution wird hier unten 
weiter diskutiert.  
 
3.2. Wasserverteilung und die drie Formen der Agrarischen Produktion 
Zuerst wird die Logik agrarischer Produktion weiter erläutert an Hand von drei 
Produktionsweisen die in dieser Studie unterschieden werden. Diese sind die staatlich 
angewiesene Produktionsweise (von Baumwolle und Weizen), die kommerzielle 
Produktionsweise (meist Reis und Viehfutter) und die Haushaltsweise (einer Vielzahl an 
Gewächsen für den eigenen Verbrauch). Jede Produktionsweise hat ihre eigene Form für die 
Organisation von Input, Arbeit, staatliche Kontrolle, Verteilung von Gewinnen und Marketing. 
In der staatlich angewiesenen Weise ist das Erreichen der gestellten Quoten das zentrale Ziel. 
Produktion findet auf fermer-Land statt, aber die Kontrolle des Staates über die landwirtschaftliche 
Produktion ist sehr stark.  
Mit der kommerzielle Produktionsweise wird das meiste Geld verdient. Auch ist es eine Art von 
Investition für fermer. Gebiete zum Anbau von Reis werden streng vom Staat kontrolliert und die 
Zuweisung dieser Gebiete wird eingesetzt als Belohnung. Durch die Kontrolle dieses 
Produktionsprozesses behält der Staat auch die Kontrolle über neu aufkommende 
landwirtschaftliche Betriebe. Letztens die Haushaltsweise. Diese erfühlt eine wichtige Rolle als 
Erwerbsquelle und als Nahrungssicherung. Es ist im Interesse des Staates um genügend Platz zu 
lassen für diese Weise der Produktion da sie direkt zusammenhängt mit sozialer, und damit auch 
politischer Stabilität.  
Eine der wichtigsten Folgerungen dieser Studie lautet das alle drei Weisen ihre eigene 
Logik haben in Beziehung auf Wassermanagement. Das heißt das innerhalb jeder Form Wasser 
anders zugeführt und anders verwaltet wird. Im Falle einer Wasserknappheit hat jede Weise ihre 
eigene Manier den Zugang zu Wasser zu sichern; die baumwollproduzierenden fermer fallen 
zurück auf staatliche Organisationen, kommerzielle Reisfermer sind abhängig von ihren 
persönlichen Beziehungen und für die individuellen Haushalte ist der kleine Bedarf informell 
geregelt. Die häuslichen Verbraucher sind politisch ‘ungreifbar’ da die häusliche Produktion eine 
wichtige Erwerbsquelle ist für die ländliche Bevölkerung.  
Die weiteren Regulationsstrukturen in der agrarischen Produktion haben einen großen Einfluss 
auf die soziale Dynamik der Wasserverteilung auf allen Niveaus, vom Feld bis zum ganzen 
System. Es ist bemerkenswert das die Produktionsweise einen solchen Einfluss hat. Das hat 
damit zutun dass die verschiedenen Weisen verknüpft sind mit spezifischen sozialpolitischen 
Strukturen und Institutionen. Im Falle der staatlich angewiesenen Baumwollproduktion sind diese 
sehr streng organisiert und kommen sie zum Ausdruck in formellen Regeln und Regulationen. 
Bei den anderen zwei Produktionsweisen ist dies eher informell arrangiert. Gerade durch diese 
Verbindung zwischen (formellen und informellen) sozialpolitischen Strukturen und den 
verschiedenen Formen sind sie so einflussreich geworden.  
 
3.3 Verwaltungsstrukturen und Wasserüberfluss 
Verschiedene verwaltende Organisationen sind beteiligt am landwirtschaftlichen 
Wassermanagement. Die Scheidung der verschiedenen Verantwortlichkeiten ist nicht immer klar 
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oder wird in der Praxis nicht befolgt. Der soziale Verkehr wird in erster Linie nicht definiert von 
offiziellen Beziehungen zwischen den Organisationen, sonders reflektiert öfters historische 
Verwaltungsmuster. Das gilt vor allem für die administrative Abteilung (die Hokimiyat), die in der 
Praxis eine viel größere Rolle spielt als sie offiziell hat. Ihre Einmischung in der Zuweisung, 
Planung und Lieferung von Wasser ist politisch eingegeben und eine Äußerung des 
Zentralverwaltungsmodels. Dies kann gesehen werden als eine Erbschaft der Sowjetzeit, die im 
heutigen Usbekistan immer noch deutlich anwesend ist.  
Die Verschlechterung und der mögliche Kollaps des Unterhaltssystems und des 
Wasserverteilungssystems, wie oft in der Literatur beschrieben, hat kein dramatisches Ausmaß in 
Khorezm. Sowohl der Zustand der Infrastruktur als die Prozeduren der Wasserzuweisung, 
Wasserplanung und Wasserlieferung sind ausreichend für effektives Wassermanagement. Erste 
Wasserzuweisungen werden gemacht auf Grund der offiziellen (zentral kontrollierten) 
Anbaupläne, zusammen mit dem Wasserbedürfnis des verschiedenen Gewächse und 
Berechnungen auf Grund durchschnittlichen Klimadaten. Dieser Zuweisungsplan wird ‘das 
Limit’, aber in der Praxis ist es nicht die Höchstmenge an Wasser die geliefert werden kann. 
Wasserlieferung vom System zu den WUAs wird gemessen und berechnet und am Ende des 
Jahres muss Mehrgebrauch bezahlt werden. In der täglichen Verwaltung spielt ‘das Limit’ nur 
eine seht minimal Rolle. In Praxis wird Wasserzufuhr angepasst an Informationen aus dem Feld; 
wenn WUAs mehr Wasser fragen bekommen sie es meistens auch. Lieferung findet statt an Hand 
der verschiedenen Anträge, die beruhen auf Feldobservationen.  
Die relative reichliche Verfügbarkeit des Wassers in Khorezm (wie geschildert im 5. 
Kapitel) erleichtert die Aufgabe der Behörden um genügend Wasser an alle zu liefern. Wasser ist 
hier keine “begrenzte Hilfsquelle”, wie sie oft beschrieben wird in Analysen der 
Bewasserungslandwirtschaft. Der Streit über Wasserverteilung ist darum weniger ausgesprochen 
als in vielen anderen Teilen der Welt. Diese Situation von limitierter sozialer Dynamik zwischen 
verschiedenen Wasserverbrauchern wird verstärkt durch sowohl den historischen ‘Weg’ der 
kollektiver Landwirtschaft und der Fortsetzung eines politischen Regimes eines restriktiven States 
mit ‘gehorsamen’ Bürgern.  
Nicht nur ist die Dynamik zwischen Wasserverbrauchern weniger klar formuliert, sie 
nimmt auch verschiedene Formen an. Erstens, dank einer Situation mit relativen 
Wasserüberfluss, leiden ‘Endgebiete’ nicht unter Wassermangel, ungleich der Situation in anderen 
Bewasserungsgebieten in der Welt. Durch relativen Wasserüberfluß leiden auch diese Enden an 
typischen Bewasserungsproblemen wie Staunässe und Versalzung in den Böden (nebst 
periodischen Wassermangel). Ein zweiter Unterschied in Dynamik zwischen Wasserverbraucher 
ist die Nutzung der Technologie. Die Geschichte der kollektiven Landwirtschaft unter strenger 
staatlicher Kontrolle hat ein Bewasserungsnetz hinterlassen das nicht statisch ist, aber eins das 
flexibel geblieben ist. Die Stabilität des Systems wurde garantiert durch politischer Macht, an statt 
robuster Technik. Zum Teil beeinflusst diese politische Macht immer noch die Wasserverteilung, 
vor allem in den Niveaus über  den WUAs. Mit dem Auseinanderfallen der kollektiven 
Bauernhöfen verfällt diese Macht aber auch teilweise an die WUAs.  
 
3.4  WUAs zwischen Bauern und Staat 
Die ehemaligen kollektiven Bauernhöfe sind die Bühne auf der die neuen fermers und die dekhans-
Haushalte ihr Bewasserungswasser teilen müssen. WUAs wurden errichtet an Stelle der 
ehemaligen kollektiven Bauernhöfe, als Verweisung an den international gepriesene Politiken 
Rahmen der Bauernselbstverwaltung. Die Usbekische Verwaltung, internationale Organisationen 
und Wissenschaftler haben diese neuen Institutionen dargestellt als die Lösung für de steigende 
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Effektivität des Wasserverbrauchs und als eine verbesserte Weise um Bauern Mitbestimmung zu 
geben. Die WUAs werden dargestellt als die Träger demokratischen Prinzipien. In Praxis aber 
sind die WUAs vom Staat verwaltete Organisationen, oder jedenfalls von Staat kontrolliert. Unter 
anderem spielen die WUAs eine wichtige Rolle in der Anwendung von (staatlicher) Kontrolle 
über die Wasserverteilung und über agrarische Produktion. Der Usbekische Staat hat mit den 
WUAs kein Trojanische Pferd in die demokratischen Reformen eingebracht. Eher hat er das 
WUA Model so interpretiert das es passt in den Plänen für die Kontrolle der landwirtschaftlichen 
Produktion. Durch den Gebrauch einer gleich(lautenden) Terminologie und formellen 
Strukturen, ist es dem Usbekischen Staat gelungen Sand in die Augen der internationalen 
Wassermanagementgesellschaft zu streuen.  
WUAs sind nicht nur lokale vom Staat kontrollierte Körper, sondern auch halbautonom. 
Ziel ist es so viel wie möglich Wasser zu bekommen für die Bauern im eigenen Gebiet und dies 
dann  Effizient zu verteilen. In dieser sozialen Arena richten die WUAs sich auf die Kontrolle des 
Wasserzuganges, während fermers (und zum Teil auch dekhans) Strategien entwickeln um Zugang 
zu Wasser zu bekommen. Diese Strategien sind abhängig von der (1) Produktionsweise, (2) das 
sozialpolitische Ansehen des betreffenden Bauers und seine Beziehungen und (3) die räumliche 
und technologische Situation auf dem Feld. Dank dem relativen Überfluss an Wasser sind diese 
Positionen nicht seht ausgeprägt (mehr in Zeiten der Wasserknappheit). Die meisten Strategien 
sind individuell, aber in manchen Fällen organisieren Bauern sich und nehmen Teil and Formen 
der gemeinsamen Aktion. Dies ist meist beiläufig und findet statt rund konkreten Sachen wie 
Unterhaltwerk oder Verteilungsprobleme. Darüber hinaus werden sie charakterisiert durch einen 
niedrigen Grad der Formalisierung. Es kommen vor in Situationen wo die WUA nicht anwesend 
ist, zum Beispiel wenn diese sich selber begrenzt auf die Kontrolle der Aspekte die für 
Baumwollproduzenten am wichtigsten sind. Obwohl diese gemeinsamen Handlungen nur 
beiläufig sind, sind sie aus zwei Gründe bemerkenswert. Erstens werden solche Aktionen im 
Algemeinen nicht von der Bevölkerung eingeläutet. Und zweitens, der Usbekische Staat erlaubt 
solche Formen der Organisation meistens nicht da sie eine Bedrohung bilden könnten für die 
politische Stabilität des Landes. Wenn diese, jetzt noch gelegentliche Formen sich konkretisieren 
und feste Systeme bilden würden, dann könnten sie sich zu einer Alternative für die WUAs 
entwickeln. Angesehen der derzeitigen Staatspolitik, die eine solche spontane Entwicklung von 
unten herab nicht zulassen wird, ist es unklar ob diese Entwicklung tatsächlich statt finden wird. 
 
3.5. Technologische Veränderung im Kontext einer Transition 
Die räumliche Einteilung des Khorezmisches Bewasserungs- und Drainagenetzes und die 
gebrauchte Technik sind stark gestaltet worden durch die sozialpolitischen Umstände in den 
diese Bewasserungslandwirtschaft entwickelt und erweitert wurde. Der spezifische 
sozialpolitische Kontext war der einer agrarischen Produktion und Bewasserung in der 
Sowjetzeit. Diese wurde gekennzeichnet durch kollektive Produktion und richtete sich auf 
maximalen Erlös durch Baumwollmonokultur und zentraler bürokratischer Verwaltung. Dieses 
Ziel und diese Handelsweise werden reflektiert in der noch anwesenden Technik und in der 
Einteilung des Systems. Mit den Worten von Bruno Latour: “Technologie ist eine fest gemachte 
Gesellschaft” (Latour, 1991). Technologische Objekte werden gezwungen bestimmte Rollen zu 
spielen, d.h. soziale Aufgaben werden an Artefakten weitergeleitet. Diese können diese Rollen 
fortdauernd erfüllen, auch wenn die Gesellschaft sich drastisch ändert. In den Jahren direkt nach 
der Unabhängigkeit änderten die Ziele und Formen der agrarischen Organisation in Usbekistan 
sich kaum. Die Reformen in 2005-2006 brachten weittragende Änderungen ein. Individuelle 
Risiken und Vorteile kamen überall im Bilde, und auch die Größe der landwirtschaftlichen 
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Betriebe änderte sich beträchtlich. Das änderte auch die Anforderungen an 
Wassermanagementtechnologien.  
Die Bewasserungstechniken aus der Sowjetzeit sind nicht leicht zu charakterisieren. Es 
sind riesige Kanalsysteme für Baumwollmonokultur. Die Hauptkanäle wurden überdimensional 
gebaut, mit Hinblick auf zukünftige Erweiterung des Bewasserungsgebietes. Aber das wichtigste 
Merkmal der Wasserkontrolle ist, dass die Exakte technische Einteilung irrelevant ist. 
Bewasserungstechnologie wurde funktionell genutzt um Wasser zu verteilen, aber die Kontrolle 
im sozialpolitischem Sinne wurde nicht an Artefakten delegiert. Die strenge staatliche Kontrolle 
des Anbaus und der agrarischen Praxis auf den Feldern, zusammen mit eine autoritären 
Kontrolle der Gesellschaft, ein Minimum an individuellem Interesse an mehr Wasser, und einen 
Überfluss an Wasser sorgten für eine Situation in der es keinen Grund gab für eine 
Bewasserungstechnik die Wassergebrauch einschränkte. Strukturen der Wasserverteilung in 
Khorezm sind kein Ausdruck umstrittener Wasserverteilung und –zuweisung wie das anderswo 
der Fall ist, und sie den Ausdruck komplizierten sozialen Beziehungen zwischen Wassernutzers 
und Verwaltern sind (siehe auch Mollinga, 1998). Die Bewasserungstechnologie und die 
räumliche Einteilung sind, wie dem auch sei, noch immer stark verbunden mit den 
sozialpolitischen Merkmalen des Sowjetischen und des postsowjetischen Produktionssystems. 
Die Weise in der das System entworfen ist, gibt Ausdruck an einer unbestreitbaren zentral 
verwaltende Kontrolle und Eigentümlichkeit des Zwecks. Dabei bewilligt es der Einteilung und 
dem hydraulischen System eine ganz pragmatische und instrumentalistische Arbeitsweise. Das 
Bewasserungs- und Drainagesystem wie es in Khorezm angetroffen wird, konnte nur dann und 
da errichtet werden.  
Die Reformen in 2005-2006 schafften individuelle Wasserverbraucher und das Interesse 
in gewinnbringende Erlöse vergrößerte sich. Damit vergrößerte sich auch das Interesse an 
zuverlässigem Wasserzugang. Eine soziale Dynamik zwischen den Verbrauchern entwickelte sich. 
Bauern fingen an die Bewasserungs- und Drainagetechnik zu manipulieren und zu verändern um 
so ihre Wasserzufuhr zu sichern. In der relativen Abwesendheit des Staates in Sachen Unterhalt 
und Ausbesserung auf dem Niveau des WUAs und darunter, investieren Bauern selber in 
technologische Änderungen. Ansprüche an Wasser ist auf Grund dieser Investierungen, ähnlich 
der Entstehung hydraulisches Eigentum, und die Gründung Wassergebrauchsrechte durch eigene 
Investitionen.  
In der Wasserverteilungsdynamik auf dem WUA-Niveau wird die Rolle der Technik 
immer wichtiger. Nicht nur in der Dynamik zwischen den Bauern, sondern auch zwischen dem 
Staat und die Bauern. Wenn der Staat die Kontrolle über Wasserverteilung behalten will, auch 
mittels den WUAs, sollte er mit neuen Kontrollstrategien kommen. Die Experimente mit 
volumetrischer Wasserpreisung kann gesehen werden als eine Reaktion auf eine sich neu 
entwickelnde Situation in der Wasser Streitthema wird. Volumetrische Wasserpreisung setzt 
detaillierte Wassermessung in den Feldern voraus. Das erfordert, unter anderem, die Installation 
Mess-Strukturen, spezialisierte Messprozesse und eine scharfe Beobachtung des Wasserstroms.   
 
